Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum possit uxorem infidelem relinquere Whether one may leave an unbelieving wife Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fidelis conversus non possit uxorem infidelem dimittere, volentem cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris. Majus enim est vinculum viri ad mulierem quam servi ad dominum. Sed servus conversus non absolvitur a vinculo servitutis, ut patet 1 Cor. 7, et 1 Timoth. 6. Ergo et vir fidelis non potest uxorem infidelem dimittere. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that a believer who has converted may not send away an unbelieving wife who wishes to live together without offense to the Creator. For the bond of a man to his wife is greater than that of a slave to his master. But a slave who has converted is not absolved of the bond of his servitude, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7:21 and 1 Timothy 6. Therefore, neither can a believing man send away his unbelieving wife. Praeterea, nullus potest alteri praejudicium facere sine ejus consensu. Sed uxor infidelis habebat jus in corpore viri infidelis. Si ergo per hoc quod vir ad fidem convertitur, mulier praejudicium pati posset, ut libere dimitteretur; non posset vir converti ad fidem sine consensu uxoris, sicut nec potest ordinari, aut vovere continentiam, sine consensu uxoris. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one can prejudice the good of another without that person’s consent. But an unbelieving wife had the right to the body of her unbelieving husband. Therefore, if by the fact that her husband converted to the faith the wife could suffer detriment, such that she might freely be sent away, then a man could not convert to the faith without his wife’s consent, as neither can he be ordained, or vow continence, without his wife’s consent. Praeterea, si aliquis contrahat cum ancilla scienter, sive sit servus sive liber, non potest propter diversam conditionem ipsam dimittere. Cum ergo vir quando contraxit cum infideli, sciverit eam esse infidelem; videtur a simili quod non possit eam propter infidelitatem dimittere. Obj. 3: Furthermore, if someone knowingly contracts with a slave-girl, whether he be a slave or a free man himself, he cannot put her away because of that very difference of condition. Therefore, since the man knew the woman to be an unbeliever when he contracted with her, it seems that by the same token he may not send her away because of her unbelief. Praeterea, pater tenetur ex debito procurare salutem prolis. Sed si discederet ab uxore infideli, filii communes matri remanerent, quia partus sequitur ventrem; et sic essent in periculo salutis. Ergo non potest uxorem infidelem licite dimittere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a father is bound in duty to attend to the salvation of his children. But if he left his unbelieving wife, their sons would remain with their mother, for “birth follows the womb.” And thus their salvation would be in danger. Therefore, he cannot licitly send away an unbelieving wife. Praeterea, adulter non potest adulteram dimittere, etiam postquam de adulterio poenitentiam egit. Ergo, si sit idem judicium de adultero et infideli; nec infidelis infidelem, etiam postquam ad fidem conversus est. Obj. 5: Furthermore, an adulterous man cannot put away an adulterous woman, even after he has done penance for the adultery. Therefore, if the same judgment be made of the adulterer and the unbeliever, then neither may an unbeliever send away an unbeliever, even after he has converted to the faith. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, 1 Cor. 7. On the contrary (1), there is what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:15. Praeterea, adulterium spirituale est gravius quam carnale. Sed propter carnale adulterium vir potest uxorem relinquere quantum ad cohabitationem. Ergo multo fortius propter infidelitatem, quae est adulterium spirituale. Furthermore (2), spiritual adultery is graver than carnal adultery. But because of carnal adultery, a man can cease to live with his wife. Therefore, even more so because of unbelief, which is spiritual adultery. Respondeo dicendum, quod homini secundum aliam et aliam vitam diversa competunt et expediunt; et ideo qui moritur priori vitae, non tenetur ad illa ad quae in priori vita tenebatur; et inde est quod ille qui in vita saeculari existens, aliqua vovit, non tenetur illa, quando mundo moritur vitam religiosam assumens, perficere. Ille autem qui ad baptismum accedit, regeneratur in Christo, et priori vitae moritur, cum generatio unius sit corruptio alterius; et ideo liberatur ab obligatione qua uxori tenebatur reddere debitum, et ei cohabitare non