Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum post divortium vir et uxor possint reconciliari Whether after a separation, the husband and wife may be reconciled Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod post divortium vir et uxor non possint reconciliari. Regula est enim in jure: quod semel bene definitum est, nulla debet iteratione retractari. Sed judicio Ecclesiae definitum est quod debent separari. Ergo non possunt reconciliari ulterius. Obj. 1: To the sixth question, we proceed thus. It seems that after a separation, the husband and wife may not be reconciled. For this is the rule in the law: what has once been well determined should not be retracted by any appeal. But it has been determined by the judgment of the Church that they should be separated. Therefore, they cannot be reconciled afterward. Praeterea, si posset esse reconciliatio, praecipue videretur quod post poenitentiam uxoris vir teneatur eam recipere. Sed non tenetur; quia etiam uxor non potest per exceptionem proponere in judicio poenitentiam suam contra virum accusantem de fornicatione. Ergo nullo modo potest esse reconciliatio. Obj. 2: Furthermore, if a reconciliation were possible, it seems particularly that after the repentance of the wife the man would be bound to take her back. But he is not bound to do this, for even in the trial a wife cannot cite her own repentance as a defense against a husband accusing her of fornication. Therefore, in no way can they be reconciled. Praeterea, si posset esse reconciliatio, videretur quod uxor adultera teneretur redire ad virum ipsam revocantem. Sed non tenetur; quia jam separati sunt judicio Ecclesiae. Ergo, etc. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if a reconciliation were possible, it would seem that the adulterous wife would be bound to return to a husband who is inviting her back. But she is not bound to this; for they have already been separated by the judgment of the Church. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, si liceret reconciliare uxorem adulteram, in illo casu praecipue deberet fieri, quando vir post divortium invenitur adulterium committere. Sed in hoc casu non potest uxor cogere eum ad reconciliationem, cum juste sit divortium celebratum. Ergo nullo modo potest reconciliari. Obj. 4: Furthermore, if it is allowed to reconcile with an adulterous wife, it should especially happen when the husband is found to have commited adultery after the separation. But in that case the wife cannot force him to a reconciliation, since the separation was justly granted. And therefore there is no way for them to be reconciled. Praeterea, si vir adulter occulte dimittat per judicium Ecclesiae uxorem convictam de adulterio, non videtur juste factum divortium. Sed tamen vir non tenetur uxorem sibi reconciliare; quia uxor probare in judicio adulterium viri non potest. Ergo multo minus quando divortium juste est celebratum, reconciliatio fieri potest. Obj. 5: Furthermore, if a secretly adulterous husband sends away his wife, convicted of adultery by the judgment of the Church, the separation does not seem to be justly done. But nonetheless the man is not bound to be reconciled with his wife; for the wife cannot prove the adultery of the husband in court. Therefore, much less when the separation is justly granted can a reconciliation take place. Sed contra est quod dicitur 1 Corinth. 7, 2: si discesserit, manere innuptam, aut viro suo reconciliari. On the contrary (1), it says in 1 Corinthians 7:11: if she has left, she must remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her own husband. Praeterea, vir poterit eam non dimittere post fornicationem. Ergo eadem ratione potest eam reconciliare sibi. Furthermore (2), the husband need not have sent her away after the fornication. Therefore, by the same reasoning he can reconcile her to himself. Respondeo dicendum, quod si uxor post divortium de peccato poenitentiam agens emendata fuerit, potest eam sibi vir reconciliare. Si autem in peccato incorrigibilis maneat, non debet eam ad se assumere, eadem ratione qua non licebat eam nolentem a peccato desistere, retinere. I answer that, if after the separation the wife has amended her life and done penance for her sin, her husband can reconcile with her. But if she remains incorrigible in sin, he should not take her back to himself, by the same reasoning by which he was not permitted to retain her when she did not wish to cease sinning. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sententia Ecclesiae divortium celebrantis non fuit cogens ad separationem; sed licentiam praebens; et ideo absque retractatione praecedentis sententiae potest reconciliatio sequi. Reply Obj. 1: The sentence of the Church granting a separation did not compel a separation, but only granted permission. Therefore, without retraction of this sentence a reconciliation can take place. Ad secundum dicendum, quod poenitentia uxoris debet inducere virum ut uxorem fornicantem non accuset, aut dimittat. Sed tamen non potest ad hoc cogi, nec potest per poenitentiam uxor eum ab accusatione repellere; quia cessante culpa et quantum ad actum et quantum ad maculam, adhuc manet aliquid de reatu; et cessante etiam reatu quo ad Deum, adhuc manet reatus quo ad poenam humano judicio inferendam; quia homo non videt cor sicut Deus. Reply Obj. 2: The repentance of the wife should induce the husband not to accuse or to send away the wife who fornicated. But nevertheless, he cannot be forced to this, nor can the wife through her repentance prevent him from making the accusation: for in the person who withdraws from sin as regards both the act of sin and the stain, something still remains of the culpability. And even someone having no more culpability before God may remain liable to penalty under human judgment. For man does not see the heart as God does. Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod inducitur in favorem alicujus, non facit ei praejudicium; unde, cum divortium sit inductum in favorem viri, non aufert ei jus petendi debitum, vel revocandi uxorem; unde uxor tenetur ei reddere, et ad eum redire si fuerit revocata, nisi de licentia ejus votum continentiae emiserit. Reply Obj. 3: What is introduced in someone’s favor does not prejudice any of his rights; therefore, when separation is granted in the husband’s favor, it does not take away his right to ask for the marital debt, or to take back his wife. For this reason the wife is bound to render it to him, and to return to him if she is invited, unless with his permission she has taken a vow of continence. Ad quartum dicendum, quod propter adulterium quod vir prius innocens post divortium committit, secundum rigorem juris non debet cogi ad recipiendum uxorem adulteram: prius tamen secundum aequitatem juris judex ex officio suo debet eum cogere ut caveat periculo animae ejus et scandalo aliorum, quamvis uxor non possit reconciliationem petere. Reply Obj. 4: According to the strict interpretation of the law, a formerly innocent husband should not be forced to take back his adulterous wife because of the adultery which he committed after the separation. But in the interest of justice, the judge by reason of his office should urge him to be careful of the danger to his soul and the scandal to others, although the wife cannot request a reconciliation. Ad quintum dicendum, quod si adulterium viri sit occultum, per hoc non aufertur jus excipiendi contra accusationem viri uxori adulterae, quamvis desit sibi probatio; et ideo peccat vir divortium petens; et si post sententiam de divortio uxor petat debitum vel reconciliationem, vir tenetur ad utrumque. Reply Obj. 5: If the adultery of the husband is hidden, it does not remove the adulterous wife’s right of bringing it as a defense against the accusation of the husband, although the proof may be lacking to her. Therefore, the husband sins by requesting a separation; and if after the granting of separation the wife should request the debt or a reconciliation, the husband is bound to both. Expositio textus Exposition of the Text Patronus est turpitudinis qui celat crimen uxoris. Contra, Prov. 11, 13: fidelis est qui celat crimen amici. Et dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur quando celatio non est in praejudicium correctionis; alias celans patrocinium turpitudini praestat. “He is a fosterer of turpitude, who hides his wife’s crime.” Against this, Proverbs 11:13: Faithful is the one who conceals the crime of his friend. And it must be said that this is to be understood when the concealment is not in prejudice of correction; otherwise, the one who conceals offers his protection to the disgrace. Solet quaeri, an valeat duci in conjugium quae prius est polluta per adulterium. Sciendum, quod plura sunt crimina quae propter sui enormitatem impediunt matrimonium contrahendum. Primum est incestus; secundum, uxoricidium, tertium rapina alienae sponsae; quartum, quando aliquis insidiando matrimonio filium proprium de sacro fonte suscepit; quintum interfecit presbyterum; sextum, quando aliquis peragit poenitentiam solemnem. Non tamen propter crimina interimitur matrimonium contractum. Sed tamen sunt quaedam crimina quae dirimunt matrimonium contractum. Unum est, quando aliquis cum aliqua conjugata concubuit, et ex hoc machinatur in mortem viri cum effectu; tunc enim ad invicem contrahere non debent; et si contraxerint, separantur. Secundum est, quando praestat fidem adulterae quod ducet eam uxorem. Sed hoc intelligendum est quando tam adulter quam adultera sciebat impedimentum; alias matrimonium non dirimeretur postquam contractum esset. Tertium est, quando contrahit cum ea de facto; primum enim matrimonium facit quod non stat secundum; unde si primum non fuisset verum matrimonium, secundum staret. Sciendum etiam, quod in casu secundo et tertio, scilicet fide data de matrimonio contrahendo, etiam matrimonio contracto per verba de praesenti de facto, nisi fuerit ibi pollutio carnalis, non propter hoc dirimitur matrimonium sequens post mortem viri de novo contractum. It is also usual to ask whether a woman who has previously been polluted by adultery can then be taken in marriage. It should be known that there are many offences which because of their enormity prevent marriage from being contracted. The first is incest; the second, wife-murder; the third, kidnapping someone else’s bride; fourth, when someone conspires to receive his own godchild in marriage; fifth, killing a priest; sixth, when someone is completing solemn repentance. But the crimes mentioned do not invalidate a marriage that has been contracted. Yet there are certain crimes which void a marriage that has been contracted. One of these is when someone lies with a married woman, and because of this plots the death of her husband and brings it about. For in this instance the two should not contract with each other; and if they have contracted, they are separated. The second is when someone keeps his word to his partner in adultery that he will take her as his wife. But this is to be understood when the adulterous man as well as the adulterous woman knew the impediment; otherwise the marriage is not voided after it was contracted. The third is