Expositio textus Exposition of the Text Omnes parvuli qui in baptismo ab originali mundantur, sacramentum et rem suscipiunt. Non tamen soli parvuli, sed etiam adulti quandoque. Tamen de parvulis non est dubium quin recipiant; de adultis autem est, quia per fictionem impediri possent; et ideo parvulis potius exemplificat. All children who in baptism are cleansed from original sin, receive both the sacrament and thing. However, not only little ones, but also sometimes adults. Nevertheless, with infants there is no doubt that they receive it; there is, however, with adults, for they can impede it by insincerity; and therefore he uses children in his example instead. Nisi poeniteat, eum veteris vitae. Contra. Ergo baptismus non est primum sacramentum, sed poenitentia. Et dicendum, quod loquitur de poenitentia prout est virtus, non prout est sacramentum. “Unless he repent of his old life.” To the contrary: then baptism is not the first sacrament, but repentance. And it should be said that he speaks of repentance as a virtue, not as a sacrament. Non redire dimissa etc., hoc qualiter verum sit, infra, dist. 22, quaest. 1, art. 1, in corp., dicetur. For . . . sins which have been forgiven return, etc. How this is true will be said below, in Distinction 22, Question 1, Article 1. Induunt homines Christum aliquando, etc. Induere Christum nihil aliud est quam Christi similitudinem assumere; quod contingit exterius per sacramentalem repraesentationem, et interius per realem imitationem. “Men put on Christ sometimes”, etc. ‘To put on Christ’ is nothing other than to assume the likeness of Christ, which happens outwardly by sacramental representation, and inwardly by real imitation. Nec tantum passio vicem baptismi implet, sed etiam fides et contritio, ubi necessitas excludit sacramentum. Contritio non totaliter supplet: quia non semper a tota poena absolvit, quamvis absolvat ab omni culpa. Nor is it suffering alone which fills the role of baptism, but also faith and contrition, where necessity precludes the sacrament. Contrition does not completely substitute, for it does not always absolve from all punishment, although it may absolve from all fault. Neque enim ille latro pro nomine Christi crucifixus est. Contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, quod Christus homicidii poenam in illo latrone fecit esse martyrium. Et dicendum quod habuit aliquid de martyrio, scilicet poenam, et justam voluntatem; et aliquid defecit ad martyrium, scilicet causa; sicut in innocentibus defuit justa voluntas; sed fuit poena et causa. “For that thief was not crucified for the name of Christ.” Against this is what Jerome says, that Christ made that thief’s punishment for homicide into martyrdom. And it should be said that it did have something of martyrdom, namely, suffering, and a just will; and it also lacked something of martyrdom, namely, the reason for the suffering—even as the Holy Innocents were lacking a just will, but they had both the suffering and the reason for it. Quem regeneraturus eram, amisi. Amisisse se eum dicit, quia gaudium et meritum quod de baptizatione ejus habiturus erat, amisit differens baptismum ejus usque ad solemne tempus secundum morem ecclesiae qui tunc erat, vel usque ad perfectam instructionem. Iste autem gratiam baptismi non amisit, quia cum desiderio ejus decessit; et hoc est verum quantum ad remissionem culpae, sed non quantum ad remissionem omnis poenae. “I lost the one whom I was about to bring to new life.” He says he ‘lost’ him, for the joy and merit that he was about to have from his baptizing, he lost by the deferral of his baptism until the time of a solemnity, according to the custom of the Church in those days, or until his instruction was complete. However, that man did not lose the grace of baptism, since he died longing for it; and this is true as to the remission of guilt, but not as to the remission of all punishment. Ubi tota sacramenta baptismi complentur. Verum est quantum ad id quod est tantum res in sacramento. “In which all the sacraments of baptism are accomplished.” It is true as to what is the reality alone in the sacrament. Aeterno supplicio puniendos, supplicium improprie nominat poenam damni, quam solam pueri sustinebunt, ut in 2 Lib., dist. 33, quaest. 2, art. 2, dictum est. Will be punished by an eternal punishment. ‘Punishment’ is not the proper word for the suffering of loss that is all children will endure, as was said in Book 2, Distinction 33, Question 2, Article 2. Quia fidelium consortio non separantur. Orationes tamen illae non sunt pro eis suffragia, sed gratiarum actiones. These are not separated from the fellowship of the faithful when the Church prays for the faithful who have died. Nevertheless those prayers are not offerings on their behalf, but thanksgiving. Distinctio 5 Distinction 5 De causa baptismi The cause of baptism Postquam determinavit Magister de baptismo per comparationem ad recipientes, hic determinat de ipso per comparationem ad dantes; et dividitur in duas partes: in prima ostendit a quibus dari possit baptismus; in secunda a quibus et qualiter dari debeat, 6 dist.: nunc quibus liceat baptizare, addamus. After the Master has examined baptism in relation to its recipients, here he examines it in relation to