tenetur quando converti non vult, quamvis in aliquo casu libere id posset facere, ut dictum est; sicut et religiosus libere perficere potest vota quae in saeculo fecit, si non sunt contra religionem suam, quamvis ad ea non teneatur, ut dictum est in praecedenti dist. I answer that, different things are fitting and expedient for a man according to one life than according to another. And so one who dies to the first life is not bound to those things that he was bound to in the first life; and so it happens that a man who vows certain things while living a secular life is not bound to fulfill those things when he dies to the world by assuming religious life. But someone who receives baptism is regenerated in Christ and dies to the previous life, since the generation of one is the corruption of the other. And thus he is freed from the obligation by which he is bound to render the debt to his wife, and he is not bound to live with her if he does not wish, once he has converted, although in some cases he might freely do so, as was said; just as a religious might freely fulfill vows he made while in the world, if they are not against his religious life, although he is not bound to fulfill them, as was said in the preceding distinction. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod servire non est aliquid incompetens Christianae religionis perfectioni, quae maxime humilitatem profitetur; sed obligatio matrimonii aliquid derogat perfectioni Christianae, cujus vitae summum statum continentes possident; et ideo non est simile de utroque. Et praeterea unus conjugum non obligatur alteri quasi possessio ejus, sicut domino servus, sed per modum societatis cujusdam, quae non congrue est fidelis ad infidelem, ut patet 1 Corinth. 7; et ideo non est simile de servo et conjuge. Reply Obj. 1: To be a slave is not something incompatible with the perfection of the Christian religion, which professes the greatest humility. But the obligation of marriage detracts something from Christian perfection, whose highest state of life is possessed by those who are continent. And thus the two things are not similar. And furthermore one spouse is not obliged to the other like his possession, as a slave is to his master, but in the mode of a partner of sorts, which is not a suitable way for a believer to relate to an unbeliever, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 7; and therefore what concerns a slave and a spouse are not the same. Ad secundum dicendum, quod uxor non habebat jus in corpore viri nisi quamdiu in vita illa manebat in qua contraxerat; quia etiam mortuo viro uxor soluta est a lege viri, ut patet Rom. 7; et ideo, si postquam vir mutat vitam moriens priori vitae, ab ea discedat, nullum fit ei praejudicium. Transiens autem ad religionem, moritur tantum spirituali morte, non autem corporali; et ideo, si matrimonium sit consummatum, non potest vir sine consensu uxoris ad religionem transire; potest autem ante copulam carnalem, quando est tantum copula spiritualis. Sed ille qui ad baptismum accedit, corporaliter etiam, Christo consepelitur in mortem; et ideo a debito reddendo absolvitur etiam post matrimonium consummatum. Vel dicendum, quod ex culpa sua uxor praejudicium patitur, quae converti contemnit. Reply Obj. 2: The wife did not have the right to the body of her husband except for as long as he remained in that life in which he had contracted with her; for also when a husband dies, the wife is freed from the rule of her husband, as is clear from Romans 7:2. And therefore, if after a man changes life, dying to his previous life, he should go away from her, no detriment is done to her. But by entering religious life, he dies only a spiritual death, but not a bodily one. And so, if the marriage has been consummated, a man cannot enter religious life without the consent of his wife. But he can before the physical union, when there is only a spiritual union. But someone who receives baptism is buried in death with Christ, even bodily; and thus he is also absolved from rendering the debt even after the marriage is consummated. Or it can be said that the wife who holds the convert in contempt suffers detriment by her own fault. Ad tertium dicendum, quod disparitas cultus facit personam simpliciter illegitimam; non autem conditio servitutis, sed solum quando est ignorata; et ideo non est similis ratio de infideli et ancilla. Reply Obj. 3: Disparity of cult makes a person incapable of marriage simply speaking, but the condition of servitude does not, except when it is unknown; and so there is not the same reasoning about an unbeliever as about a slave-girl. Ad quartum dicendum, quod proles aut pervenit ad perfectam aetatem, et tunc poterit libere sequi