Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum si alter conjugum infidelium convertatur ad fidem sine altero, possit in eodem matrimonio commanere If one of two unbelieving spouses should convert to the faith without the other, whether he may remain in the same marriage Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod conjux conversus ad fidem non possit commanere cum uxore infideli nolente converti, cum qua in infidelitate contraxerat. Ubi enim est idem periculum, debet eadem cautela adhiberi. Sed propter periculum subversionis fidei prohibetur ne fidelis cum infideli contrahat. Cum ergo idem periculum sit, si fidelis commaneat cum infideli, cum qua prius contraxerat, et adhuc majus, quia neophiti facilius pervertuntur quam illi qui sunt nutriti in fide; videtur quod fidelis post conversionem non possit commanere cum uxore infideli. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that a husband who has converted to the faith cannot remain with an unbelieving wife who does not wish to convert, with whom he contracted during his unbelief. For where there is the same danger, the same precautions should be applied. But because of the danger of subversion of the faith, it is forbidden that a member of the faithful should contract with an unbeliever. Therefore, since there is the same danger if a member of the faithful remains with an unbeliever with whom he contracted before, and even more so, since neophytes are more easily subverted than those who are nourished in the faith; it seems that a member of the faithful cannot remain with an unbelieving wife after his conversion. Praeterea, causa 28, qu. 1, dicitur: non potest infidelis in ejus conjunctione permanere quae jam in Christianam translata est fidem. Ergo fidelis habet necesse uxorem infidelem dimittere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Case 28, Question 1, it says, an unbeliever cannot remain in a union with a woman who has already converted to the Christian faith. Therefore, a member of the faithful must necessarily send away an unbelieving wife. Praeterea, matrimonium quod inter fideles contrahitur, est perfectius quam illud quod contrahitur inter infideles. Sed si fideles contrahant in gradu prohibito ab Ecclesia, dissolvitur eorum matrimonium. Ergo et infidelium; et ita vir fidelis non potest commanere cum uxore infideli, ad minus quando cum ea in infidelitate contraxit in gradu prohibito. Obj. 3: Furthermore, a marriage that is contracted between members of the faithful is more perfect than one that is contracted between unbelievers. But if the faithful contract marriage in a degree [of consanguinity] prohibited by the Church, their marriage is dissolved. Therefore, also among unbelievers; and so a believing man cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at least when he has contracted with her in a prohibited degree of consanguinity. Praeterea, aliquis infidelis habet quandoque plures uxores secundum ritum suae legis. Si ergo potest commanere cum illis cum quibus in infidelitate contraxit, videtur quod possit etiam post conversionem plures uxores retinere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, sometimes a certain unbeliever has multiple wives according to the rite of his own law. Therefore, if he can remain with the woman with whom he contracted in his unbelief, it seems that after his conversion he could also retain several wives. Praeterea, potest contingere quod repudiata una uxore aliam duxerit, et in illo matrimonio existens convertatur. Ergo videtur quod saltem in hoc casu non possit cum uxore quam de novo habet, commanere. Obj. 5: Furthermore, it can happen that having divorced one wife, a man takes another, and while he remains in that marriage, he is converted. Therefore, it seems that at least in this case he cannot remain with his new wife. Sed contra est quod apostolus, 1 Corinth. 7, consulit quod commaneant. On the contrary (1), in 1 Corinthians 7:12, the Apostle counsels that they remain together. Praeterea, nullum impedimentum superveniens matrimonio, tollit ipsum. Sed matrimonium erat verum, cum uterque infidelis erat. Ergo quando alter convertitur, non dirimitur matrimonium per hoc; et ita videtur quod possint licite commanere. Furthermore (2), no impediment arising after marriage can destroy it. But the marriage was valid when both were unbelievers. Therefore, when one or the other is converted, the marriage is not invalidated by that fact; and so it seems that they can licitly remain together. Respondeo dicendum, quod fides ejus qui est in matrimonio, non solvit, sed perficit matrimonium. Unde cum inter infideles sit verum matrimonium, ut ex dictis patet, per hoc quod alter convertitur ad fidem, non ex hoc ipso vinculum matrimonii solvitur; sed aliquando, vinculo matrimonii manente, solvitur matrimonium quantum ad cohabitationem et debiti solutionem; in quo pari passu currunt infidelitas et adulterium, quia utrumque est contra bonum prolis. Unde sicut se habet in potestate dimittendi adulteram vel commanendi cum ea; ita se habet in potestate dimittendi infidelem vel commanendi cum ea. Potest enim vir innocens libere cum adultera commanere spe correctionis; non autem si in