Ad quartum dicendum, quod duplex est congregatio: quaedam oeconomica, sicut familia aliqua; et quaedam politica, sicut civitas aut regnum. Ille igitur qui praeest secundae congregationi, ut rex aut judex, potest infligere poenam et corrigentem personam, et exterminantem ad purgationem communitatis cujus curam gerit. Sed ille qui praeest in prima congregatione, sicut paterfamilias, non potest infligere nisi poenam corrigentem, quae non se extendit ultra terminos emendationis, quam transcendit poena mortis; et ideo vir qui sic praeest uxori, non potest ipsam interficere, sed alias castigare. Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of community. One is the domestic, like a family, and another is the political, like a city or kingdom. Therefore, the man who rules the second kind of community, such as a king or judge, can inflict a penalty both in order to correct a person and to expel for the purification of the community that he cares for. But that man who rules in the first kind of community, like the father of a family, can only inflict corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond the boundaries of reform, whereas the death penalty does cross these limits. And therefore, a husband, who is set over his wife in this way, cannot kill her, but only chastise her in other ways. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum uxoricidium impediat matrimonium Whether uxoricide impedes matrimony Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod uxoricidium non impediat matrimonium. Directius enim opponitur matrimonio adulterium quam homicidium. Sed adulterium non impedit matrimonium. Ergo nec homicidium uxoris. Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that uxoricide does not impede matrimony. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than homicide. But adultery does not impede marriage. Therefore, neither does the homicide of one’s wife. Praeterea, gravius peccatum est occidere matrem quam uxorem: quia nunquam licet verberare matrem, licet autem verberare uxorem. Sed occisio matris non impedit matrimonium. Ergo nec occisio uxoris. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is a graver sin to kill one’s mother than to kill one’s wife, for it is never permitted to strike one’s mother, but it is permitted to strike one’s wife. But killing one’s mother does not impede marriage. Therefore, neither does killing one’s wife. Praeterea, magis peccat qui uxorem alterius propter adulterium interficit, quam qui uxorem suam; inquantum minus habet de motivo, et minus ad eum spectat ejus correctio. Sed qui alienam uxorem occidit, non impeditur a matrimonio. Ergo nec ille qui propriam uxorem interficit. Obj. 3: Furthermore, someone who kills the wife of another because of adultery sins more than someone who kills his own wife, inasmuch as he has less motive, and her correction is less his business. But someone who kills the wife of another is not impeded from marriage. Therefore, neither is someone who kills his own wife. Praeterea, remota causa removetur effectus. Sed peccatum homicidii potest per poenitentiam removeri. Ergo impedimentum matrimonii quod ex eo causatur; et ita videtur quod post peractam poenitentiam non prohibeatur matrimonium contrahere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, an effect is removed by the removal of its cause. But the sin of homicide can be removed by penance. Therefore, so can the impediment to marriage which is caused by it; and thus it seems that after the completion of penance the man is not prohibited from contracting marriage. Sed contra est quod canon dicit: interfectores suarum conjugum ad poenitentiam redigendi sunt, quibus penitus denegatur conjugium. On the contrary (1), the canon states: someone who kills his own spouse is to be directed to the sacrament of penance, and marriage is completely denied to him. Praeterea, in eo in quo quis peccat, debet etiam puniri. Sed peccat contra matrimonium qui uxorem occidit. Ergo debet puniri, ut matrimonio privetur. Furthermore (2), in that matter in which someone sins, he should also be punished. But the man who slays his wife sins against marriage. Therefore, he should be punished by being deprived of marriage. Respondeo dicendum, quod uxoricidium ex statuto Ecclesiae matrimonium impedit. Sed quandoque impedit contrahendum, et non dirimit contractum; quando scilicet vir propter adulterium aut propter odium occidit uxorem; tamen si timetur de incontinentia ejus, potest cum eo dispensari per Ecclesiam, ut licite matrimonium contrahat. Quandoque etiam dirimit contractum, ut quando aliquis interficit uxorem suam, ut ducat eam cum qua moechatur: tunc enim efficitur illegitima persona simpliciter ad contrahendum cum illa; ita quod si de facto cum ea contraxerit matrimonium, dirimitur. Sed ex hoc non efficitur persona simpliciter illegitima respectu aliarum mulierum; unde si cum alia