Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum gradus matrimonium impedientes possint per statutum Ecclesiae determinari Whether the degrees that impede marriage can be determined by the statutes of the Church Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consanguinitatis gradus matrimonium impedientes non potuerint taxari ab Ecclesia usque ad quartum gradum. Matth. 19, 6, dicitur: quos Deus conjunxit, homo non separet. Sed illos qui conjunguntur infra quartum consanguinitatis gradum, Deus conjungit; non enim divina lege eorum conjunctio prohibetur. Ergo non debent humano statuto separari. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the degrees of consanguinity that impede marriage could not be fixed by the Church up to the fourth degree. For in Matthew 19:6 it says, what God has joined, let man not separate. But those who are joined within the fourth degree of consanguinity, God has joined, for their union is not prohibited by divine law. Therefore, they should not be separated by human statute. Praeterea, matrimonium est sacramentum, sicut et baptismus. Sed non posset ex statuto Ecclesiae fieri quod ille qui ad baptismum accedit, non reciperet characterem baptismalem, si ex jure divino ejus capax sit. Ergo nec Ecclesiae statutum facere potest quod matrimonium non sit inter illos qui per jus divinum matrimonialiter conjungi non prohibentur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, marriage is a sacrament, just as baptism is. But it cannot happen by Church statute that the one who approaches baptism would not receive the baptismal character, if the person, by divine law, were capable of it. Therefore, neither can the statute of the Church make it so that marriage would not exist between those who are not prohibited by divine law from being joined matrimonially. Praeterea, jus positivum non potest ea quae sunt naturalia removere vel ampliare. Sed consanguinitas est naturale vinculum, quod, quantum est de se, natum est matrimonium impedire. Ergo Ecclesia non potest aliquo statuto facere quod aliqui possint matrimonialiter conjungi vel non conjungi, sicut non potest facere quod non sint consanguinei vel non consanguinei. Obj. 3: Furthermore, positive law cannot remove or increase those things that are natural. But consanguinity is a natural bond, which in itself does not necessarily impede marriage. Therefore, the Church cannnot by a certain statute make it be the case that some people can be joined or not joined matrimonially, just as it cannot make them consanguineous or not consanguineous. Praeterea, statutum juris positivi debet aliquam rationabilem causam habere; quia secundum causam rationabilem quam habet, a jure naturali procedit. Sed causae quae assignantur de numero graduum, omnino videntur irrationabiles causae, cum nullam habeant habitudinem ad causata; sicut quod consanguinitas prohibeatur usque ad quartum gradum propter quatuor elementa, usque ad sextum propter sex aetates, usque ad septimum propter septem dies, quibus omne tempus agitur. Ergo videtur quod talis prohibitio nullum vigorem habeat. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the statute of positive law must have some reasonable cause, for it is according to its reasonable cause that it proceeds from natural law. But the causes that are assigned for the number of degrees seem to be entirely unreasonable, for they have no relation to what is caused. For example, that consanguinity is prohibited up to the fourth degree because of the four elements, up to the sixth degree because of the six ages of man, up to the seventh degree because of the seven days in which all time is measured. Therefore, it seems that such a prohibition as this has no strength. Praeterea, ubi est eadem causa, debet esse idem effectus. Sed causa quare consanguinitas impedit matrimonium, est bonum prolis, repressio concupiscentiae, et multiplicatio amicitiae, ut ex dictis patet, quae omni tempore necessaria aequaliter sunt. Ergo omni tempore debuissent aequaliter gradus consanguinitatis matrimonium impedire; quod non est verum; cum modo usque ad quartum, antiquitus usque ad septimum gradum matrimonium consanguinitas impediret. Obj. 5: Furthermore, where there is the same cause, there must be the same effect. But the reason that consanguinity impedes marriage is the good of offspring, the repression of concupiscence, and the multiplication of friendship, as is clear from what has been said, and these things are equally necessary at all times. Therefore at all times marriage should have been impeded by equal