adulterii peccato fuerit obstinata, ne videatur patronus turpitudinis, ut supra, dist. 35, qu. 1, art. 2, dictum est, quamvis etiam cum spe correctionis possit eam libere dimittere. Similiter fidelis conversus potest cum infideli manere cum spe conversionis si eam in infidelitate obstinatam non viderit, et bene facit commanendo; tamen non tenetur; et de hoc est consilium apostoli. I answer that, the faith of the one who is in the marriage does not dissolve, but rather perfects the marriage. For this reason, since there is a valid marriage between unbelievers, as is clear from what has been said, the marriage bond is not dissolved by the fact that one converts to the faith. But sometimes, although the marriage bond endures, the marriage is dissolved as far as living together and rendering the debt are concerned; for unbelief and adultery parallel each other, for either one is against the good of children. Therefore, just as a man has the power to put away an adulterous wife or to remain with her, so also someone has the power of sending away an unbelieving wife or remaining with her. For an innocent man can freely remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of correction, but not if she was obstinate in the sin of adultery, or he might seem to approve her baseness, as was said above in Distinction 35, Question 1, Article 2; although he is also free to put her away with the hope of correction. In the same way, a believer who has converted can remain with an unbeliever in the hope of conversion, if he has not seen her obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well to remain. However, he is not bound to, and this is what the counsel of the Apostle concerns. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod facilius impeditur aliquid fiendum quam destruatur quod rite factum est; et ideo multa sunt quae impediunt matrimonium contrahendum, si praecedant, quae tamen ipsum non possunt dissolvere, si sequantur; sicut de affinitate patet; et similiter dicendum est de disparitate cultus. Reply Obj. 1: It is easier to prevent something from being done than to destroy what was done correctly; and therefore there are many things that impede marriage from being contracted, if they precede it, which nevertheless are not able to dissolve it, if they follow it, as is clear in the case of affinity; and the same thing is to be said of disparity of cult. Ad secundum dicendum, quod in primitiva Ecclesia tempore apostolorum passim convertebantur ad fidem et Judaei et gentiles; et ideo tunc vir fidelis poterat habere probabilem spem de conversione uxoris, etiam si conversionem non promitteret. Postmodum autem, tempore procedente, Judaei sunt magis obstinati, et gentes adhuc intrabant ad fidem; sicut tempore martyrum, et temporibus Constantini imperatoris, et circa tempora illa; et ideo tunc non erat tutum fideli cum uxore infideli Judaea cohabitare; nec erat spes de conversione ejus, sicut erat spes de conversione uxoris gentilis; et ideo tunc fidelis conversus poterat cohabitare cum gentili, sed non cum Judaea, nisi conversionem promitteret; et secundum hoc loquitur decretum illud. Sed nunc pari passu ambulant utrique, scilicet gentiles et Judaei, quia utrique obstinati sunt; et ideo nisi uxor infidelis converti velit, non permittitur ei cohabitare, sive sit gentilis, sive Judaea. Reply Obj. 2: In the primitive church at the time of the apostles, both Jews and gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith; and thus at that time a believing man could have probable hope of his wife’s conversion, even if she did not promise to convert. Afterward, however, as time went on, the Jews became more obstinate, and gentiles still entered the faith, as in the time of the martyrs, and the time of Emperor Constantine, and those times around then. And so at that time it was not safe for a believer to live together with an unbelieving Jewish wife; nor was there the same hope for her conversion as there was hope for the conversion of a gentile wife. And therefore, at that time a converted believer could live together with a gentile, but not with a Jewish wife, unless she promised to convert; and it is according to this that the decree speaks. But now both Jews and gentiles tread the same path, for both are obstinate; and therefore unless an unbelieving wife wants to convert, it is not permitted to live together with her, whether she be gentile or Jewish. Ad tertium dicendum, quod infideles non baptizati non sunt astricti statutis Ecclesiae, sed sunt astricti statutis juris divini; et ideo si contraxerint aliqui infideles in gradibus secundum legem divinam prohibitis, Levit. 