when someone has already contracted with a woman de facto, for the first marriage prevents the second one from being valid; and then, if the first was not a valid marriage, the second would stand. For it must be known that in the second and third cases, that is, when a promise is given that a marriage will be contracted, and when a marriage has been contracted de facto by words of the present, unless carnal defilement took place, a subsequent marriage newly contracted after the husband’s death is not voided on this account. Distinctio 36 Distinction 36 De impedimento conditionis servilis The impediment of slavery Postquam determinavit Magister de impotentia coeundi, per quam impeditur actus matrimonii, ne de facto omnino fieri possit; hic determinat de impedimento conditionis servilis, per quam impeditur actus matrimonii ne libere fiat; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de conditione servili; in secunda epilogat, continuans praecedentia ad sequentia, ibi: duo illa executi sumus, etc. After the Master has considered impotence to have intercourse, which de facto impedes the marital act from taking place at all, here he addresses the impediment of servile condition, which impedes the marital act from taking place freely; and this is divided into two parts: in the first he considers the servile condition, in the second he gives an epilogue, continuing from what he has said before to its consequences, at: we have set out two of those things by which . . . marriage can be dissolved, etc. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de impedimento conditionis servilis; in secunda de impedimento ex defectu aetatis, quia talis non differt a servo, quamdiu sub tutoribus est, Gal. 4, ibi: hic etiam sciendum, quod pueri ante quatuordecim annos, et puellae ante duodecim annos secundum leges matrimonium inire nequeunt. The first part is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the impediment of servile condition, in the second, the impediment of insufficient age, since such a person is no different from a slave, as long as he is under his guardians (Galatians 4), at: it is also to be known that, according to the laws, boys cannot enter into marriage before the age of fourteen years, and girls before twelve. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de servitute quae praecedit matrimonium; in secunda de servitute quae matrimonio superinducitur, ibi: illud etiam notandum est, etc. The first is divided into two: first, he considers when servitude precedes the marriage; second, he addresses slavery occurring after a marriage exists, at: it is also to be noted, etc. Prima in duas: in prima determinat de servitute matrimonium praecedente quae est ex altera tantum parte contrahentium; in secunda de illa quae est ex utraque parte, ibi: quaeritur etiam, si servus unius ancillam alterius acceperit, an sit inter eos conjugium. The first is divided into two parts: first, he considers the pre-existing slavery that exists only on the part of one of those contracting marriage; second, that servitude which is pre-existing in both parties, at: it is also asked if one man’s serf should take another man’s serving-girl, whether there is a marriage between them. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De impedimento servitudinis The impediment of slavery Hic quaeruntur quinque: Here five questions arise: primo, utrum conditio servitutis matrimonium impediat; first, whether the condition of slavery impedes marriage; secundo, utrum possit servus sine consensu domini matrimonium contrahere; second, whether a slave can contract marriage without the consent of his master; tertio, de servitute quae supervenit matrimonio; third, concerning servitude that is introduced during the marriage; quarto, utrum proles sequatur matrem; fourth, whether the children follow the condition of their mother; quinto, de defectu aetatis, utrum impediat matrimonium. fifth, whether a defect of age impedes marriage. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum conditio servitutis matrimonium impediat Whether the condition of slavery impedes marriage Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conditio servitutis non impediat matrimonium. Nihil enim impedit matrimonium nisi quod habet aliquam contrarietatem ad ipsum. Sed servitus non habet aliquam contrarietatem ad matrimonium; alias inter servos non possent esse conjugia. Ergo servitus non impedit matrimonium. Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that the condition of servitude does not impede marriage. For nothing impedes marriage except what is somehow contrary to it. But slavery has nothing in it contrary to marriage; otherwise, there could not be marriages between slaves. Therefore, slavery does not impede marriage. Praeterea, illud quod est contra naturam, non potest impedire illud quod est secundum naturam. Sed servitus est contra naturam; quia, sicut dicit Gregorius, contra naturam est hominem homini velle dominari; quod etiam patet ex hoc quod homini dictum est, Gen. 1, 26: ut praesit piscibus maris etc., non autem ut praesit homini. Ergo non potest impedire matrimonium, quod est naturale. Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is against nature cannot impede something that is according to nature. But slavery is against nature; for as Gregory says, it is against nature for a man to want to dominate another man, which is also evident from what is said to man in Genesis 1:26: let him be master of the fish of the sea, etc., but not that he should be master of a man. Therefore, it cannot impede marriage, which is natural.