contraxerit, quamvis peccet contra statutum Ecclesiae faciens, tamen matrimonium contractum non dirimitur propter hoc. I answer that, uxoricide impedes marriage by the statute of the Church. But sometimes it impedes marriage from being contracted, yet does not annul the contract; for example, when a man kills his wife because of adultery or because of hatred, if his continence is feared for, he can nevertheless be granted a dispensation by the Church, so that he may contract marriage licitly. Sometimes it also voids the contract, as when someone kills his wife so that he may marry the one with whom he committed adultery: for then a person becomes simply ineligible for contracting marriage with that woman, so that if he does in fact contract marriage with her, it is invalidated. But the person is not made simply ineligible with respect to other women; therefore, if he has contracted with another woman, although he sins against the statutes of the Church by doing it, nonetheless the marriage contracted is not invalidated on this account. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homicidium et adulterium in aliquo casu impediunt matrimonium contrahendum et dirimunt contractum, sicut de uxoricidio hic dicitur, et de adulterio, ut habitum est supra, dist. 35. Vel dicendum, quod uxoricidium est contra substantiam conjugii, sed adulterium est contra bonum fidei ei debitae; et sic adulterium non est magis contra matrimonium quam uxoricidium; et ita ratio procedit ex falsis. Reply Obj. 1: Homicide and adultery in certain cases impede marriage from being contracted and void the contract, as is here said of uxoricide, and as was said of adultery above in Distinction 35. Or it may be said that uxoricide is against the substance of the union, but adultery is against the good of fidelity owed it. And thus adultery is not more against marriage than uxoricide; and so the argument proceeds from false premises. Ad secundum dicendum, quod simpliciter loquendo, gravius peccatum est occidere matrem quam uxorem, et magis contra naturam: quia naturaliter homo matrem reveretur; et ideo minus inclinatur ad interfectionem matris, et pronior est ad interfectionem uxoris; ad cujus pronitatis repressionem uxoricidis est matrimonium ab Ecclesia interdictum. Reply Obj. 2: Simply speaking, it is a graver sin to kill one’s mother than one’s wife, and more against nature; for a man naturally reveres his mother, and therefore, he is less inclined to kill her, and more prone to killing his wife; and for the repression of this proneness the marriage of a wife-killer is forbidden by the Church. Ad tertium dicendum, quod talis non peccat contra matrimonium, sicut ille qui propriam uxorem interficit; et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 3: Such a person does not sin against marriage as the man does who kills his wife; therefore, it is not the same. Ad quartum dicendum, quod non est necessarium quod deleta culpa deleatur omnis poena, sicut de irregularitate patet: non enim poenitentia restituit in pristinam dignitatem, quamvis possit restituere in pristinum statum gratiae, ut supra, dist. 14, dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: It is not necessary that when guilt is blotted out, all penalty is blotted out as well, as is evident from the case of irregularity. For penance has not restored one to one’s original dignity, although it may restore one to a pristine state of grace, as was said above in Distinction 14. Expositio textus Exposition of the Text Uxorem virginem, etc. Intelligitur sub hypothesi; idest, si ad clericatum redire desiderat ad sacerdotium promovendus. “A virgin wife.” This is understood as a hypothesis; that is, if a man about to advance to the priesthood desires to return to the clerical state. Sancta Dei Ecclesia gladium non habet, etc. Contra est quod Bernardus dicit ad Eugenium, quod Ecclesia utrumque gladium habet. Et dicendum, quod habet spiritualem tantum quantum ad executionem sua manu exercendam; sed habet etiam temporalem quantum ad ejus jussionem: quia ejus nutu extrahendus est, ut dicit Bernardus. “The holy Church of God is never bound by worldly laws, and has no sword apart from the spiritual one.” Against this is what Bernard says to Eugene, that the Church has both swords. And it should be said that the Church has only the spiritual sword with regard to what must be done by her own hand; but she also has the temporal sword as regards command over it: for at her bidding it must be unsheathed, as Bernard says. Distinctio 38 Distinction 38 De impedimento voti On religious vows Postquam determinavit Magister de impedimento ordinis, hic determinat de impedimento voti; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima ostendit quomodo impeditur a matrimonio contrahendo per votum quo Deo se obligat; in secunda quomodo impeditur a matrimonio per aliud matrimonium jam contractum, quo se homo