patrem fidelem, vel matrem infidelem; vel est in minori aetate constituta; et tunc debet dari fideli, non obstante quod indiget matris obsequio ad educationem. Reply Obj. 4: The children have either arrived at the age of maturity, and then are able to freely follow either their believing father or their unbelieving mother; or else they are considered to be in the age of minority, and then they should be given to the believing parent, notwithstanding that their mother’s submission is necessary for their education. Ad quintum dicendum, quod adulter per poenitentiam non transit ad aliam vitam, sicut infidelis per baptismum; et ideo non est similis ratio. Reply Obj. 5: An adulterer does not embark upon another life by penance, as an unbeliever does by baptism; and thus the argument is not similar. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum ea dimissa possit aliam ducere Whether, having put his wife away, one may marry another Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fidelis discedens ab uxore infideli, non possit aliam ducere in uxorem. Quia insolubilitas matrimonii est de ratione ipsius, cum repudium uxoris sit contra legem naturae, ut supra, distinc. 33, qu. 1, art. 1, dictum est. Sed inter infideles erat verum matrimonium. Ergo nullo modo potest illud matrimonium solvi. Sed manente vinculo matrimonii ad unam, non potest aliquis cum alia contrahere. Ergo fidelis discedens non potest cum alia contrahere. Obj. 1: To the fifth question, we proceed thus. It seems that a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife may not take another wife. For the indissolubility of marriage comes from its very nature, since the divorce of one’s wife is against the law of nature, as was said above in Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 1. But between unbelievers there was a valid marriage. Therefore, in no way can that marriage be dissolved. But as long as the bond of marriage to one person remains, a person cannot contract with another. Therefore, a believer who leaves cannot contract with another. Praeterea, crimen superveniens matrimonio non solvit matrimonium. Sed si mulier velit cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris, non est solutum vinculum matrimonii; quia vir non potest aliam ducere. Ergo peccatum uxoris quae non vult cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris, non solvit matrimonium, ut possit libere vir aliam uxorem ducere. Obj. 2: Furthermore, crime happening during the marriage does not dissolve marriage. But if the wife wishes to live together without affront to the Creator, the bond of marriage is not dissolved; for the man cannot take another wife. Therefore, the sin of the wife who does not wish to live together without affront to the Creator does not dissolve marriage such that a man might take another wife. Praeterea, vir et uxor sunt pares in vinculo matrimonii. Cum ergo uxori infideli non liceat vivente viro alium virum ducere, videtur quod nec fideli liceat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, man and wife are equals in the marriage bond. Therefore, since it is not permitted to an unbelieving wife to take another husband while her first husband is still alive, it seems that neither should it be permitted to the believing man. Praeterea, favorabilius est continentiae votum quam matrimonii contractus. Sed viro fideli uxoris infidelis non licet, ut videtur, votum continentiae emittere: quia tunc uxor fraudaretur matrimonio, si postmodum converteretur. Ergo multo minus licet ei matrimonium contrahere cum alia. Obj. 4: Furthermore, a vow of continence is more favorable than a contract of marriage. But as it seems, it is not permitted for the believing husband of an unbelieving wife to take a vow of continence: for then the wife is defrauded of her marriage, if afterward she should be converted. Therefore, much less is it permitted for him to contract marriage with another. Praeterea, filius qui remanet in infidelitate, patre converso, amittit jus paternae hereditatis; et tamen si postea convertitur, redditur ei sua hereditas, etiam si alius in possessionem intravit. Ergo videtur a simili, quod si uxor fidelis postea convertatur, sibi sit reddendus vir suus, etiam si cum alia contraxerit; quod non posset esse, si secundum matrimonium esset verum. Ergo non potest contrahi cum alia. Obj. 5: Furthermore, a son who remains in unbelief once his father has converted loses the right of paternal inheritance; and nevertheless, if afterward he converts, his inheritance is restored to him, even if another person has come into possession of it. Therefore, it seems that similarly, if the wife of a believer converts afterward, her own husband is to be restored to