18, sive uterque, sive alter ad fidem convertatur, non possunt in tali matrimonio commanere; si autem contraxerint in gradibus prohibitis per statutum Ecclesiae, possunt commanere, si uterque convertatur, vel si uno converso spes sit de conversione alterius. Reply Obj. 3: Unbaptized non-believers are not bound by the statutes of the Church, but they are bound by the statutes of divine law; and so if certain unbelievers had contracted in degrees prohibited by divine law in Leviticus 18, and either one or both had converted to the faith, they could not remain in such a marriage. If, however, they had contracted in degrees prohibited by the statute of the Church, they could remain together, if both converted, or if one converted and there was hope of the other’s conversion. Ad quartum dicendum, quod habere plures uxores est contra legem naturae, ut supra, dist. 33, qu. 1, art. 1, dictum est, cui etiam infideles sunt astricti; et ideo non est verum matrimonium infidelis, nisi cum illa cum qua primo contraxit. Unde si ipse cum omnibus suis uxoribus convertatur, potest cum prima cohabitare, et alias debet abjicere. Si autem prima converti noluerit, et aliqua aliarum convertatur, idem jus habet contrahendi cum illa de novo, quod cum alia haberet; de quo post dicetur. Reply Obj. 4: As was said above in Distinction 33, Question 1, article 1, to have many wives is against the law of nature, which unbelievers are also bound by. And therefore, the only valid marriage that an unbeliever has is with the woman with whom he first contracted. Thus, if he is converted with all of his wives, he can live together with the first, and he must abjure the others. But if the first refused to be converted, and some one of the others did convert, he has the same right to contract with her anew that he had of contracting with the other; and we will speak of this further on. Ad quintum dicendum, quod repudium uxoris, ut supra, dist. 33, dictum est, est contra legem naturae; unde non licet infideli uxorem repudiare. Et ideo si convertatur postquam una repudiata alteram duxit, idem judicium est de hoc, et de illo qui plures uxores habebat; quia tenetur primam quam repudiaverat, accipere, si converti voluerit, et aliam abjicere. Reply Obj. 5: Divorcing one’s wife is against the law of nature, as was said above in Distinction 33. And therefore it is not permitted to an unbeliever to divorce his wife. And so, if he is converted after he has divorced one wife and married another, the same judgment is made of him as of someone who had several wives. For he is bound to take back the first wife whom he divorced, if she wishes to convert, and to abjure the other. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum possit uxorem infidelem relinquere Whether one may leave an unbelieving wife Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fidelis conversus non possit uxorem infidelem dimittere, volentem cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris. Majus enim est vinculum viri ad mulierem quam servi ad dominum. Sed servus conversus non absolvitur a vinculo servitutis, ut patet 1 Cor. 7, et 1 Timoth. 6. Ergo et vir fidelis non potest uxorem infidelem dimittere. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that a believer who has converted may not send away an unbelieving wife who wishes to live together without offense to the Creator. For the bond of a man to his wife is greater than that of a slave to his master. But a slave who has converted is not absolved of the bond of his servitude, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7:21 and 1 Timothy 6. Therefore, neither can a believing man send away his unbelieving wife. Praeterea, nullus potest alteri praejudicium facere sine ejus consensu. Sed uxor infidelis habebat jus in corpore viri infidelis. Si ergo per hoc quod vir ad fidem convertitur, mulier praejudicium pati posset, ut libere dimitteretur; non posset vir converti ad fidem sine consensu uxoris, sicut nec potest ordinari, aut vovere continentiam, sine consensu uxoris. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one can prejudice the good of another without that person’s consent. But an unbelieving wife had the right to the body of her unbelieving husband. Therefore, if by the fact that her husband converted to the faith the wife could suffer detriment, such that she might freely be sent away, then a man could not convert to the faith without his wife’s consent, as neither can he be ordained, or vow continence, without his wife’s consent. Praeterea, si aliquis contrahat cum ancilla scienter, sive sit servus sive liber, non potest propter diversam conditionem ipsam dimittere. Cum ergo vir quando contraxit cum infideli, sciverit eam esse infidelem; videtur a simili quod non possit eam propter infidelitatem dimittere. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if someone knowingly contracts with a slave-girl, whether he be a slave or a free man himself, he cannot put her away because of that very difference of condition. Therefore, since the man knew the woman to be an unbeliever when he contracted with her, it seems that by the same token he may not send her away because of her unbelief. Praeterea, pater tenetur ex debito procurare salutem prolis. Sed si discederet ab uxore infideli, filii communes matri remanerent, quia partus sequitur ventrem; et sic essent in periculo salutis. Ergo non potest uxorem infidelem licite dimittere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a father is bound in duty to attend to the salvation of his children. But if he left his unbelieving wife, their sons would remain with their mother, for “birth follows the womb.” And thus their salvation would be in danger. Therefore, he cannot licitly send away an unbelieving wife. Praeterea, adulter non potest adulteram dimittere, etiam postquam de adulterio poenitentiam egit. Ergo, si sit idem judicium de adultero et infideli; nec infidelis infidelem, etiam postquam ad fidem conversus est. Obj. 5: Furthermore, an adulterous man cannot put away an adulterous woman, even after he has done penance for the adultery. Therefore, if the same judgment be made of the adulterer and the unbeliever, then neither may an unbeliever send away an unbeliever, even after he has converted to the faith. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, 1 Cor. 7. On the contrary (1), there is what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:15. Praeterea, adulterium spirituale est gravius quam carnale. Sed propter carnale adulterium vir potest uxorem relinquere quantum ad cohabitationem. Ergo multo fortius propter infidelitatem, quae est adulterium spirituale. Furthermore (2), spiritual adultery is graver than carnal adultery. But because of carnal adultery, a man can cease to live with his wife. Therefore, even more so because of unbelief, which is spiritual adultery. Respondeo dicendum, quod homini secundum aliam et aliam vitam diversa competunt et expediunt; et ideo qui moritur priori vitae, non tenetur ad illa ad quae in priori vita tenebatur; et inde est quod ille qui in vita saeculari existens, aliqua vovit, non tenetur illa, quando mundo moritur vitam religiosam assumens, perficere. Ille autem qui ad baptismum accedit, regeneratur in Christo, et priori vitae moritur, cum generatio unius sit corruptio alterius; et ideo liberatur ab obligatione qua uxori tenebatur reddere debitum, et ei cohabitare non tenetur quando converti non vult, quamvis in aliquo casu libere id posset facere, ut dictum est; sicut et religiosus libere perficere potest vota quae in saeculo fecit, si non sunt contra religionem suam, quamvis ad ea non teneatur, ut dictum est in praecedenti dist. I answer that, different things are fitting and expedient for a man according to one life than according to another. And so one who dies to the first life is not bound to those things that he was bound to in the first life; and so it happens that a man who vows certain things while living a secular life is not bound to fulfill those things when he dies to the world by assuming religious life. But someone who receives baptism is regenerated in Christ and dies to the previous life, since the generation of one is the corruption of the other. And thus he is freed from the obligation by which he is bound to render the debt to his wife, and he is not bound to live with her if he does not wish, once he has converted, although in some cases he might freely do so, as was said; just as a religious might freely fulfill vows he made while in the world, if they are not against his religious life, although he is not bound to fulfill them, as was said in the preceding distinction. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod servire non est aliquid incompetens Christianae religionis perfectioni, quae maxime humilitatem profitetur; sed obligatio matrimonii aliquid derogat perfectioni Christianae, cujus vitae summum statum continentes possident; et ideo non est simile de utroque. Et praeterea unus conjugum non obligatur alteri quasi possessio ejus, sicut domino servus, sed per modum societatis cujusdam, quae non congrue est fidelis ad infidelem, ut patet 1 Corinth. 7; et ideo non est simile de servo et conjuge. Reply Obj. 1: To be a slave is not something incompatible with the perfection of the Christian religion, which professes the greatest humility. But the obligation of marriage detracts something from Christian perfection, whose highest state of life is possessed by those who are continent. And thus the two things are not similar. And furthermore one spouse is not obliged to the other like his possession, as a slave is to his master, but in the mode of a partner of sorts, which is not a suitable way for a believer to relate to an unbeliever, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7; and therefore what concerns a slave and a spouse are not the same. Ad secundum dicendum, quod uxor non habebat jus in corpore viri nisi quamdiu in vita illa manebat in qua contraxerat; quia etiam mortuo viro uxor soluta est a lege viri, ut patet Rom. 7; et ideo, si postquam vir mutat vitam moriens priori vitae, ab ea discedat, nullum fit ei praejudicium. Transiens autem ad religionem, moritur tantum spirituali morte, non autem corporali; et ideo, si matrimonium sit consummatum, non potest vir sine consensu uxoris ad religionem transire; potest autem ante copulam carnalem, quando est tantum copula spiritualis. Sed ille qui ad baptismum accedit, corporaliter etiam, Christo consepelitur in mortem; et ideo a debito reddendo absolvitur etiam post matrimonium consummatum. Vel dicendum, quod ex culpa sua uxor praejudicium patitur, quae converti contemnit. Reply Obj. 2: The wife did not have the right to the body of her husband except for as long as he remained in that life in which he had contracted with her; for also when a husband dies, the wife is freed from the rule of her husband, as is clear from Romans 7:2. And therefore, if