degrees of consanguinity, which is not the case; for currently consanguinity impedes marriage up to the fourth degree, while formerly, up to the seventh. Praeterea, una et eadem conjunctio non potest esse in genere sacramenti et in genere stupri. Sed hoc contingeret, si Ecclesia haberet potestatem statuendi diversum numerum in gradibus impedientibus matrimonium; sicut si aliqui in quinto gradu, quando prohibitus erat, conjuncti fuissent, talis conjunctio stuprum esset; sed postmodum eadem conjunctio, Ecclesia prohibitionem revocante, matrimonium esset; et e converso posset accidere, si aliqui gradus concessi possent postmodum ab Ecclesia interdici. Ergo videtur quod potestas Ecclesiae non se extendat ad hoc. Obj. 6: Furthermore, one and the same union cannot be in the genus of sacrament and in the genus of illicit sexual intercourse. But this would happen if the Church had the power of establishing a different number of degrees that would impede marriage. For if some couple were related in the fifth degree, when it was prohibited, such a union would be illicit sexual intercourse. But afterward when the Church revoked the prohibition, the same union would be a marriage; and by the converse, it could happen if some degrees were allowed by the Church, and afterward were forbidden. Therefore it seems that the power of the Church does not extend to this. Praeterea, jus humanum debet imitari jus divinum. Sed secundum jus divinum, quod in lege veteri continetur, non aequaliter currit prohibitio graduum in sursum et deorsum; quia in veteri lege aliquis prohibebatur accipere in uxorem sororem patris sui, non tamen filiam fratris. Ergo nec modo debet aliqua prohibitio de nepotibus et patruis manere. Obj. 7: Furthermore, human law should imitate divine law. But according to divine law, which is contained in the Old Law, the prohibition of degrees does not run equally above and below; for in the Old Law someone was prohibited from taking the sister of his father to wife, but not the daughter of his brother. Therefore, neither should any prohibition remain today regarding uncles and aunts and nieces and nephews. Sed contra est quod dominus dicit discipulis Luc. 10, 16: qui vos audit, me audit. Ergo praeceptum Ecclesiae habet firmitatem sicut praeceptum Dei. Sed Ecclesia quandoque prohibuit et quandoque concessit aliquos gradus quos lex vetus non prohibuit. Ergo illi gradus matrimonium impediunt. On the contrary (1), the Lord said to his disciples in Luke 10:16: he who hears you, hears me. Therefore, the precept of the Church has the same strength as the precept of God. But the Church has sometimes prohibited and sometimes allowed certain degrees that the Old Law did not prohibit. Therefore, these degrees impede marriage. Praeterea, sicut olim matrimonia gentilium dispensabantur per leges civiles; ita nunc per statuta Ecclesiae. Sed olim lex civilis determinabat gradus consanguinitatis qui matrimonium impediunt, et qui non. Ergo et modo potest hoc fieri per Ecclesiae statutum. Furthermore (2), just as at one time the marriages of the gentiles were dispensed by civil laws, so now they are by the statutes of the Church. But formerly the civil law determined which degrees of consanguinity impede marriage and which ones do not. Therefore, this can also be done now by the statutes of the Church. Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum tempora diversa invenitur consanguinitas secundum gradus diversos matrimonium impedisse. In principio enim humani generis solus pater et mater a matrimonio repellebantur, eo quod tunc temporis erat paucitas hominum, et oportebat propagationi humani generis maximam curam impendere; unde non erant removendae nisi illae personae quae matrimonio incompetentes erant etiam quantum ad principalem matrimonii finem, qui est bonum prolis, ut dictum est. I answer that, in keeping with different times, consanguinity has impeded marriage at different degrees. For in the beginning of the human race only the father and mother were barred from marriage to their children, for at that time there was a scarcity of men, and it was necessary to expend the greatest care for the propagation of the human race; and thus no one was to be excluded except those persons who were inadmissible to marriage according to the chief end of marriage, which is the good of offspring, as was said. Postmodum autem multiplicato humano genere, per legem Moysi plures personae exceptae sunt, quae jam concupiscentiam reprimere incipiebant; unde, ut dicit Rabbi Moyses, omnes illae personae exceptae sunt a