her, even if he has since contracted with another; which could not be the case, if the second marriage were valid. Therefore he cannot contract with another. Sed contra, matrimonium non est ratum sine sacramento baptismi. Sed quod non est ratum, potest dissolvi. Ergo matrimonium in infidelitate contractum potest dissolvi; et ita soluto matrimoniali vinculo, licet viro alteram ducere uxorem. On the contrary (1), marriage is not ratified without the sacrament of baptism. But what is not ratified can be dissolved. Therefore, marriage contracted in unbelief can be dissolved; and thus once the marriage bond is dissolved, it is permitted for a man to take another wife. Praeterea, vir non debet cohabitare uxori infideli nolenti cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris. Si ergo non liceret ei aliam ducere, cogeretur continentiam servare; quod videtur inconveniens; quia sic ex conversione sua incommodum reportaret. Furthermore (2), a man should not live together with an unbelieving wife who does not wish to live together without affront to the Creator. If therefore it were not permitted to him to take another wife, he would be forced to keep continence, which seems unfitting, for it would mean that his conversion worked to his own disadvantage. Respondeo dicendum, quod quando alter conjugum ad fidem convertitur, altero in infidelitate remanente, distinguendum est. Quia si infidelis vult cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris, vel sine hoc quod ad infidelitatem inducat, potest fidelis libere discedere; sed discedens non potest alteri nubere. Si autem infidelis non velit cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris in verba blasphemiae prorumpens, et nomen Christi audire nolens; tunc si ad infidelitatem detrahere nitatur, vir fidelis discedens potest alteri per matrimonium copulari. I answer that, when one spouse is converted to the faith, while the other remains in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if the unbeliever wishes to live together without affront to the Creator, or without provoking the other to unbelief, the believer can freely leave, but he cannot marry another. But if the unbeliever, breaking forth in words of blasphemy and refusing to hear the name of Christ, does not wish to live together without affront to the Creator, then if she should endeavor to bring him back to unbelief, the believing husband can leave and be united with another in marriage. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod matrimonium infidelium imperfectum est, ut dictum est art. 2 hujus quaest. Sed matrimonium fidelium est perfectum, et ita est firmius. Semper autem firmius vinculum solvit minus firmum, si sit ei contrarium; et ideo matrimonium quod post in fide Christi contrahitur, solvit matrimonium quod prius in infidelitate contractum erat; unde matrimonium infidelium non est omnino firmum et ratum; sed ratificatur postmodum per fidem Christi. Reply Obj. 1: The marriage of unbelievers is incomplete, as was said in Article 2 of this question. But the marriage of believers is complete, and as such it is firmer. But the stronger bond always dissolves the less strong, if it be at odds with it. And thus the marriage that is contracted afterward in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage that had been contracted first in unbelief. For which reason, marriage of unbelievers is not absolutely firm and ratified. But it is ratified afterward by faith in Christ. Ad secundum dicendum, quod crimen uxoris nolentis cohabitare sine contumelia Creatoris absolvit virum a servitute qua tenebatur uxori, ut non posset ea vivente aliam ducere; sed nondum solvit matrimonium: quia si blasphema illa converteretur antequam ille aliud matrimonium contraheret, redderetur ei vir suus: sed solvitur per matrimonium sequens, ad quod pervenire non posset vir fidelis non solutus a servitute uxoris per culpam ejus. Reply Obj. 2: The crime of a wife who refuses to live together without affront to the Creator absolves the man of the servitude by which he was bound to his wife which prevented his marrying another while she lived. But it still does not dissolve the marriage: for if the blasphemous one were converted before he had contracted another marriage, her husband would be restored to her; but it is dissolved by the subsequent marriage, which the believing man could not enter upon if he were not freed from servitude to his wife by her own fault. Ad tertium dicendum, quod postquam fidelis contraxit, solutum est vinculum matrimonii ex utraque parte: quia matrimonium non claudicat quantum ad vinculum, sed quandoque claudicat quantum ad effectum. Unde in poenam uxoris infidelis ei indicitur quod non possit cum