after a man changes life, dying to his previous life, he should go away from her, no detriment is done to her. But by entering religious life, he dies only a spiritual death, but not a bodily one. And so, if the marriage has been consummated, a man cannot enter religious life without the consent of his wife. But he can before the physical union, when there is only a spiritual union. But someone who receives baptism is buried in death with Christ, even bodily; and thus he is also absolved from rendering the debt even after the marriage is consummated. Or it can be said that the wife who holds the convert in contempt suffers detriment by her own fault. Ad tertium dicendum, quod disparitas cultus facit personam simpliciter illegitimam; non autem conditio servitutis, sed solum quando est ignorata; et ideo non est similis ratio de infideli et ancilla. Reply Obj. 3: Disparity of cult makes a person incapable of marriage simply speaking, but the condition of servitude does not, except when it is unknown; and so there is not the same reasoning about an unbeliever as about a slave-girl. Ad quartum dicendum, quod proles aut pervenit ad perfectam aetatem, et tunc poterit libere sequi patrem fidelem, vel matrem infidelem; vel est in minori aetate constituta; et tunc debet dari fideli, non obstante quod indiget matris obsequio ad educationem. Reply Obj. 4: The children have either arrived at the age of maturity, and then are able to freely follow either their believing father or their unbelieving mother; or else they are considered to be in the age of minority, and then they should be given to the believing parent, notwithstanding that their mother’s submission is necessary for their education. Ad quintum dicendum, quod adulter per poenitentiam non transit ad aliam vitam, sicut infidelis per baptismum; et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 5: An adulterer does not embark upon another life by penance, as an unbeliever does by baptism; and thus the argument is not similar. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum ea dimissa possit aliam ducere Whether, having put his wife away, one may marry another Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fidelis discedens ab uxore infideli, non possit aliam ducere in uxorem. Quia insolubilitas matrimonii est de ratione ipsius, cum repudium uxoris sit contra legem naturae, ut supra, distinc. 33, qu. 1, art. 1, dictum est. Sed inter infideles erat verum matrimonium. Ergo nullo modo potest illud matrimonium solvi. Sed manente vinculo matrimonii ad unam, non potest aliquis cum alia contrahere. Ergo fidelis discedens non potest cum alia contrahere. Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. It seems that a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife may not take another wife. For the indissolubility of marriage comes from its very nature, since the divorce of one’s wife is against the law of nature, as was said above in Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 1. But between unbelievers there was a valid marriage. Therefore, in no way can that marriage be dissolved. But as long as the bond of marriage to one person remains, a person cannot contract with another. Therefore, a believer who leaves cannot contract with another. Praeterea, crimen superveniens matrimonio non solvit matrimonium. Sed si mulier velit cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris, non est solutum vinculum matrimonii; quia vir non potest aliam ducere. Ergo peccatum uxoris quae non vult cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris, non solvit matrimonium, ut possit libere vir aliam uxorem ducere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, crime happening during the marriage does not dissolve marriage. But if the wife wishes to live together without affront to the Creator, the bond of marriage is not dissolved; for the man cannot take another wife. Therefore, the sin of the wife who does not wish to live together without affront to the Creator does not dissolve marriage such that a man might take another wife. Praeterea, vir et uxor sunt pares in vinculo matrimonii. Cum ergo uxori infideli non liceat vivente viro alium virum ducere, videtur quod nec fideli liceat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, man and wife are equals in the marriage bond. Therefore, since it is not permitted to an unbelieving wife to take another husband while her first husband is still alive, it seems that neither should it be permitted to the believing man. Praeterea, favorabilius est continentiae votum quam matrimonii contractus. Sed viro fideli uxoris infidelis non licet, ut videtur, votum continentiae emittere: quia tunc uxor fraudaretur matrimonio, si postmodum converteretur. Ergo multo minus licet ei matrimonium contrahere cum alia. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a vow of continence is more favorable than a contract of marriage. But as it seems, it is not permitted for the believing husband of an unbelieving wife to take a vow of continence: for then the wife is defrauded of her marriage, if afterward she should be converted. Therefore, much less is it permitted for him to contract marriage with another.