uxori obligavit, ibi: cum vir et mulier, etc. After the Master has considered the impediment of orders, here he considers the impediment of religious vows; and this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how someone is impeded from contracting marriage through a vow by which he obliges himself to God; in the second, how a marriage is impeded by another marriage already contracted, by which a man has obliged himself to a wife, where he states: when a husband and wife are lawfully united, etc. Prima in tres: in prima ostendit quid sit votum; in secunda distinguit multiplex votum, ibi: sciendum vero, quod votorum aliud est commune, aliud singulare; in tertia ostendit quod votum et qualiter matrimonium impedit, ibi: qui privatum faciunt votum continentiae, matrimonium contrahere non debent. The first part is divided into three: first, he shows what a vow is; in the second, he distinguishes many kinds of vows, where he states: but it is to be known that one kind of vow is common, another singular; in the third, he shows which vow impedes marriage and how, where he says: those who make a private vow of continence must not contract marriage. Et haec pars dividitur in duas: in prima ostendit quod votum continentiae impedit matrimonium; in secunda ostendit quid agendum sit cum eis qui post votum nupserint, ibi: de virginibus non velatis si deviaverint . . . tale decretum habemus. And this part is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that a vow of continence impedes marriage; in the second, he shows what is to be done with those who marry after such a vow, at: “concerning virgins not [yet] veiled, if they should change their purpose, we have a decree . . .” Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit qui debent agere poenitentiam; secundo objicit in contrarium, ibi: non est hic praetermittendum quod Innocentius Papa de viduis et puellis decrevit. And concerning this he does three things: first, he shows that they should do penance; second, he objects to the contrary, at: nor ought we to omit here what Innocent decreed concerning widows and girls. Cum vir et mulier etc., hic determinat de alio impedimento matrimonii, quod supra dictum est ligamen; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima ostendit quod matrimonium praecedens dum stat, impedit ab alio matrimonio contrahendo; in secunda ostendit quomodo adhuc matrimonio stante, potest esse conjunctio secundi matrimonii sine peccato, quamvis non sit verum matrimonium, ibi: hic quaeritur de illis feminis quae putantes viros suos interemptos, vel in captivitate, vel ab iniqua dominatione nunquam liberandos, in aliorum conjugia transierunt. When a husband and wife are lawfully united. Here he addresses the other impediment to marriage, which was called above ‘previous ties’. And this is divided into two parts: in the first he shows that while a preceding marriage stands, it impedes another marriage from being contracted; in the second, he shows how even with a marriage as yet standing, the union of a second marriage can exist without sin, although it is not a valid marriage, at: here it is asked concerning those women who, believing that their husbands have been killed in captivity or will never be freed from an iniquitous domination, have passed on to other marriages. Et haec in duas secundum duos casus quos ponit. Secunda pars incipit ibi: sed si quis relicta in patria sua uxore, in longinquam abiens regionem, aliam ducat uxorem, etc. And he sets forth these things in two parts according to two cases. The second part begins at: but if a man, who has left his wife in his own country, goes to a far region and marries another, etc. Hic est duplex quaestio: prima de voto. Secunda de scandalo, quod alicui voto adjungitur, ut in littera dicitur. De ligaminis enim impedimento idem est quaerere quod de pluralitate uxorum, et de indivisibilitate matrimonii, de quibus, dist. 33, dictum est. Here there are two questions: first, concerning the vow; second, concerning scandal, which is connected with some vows, as it states in the text. To ask about the impediment of previous ties is the same as to ask about multiple wives, and about the indissolubility of matrimony, which was discussed in Distinction 33. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De voto On religious vows Circa primum quaeruntur quinque: Concerning the first question, five questions arise: primo, de voto secundum se; first, concerning the vow in itself; secundo, de voti divisione; second, concerning the division of vows; tertio, de voti obligatione; third, concerning the obligation of a vow; quarto, de voti dispensatione; fourth, concerning dispensation from a vow; quinto, de velatione virginum, quae fit in signum cujusdam voti. fifth, on the veiling of virgins, which is done as a certain sign of the vow. Articulus 1 Article 1 De voto secundum se Concerning the vow in itself