matrimonio quae in una familia cohabitare solent; quia si inter eos licite carnalis copula esse posset, magnum incentivum libidini praestaretur. Sed alios consanguinitatis gradus lex vetus permisit; immo quodammodo praecepit; ut scilicet unusquisque de cognatione sua uxorem acciperet, ne successionum confusio esset; quia tunc temporis cultus divinus per successionem generis propagabatur. But after the human race had increased, many persons were ruled out by the law of Moses, which already began to restrain concupiscence; for which reason, as Rabbi Moses says, all those persons were barred from marriage who were accustomed to live together in one family; for if physical intimacy could legally take place among them, it would have presented a great incentive to sensual desire. But the Old Law permitted other degrees of consanguinity; indeed, in a certain way, it even commanded them, as, for example, each man took his wife from among his blood relations, so that there would be no confusion about the succession; for in those days the divine worship was propagated by the succession of the race. Sed postmodum in lege nova, quae est lex spiritus et amoris, plures gradus consanguinitatis sunt prohibiti; quia jam per spiritualem gratiam, non per carnis originem, cultus derivatur et multiplicatur; unde oportet ut homines etiam magis a carnalibus retrahantur, spiritualibus vacantes, et ut amor amplius diffundatur; et ideo antiquitus usque ad remotiores gradus consanguinitatis matrimonium impediebatur, ut ad plures per consanguinitatem et affinitatem naturalis amicitia permaneret; et rationabiliter usque ad septimum gradum; tum quia ultra hoc non de facili remanebat communis radicis memoria; tum quia septiformi gratiae spiritus sancti congruebat. But afterward, in the New Law, which is a law of spirit and love, many degrees of consanguinity were prohibited, for now by spiritual grace, not by physical origin, worship is handed on and increased. This is why people had to be withdrawn more from physical things to be free for the spiritual things, and so that love would be diffused more widely. And so, in ancient times it was impeded up to more distant degrees of consanguinity, so that for many, a natural friendship would endure because of consanguinity and affinity; and reasonably up to the seventh degree, both because memory of the common root was not easily retained beyond the seventh degree, and because it corresponded to the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit. Sed postmodum circa haec ultima tempora restrictum est Ecclesiae interdictum usque ad quartum gradum; quia ultra inutile et periculosum erat gradus consanguinitatis prohibere. Inutile quidem, quia ad remotiores consanguineos quasi nullum foedus majoris amicitiae quam ad extraneos habeatur, caritate in multorum cordibus frigescente. Periculosum autem erat, quia concupiscentia et negligentia praevalente, tam numerosam consanguineorum multitudinem homines non satis observabant; et sic laqueus damnationis multis injiciebatur ex remotiorum graduum prohibitione. Satis etiam convenienter usque ad quartum gradum dicta prohibitio est restricta; tum quia usque ad quartam generationem homines vivere consueverunt, ut sic non possit consanguinitatis memoria aboleri; unde dominus in tertiam et quartam generationem peccata parentum se visitaturum in filiis comminatur; tum quia in qualibet generatione nova mixtio sanguinis, cujus identitas consanguinitatem facit, fit cum sanguine alieno; et quantum miscetur alteri, tantum receditur a primo: et quia elementa sunt quatuor, quorum quodlibet tanto est facilius miscibile, quanto est magis subtile; ideo in prima commixtione evanescit sanguinis identitas quantum ad primum elementum, quod est subtilissimum; in secunda quantum ad secundum; in tertia quantum ad tertium; in quarta quantum ad quartum; et sic convenienter post quartam generationem potest iterari carnalis conjunctio. But afterward, in recent times, the prohibition of the Church was restricted to the first four degrees, for it was useless and dangerous to prohibit the degrees of consanguinity beyond that. Useless indeed, for to more remote blood relatives there is hardly any bond of greater friendship than to strangers, with charity growing cold in many hearts. It was dangerous, moreover, because while concupiscence and negligence were prevailing all the same, men did not keep track of the great number of their blood relations. And in this way a snare of damnation was hurled into the path of many by the prohibition of the more remote degrees