alio contrahere, magis quam ex virtute matrimonii praecedentis. Sed si postea convertatur, potest ei concedi dispensative ut alteri nubat, si vir ejus aliam uxorem duxit. Reply Obj. 3: After the believer contracted, the bond of marriage was cut loose from both sides: for marriage cannot limp on one foot with regard to the bond, but sometimes it does limp as regards the effect. For this reason it is appointed that the unbelieving wife may not contract with another, more in penalty to her than from the strength of the preceding marriage. But if afterward she should convert, a dispensation can be granted to her to marry another, if her husband has taken another wife. Ad quartum dicendum, quod si post conversionem viri sit aliqua probabilis spes de conversione uxoris, non debet votum continentiae vir emittere, nec ad aliud matrimonium transire: quia difficilius converteretur uxor, viro suo sciens se privatam. Si autem non sit spes de conversione, potest ad sacros ordines vel ad religionem accedere, prius requisita uxore quod convertatur; et tunc, si postquam vir sacros ordines accepit, uxor convertatur, non est sibi vir suus reddendus: sed debet sibi imputare in poenam tardae conversionis quod viro suo privatur. Reply Obj. 4: If after the conversion of the man there should be some probable hope of the conversion of his wife, the man cannot take a vow of continence, nor may he enter upon another marriage: for it would be more difficult for the wife to be converted if she knew that she had lost her husband. But if there were no hope of her conversion, he could enter religious life or holy orders, after having asked his wife to convert. And then after the man has received holy orders, if the wife should convert, her husband would not be restored to her; but it should be imputed to her as a penalty for her late conversion that she has been deprived of her husband. Ad quintum dicendum, quod vinculum paternitatis non solvitur per disparem cultum, sicut vinculum matrimonii; et ideo non est simile de hereditate et uxore. Reply Obj. 5: The bond of paternity is not dissolved by disparity of cult, as the bond of marriage is; and therefore it is not the same concerning one’s inheritance and one’s wife. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum propter alia peccata vir possit dimittere uxorem, sicut propter infidelitatem Whether a man may put away his wife because of other sins, as for unbelief Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod alia vitia solvant matrimonium, sicut et infidelitas. Adulterium enim directius videtur esse contra matrimonium quam infidelitas. Sed infidelitas in aliquo casu solvit matrimonium, ut liceat ad aliud matrimonium transire. Ergo et adulterium idem facit. Obj. 1: To the sixth question, we proceed thus. It seems that other vices dissolve marriage, just as unbelief does. For adultery seems to be more directly opposed to marriage than unbelief. But unbelief in some cases dissolves the marriage, such that one is permitted to enter upon another marriage. Therefore, adultery also does the same thing. Praeterea, sicut infidelitas est fornicatio spiritualis, ita etiam quodlibet peccatum. Si ergo propter hoc infidelitas matrimonium solvit, quia est fornicatio spiritualis, quodlibet aliud peccatum matrimonium solvit pari ratione. Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as unbelief is a spiritual fornication, so is any other kind of sin. Therefore, if unbelief, which is a spiritual fornication, dissolves marriage on this account, any other sin would dissolve marriage by the same reasoning. Praeterea, Matth. 5, 30, dicitur: si dextera manus tua scandalizat te, abscinde eam, et projice abs te; et dicit Glossa quod in manu et in dextero oculo possunt accipi fratres, uxor, propinqui, et filii. Sed per quodlibet peccatum efficiuntur nobis impedimento. Ergo propter quodlibet peccatum potest dissolvi matrimonium. Obj. 3: Furthermore, it says in Matthew 5:30, if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it from you; and it says in the Gloss that ’hand’ and ‘right eye’ can be taken as meaning brothers, wife, neighbors, and children. But they become an impediment to us by any sort of sin. Therefore, marriage can be dissolved because of any sin. Praeterea, avaritia idolatria est, ut dicitur Ephes. 5. Sed propter idolatriam potest mulier dimitti. Ergo pari ratione propter avaritiam, et ita propter alia peccata, quae sunt majora quam avaritia. Obj. 4: Furthermore, avarice is an idolatry, as it says in Ephesians 5:5. But because of idolatry a woman can be put away. Therefore, by the same reasoning she can be put away on account of avarice, and in the same way because of other sins, which are greater than avarice.