those giving it; and this is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows by whom baptism can be given; in the second, by whom and how it ought to be given, at Distinction 6: Now let us add something about those for whom it is lawful to baptize. Prima in tres: in prima ostendit a quibus dari possit baptismus, quia a bonis et a malis; in secunda assignat hujus rationem, ibi: quia ministerium tantum habent, non potestatem baptismi; in tertia removet quamdam dubitationem, ibi: hic quaeritur quae sit potestas baptismi quam Christus sibi retinuit. The first is in three parts: in the first, he shows by whom baptism can be given, since it may be given by good men and bad; in the second, he assigns the reason, at: [This is] because they have only the ministry, not the power, of baptism; in the third, he expels a particular doubt, at: Here it is asked what is that power of baptism that Christ retained for himself. Hic est duplex quaestio. Prima de potestate baptizandi. Secunda de ipsis baptizantibus. Here, there is a two-fold question: first, about the power of baptizing; second, about those who do the baptizing. Quaestio 1 Question 1 De potestate baptizandi The power of baptizing Circa primum quaeruntur tria: Concerning the first, three questions arise: primo, quam potestatem Christus, secundum quod homo, in baptizando habuit; first, what power Christ, as man, had in baptizing; secundo, quam ministris contulerit; second, what power he conferred on his ministers; tertio, quam conferre potuerit, sed non contulit. third, what power he could have conferred, but did not confer. Articulus 1 Article 1 Quam potestatem Christus, secundum quod homo, in baptizando habuit What power Christ, as man, had in baptizing Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus, secundum quod homo, habuit potestatem dimittendi peccata. Matth. 9, 6, dicitur: ut autem sciatis quia filius hominis habet potestatem in terra dimittendi peccata, dixit paralytico: surge, et ambula. Sed non oportebat signum ostendere ad probandum quod Deus haberet potestatem dimittendi peccatum: quia hoc Judaei confitebantur. Ergo etiam secundum quod homo habuit hanc potestatem. Obj. 1: To the first we proceed thus. It seems that Christ, as man, had the power of forgiving sins. For it is said: but so that you may know that the Son of Man has the power on earth to forgive sins, he said to the paralytic, “rise, and walk” (Matt 9:6). But it was not necessary to show a sign in order to prove that God had the power of forgiving sins, for the Jews professed this. Therefore, he had this power also as man. Praeterea, Christus, secundum quod homo, est redemptor, ut in 3, dist. 19, qu. 1, art. 4, quaestiunc. 1, dictum est. Sed non potest aliquis liberari a servitute peccati nisi sibi peccatum dimissum sit. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, habuit potestatem dimittendi peccata. Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ as man is the redeemer, as was said in Book 3, Distinction 19, Question 1, Article 4, Subquestion 1. But someone cannot be freed from slavery to sin unless his sins are forgiven him. Therefore, Christ had the power of forgiving sins as man. Praeterea, super illud Joan. 5: sicut pater suscitat mortuos etc., dicit Augustinus: judicat, et suscitat corpora, non Pater, sed Filius, secundum humanitatis dispensationem, qua minor est Patre. Sed suscitatio corporum attestatur suscitationi animarum, quae fit per dimissionem peccati. Ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, potuit peccatum dimittere. Obj. 3: Furthermore, concerning the passage in John: Just as the Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whomever he wishes (John 5:21), Augustine says he judges, and he raises bodies—not the Father, but the Son, according to the dispensation of his humanity, in which he is less than the Father. But the raising of bodies attests to the raising of souls, which happens by the forgiving of sins. Therefore, Christ, as man, could forgive sin. Praeterea, majus est imperium ejus quam invocatio nominis ejus. Sed ad invocationem nominis Christi dabatur baptismus et remissio peccatorum in primitiva ecclesia. Ergo et ipse Christus suo imperio poterat peccata dimittere. Obj. 4: Furthermore, his power is greater than the invocation of his name. But in the early Church, baptism and the remission of sins were granted at the invocation of Christ’s name. Therefore, Christ himself, too, could forgive sins by his own power. Praeterea, Christus amplioris gloriae prae Moyse habitus est, quia non sicut servus vel minister, sicut Moyses, est in domo Dei, sed sicut dominus et heres, ut dicitur Hebr. 3. Sed si non haberet potestatem dimittendi peccatum, secundum quod homo, non esset sicut dominus, sed solum sicut minister, sicut et alii. Ergo habet potestatem dimittendi peccata. Obj. 5: Furthermore, Christ was held to have greater glory than Moses, for he was not in the house of God as a servant or minister, like Moses, but as lord and heir, as is said in Hebrews 3:3. But if he did not have the power of forgiving sins as man, he would not be as the lord, but only as the minister, just like all the others. Therefore, he has the power of forgiving sins. Sed contra, illud quod est solius Dei, non convenit Christo inquantum est homo. Sed dimittere peccatum est hujusmodi; ut patet Isai. 43: ego sum qui deleo iniquitates tuas propter me. Ergo non convenit Christo. On the contrary (1), what belongs to God alone does not belong to Christ as man. But to forgive sin is one of these things, as is clear from Isaiah: I am he who blots out your transgressions for my own sake (Isa 43:25). Therefore, it does not belong to Christ as man. Praeterea, nulli dimittitur peccatum, nisi per Spiritum Sanctum. Sed Christus, secundum quod homo, non poterat dare Spiritum Sanctum, ut dist. 15, 1 Lib., quaest. 5, art. 1, quaestiunc. 4, dictum est. Ergo non potest remittere peccata secundum quod homo. Furthermore (2), sin is forgiven no one except by the Holy Spirit. But Christ, as man, could not give the Holy Spirit, as was said in Book 1, Distinction 15, Question 5, Article 1, Subquestion 4. Therefore he, as man, cannot remit sins. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Christus secundum quod est Filius Dei, est vita quae vivificat animas. Sed quod convenit sibi inquantum est Filius Dei, non competit ei secundum quod est homo. Ergo vivificare animas remittendo peccata, non competit ei secundum quod homo. Furthermore (3), Augustine says that Christ, according as he is the Son of God, is the life that gives life to souls. But what belongs to him insofar as he is Son of God does not befit him according as he is man. Therefore, to give life to souls by the remission of sins does not belong to him as man. Respondeo dicendum, quod triplex est potestas absolvendi a peccato in baptismo. Una potestas auctoritatis; et haec solius Dei est, quia propria virtute peccata dimittit, quasi principalis causa remissionis peccati; unde tali potestate Christus, secundum quod homo, peccata remittere non poterat. Alia potestas est ministerii, quae eis competit qui sacramenta dispensant, in quibus divina virtus secretius operatur salutem. Tertia est media inter has duas, quae dicitur potestas excellentiae; et hanc Christus prae aliis habuit. I answer that, there are three kinds of power for absolving from sin in baptism. One is the power of authority, and this pertains to God alone, who forgives sins by his own power, as the principal cause of the remission of sins; hence Christ as man could not forgive sins with that kind of power. Another power is that of the minister, which belongs to those who dispense the sacraments, in which divine power invisibly works our salvation. The third is a mean between these two, which is called the power of excellence; and this Christ had above everyone else. Attenditur autem haec excellentia quantum ad tria. Primo quantum ad hoc quod ex merito passionis ejus baptismus efficaciam habet, non autem ex merito alicujus alterius baptizantis; unde non est melior baptismus a meliore baptizante datus. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod Christus sine sacramento sacramentorum effectum conferre poterat quasi Dominus et institutor sacramentorum; quod de aliis non est verum. Tertio quantum ad hoc quod ad invocationem nominis ejus dabatur remissio peccatorum in baptismo in primitiva ecclesia. Sed quia secundae rationes videntur procedere de prima potestate, ideo concedendae sunt illae, et respondendum est ad primas. Now this excellence has three aspects. First, baptism has its efficacy from the merit of his Passion, but not from the merit of anyone else who baptizes; hence a baptism given by a better baptizer is not a better baptism. Second, Christ, as Lord and institutor of the sacraments, could confer the effect of the sacraments without a sacrament, which is not true of the others. Third, in the early Church, the remission of sins was given at the invocation of his name in baptism. But because the second arguments seem based on the first power, therefore they should be conceded, and the first ones should be answered. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Filius Hominis habebat potestatem auctoritatis dimittendi peccata, non secundum quod homo, sed secundum quod Deus; et ideo per miraculum ostensum hic probatur quod ille homo esset Deus, cui natura obediebat quasi proprio creatori. Reply Obj. 1: The Son of Man had the power of authority for forgiving sins, not insofar as he was man, but insofar as he was God; and thus, by the miracle displayed here, it is proved that that man was God, whom nature obeyed as its proper creator. Ad secundum dicendum, quod redemptor dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo propter usum potestatis auctoritativae in absolvendo a peccato, et sic Christus secundum quod Deus, redemptor est. Alio modo propter effectum humilitatis; et sic competit ei secundum quod homo, inquantum per humilitatem passionis nobis remissionem meruit peccatorum; et hoc pertinet ad potestatem excellentiae, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: ‘Redeemer’ is said in two ways. In one way, because of the use of authoritative power in absolving from sins, and in this way, Christ, as God, was the redeemer. In another way, because of the effect of humility; and in this way, it applied to him as man, inasmuch as by the humility of his Passion, he merited for us the remission of sins; and this belongs to the power of excellence, as was said.