of consanguinity. And the prohibition mentioned, reaching to the fourth degree, is appropriately strict enough, both because people are accustomed to living together up to the fourth generation, and so the memory of consanguinity cannot be effaced, for which reason the Lord threatens that the sins of the parents will be visited upon the sons up to the third and fourth generation; and because in any generation the mixture of blood, which causes consanguinity when it is the same, is newly combined with the blood of others; and to the degree that it is mixed with others, it is removed from the first ones. And since there are four elements, of which any one is more easily mixable to the degree that it is finer, consequently in the first commingling, the identity of the blood is diluted as concerns the first element, which is the most subtle; in the second commingling, as to the second element; in the third, as to the third element; in the fourth, as to the fourth element; and thus carnal union can fittingly happen again after the fourth generation. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut Deus non conjungit illos qui conjunguntur contra divinum praeceptum, ita non conjungit illos qui conjunguntur contra Ecclesiae praeceptum, quod habet eamdem obligandi efficaciam quam et praeceptum divinum. Reply Obj. 1: Just as God does not join those who are joined against the divine precept, so he does not join those who are joined against the precept of the Church, which has the same power of obliging as divine precept. Ad secundum dicendum, quod matrimonium non tantum est sacramentum, sed etiam est in officium; et ideo magis subjacet ordinationi ministrorum Ecclesiae quam baptismus, qui est sacramentum tantum; quia sicut contractus et officia humana determinantur legibus humanis, ita contractus et officia spiritualia lege Ecclesiae. Reply Obj. 2: Marriage is not only a sacrament, but also an office; and thus it is more subject to the ordering of the ministers of the Church than baptism, which is only a sacrament; for spiritual contracts and duties are determined by the laws of the Church just as human contracts and duties are determined by human laws. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis consanguinitatis vinculum sit naturale; tamen non est naturale quod consanguinitas carnalem copulam impediat, nisi secundum aliquem gradum, ut dictum est; et ideo Ecclesia suo instituto non facit quod aliqui sint vel non sint consanguinei, quia secundum omne tempus aequaliter consanguinei remanent; sed facit quod carnalis copula sit licita vel illicita secundum diversa tempora in diversis gradibus consanguinitatis. Reply Obj. 3: Although the bond of consanguinity is natural, nevertheless it is not natural that consanguinity impede carnal intimacy, unless according to a certain degree, as was said; and thus the Church does not make its own decree that certain people are or are not consanguineous, for in every age they remain equally consanguineous; but it decrees that carnal intimacy is licit or illicit in different degrees of consanguinity according to different times. Ad quartum dicendum, quod tales rationes assignatae magis dantur per modum adaptationis et congruentiae, quam per modum causae et necessitatis. Reply Obj. 4: Arguments such as those ascribed are given more in the mode of fittingness and proportion than in the mode of cause and necessity. Ad quintum dicendum, quod jam ex dictis patet quod non est eadem causa secundum diversa tempora gradus consanguinitatis prohibendi; unde quod aliquo tempore utiliter conceditur, alio salubriter prohibetur. Reply Obj. 5: From what has been said, it is already clear that there is not the same reason for prohibiting degrees of consanguinity at different times; for which reason what is conceded as practical at a certain time may be more wholesome to prohibit at another. Ad sextum dicendum, quod statutum non imponit modum praeteritis, sed futuris; unde si modo prohiberetur quintus gradus, qui nunc est concessus, illi qui jam sunt in quinto gradu conjuncti, non essent separandi; nullum enim impedimentum matrimonio superveniens ipsum potest dirimere; et sic conjunctio quae prius fuit matrimonium, non efficeretur per statutum Ecclesiae stuprum; et similiter si aliquis gradus concederetur qui nunc est prohibitus, illa conjunctio non efficeretur matrimonialis ex statuto Ecclesiae ratione primi contractus, quia possent separari si vellent; sed tamen possent de novo contrahere, et alia conjunctio esset. Reply Obj. 6: A statute does not have to do with what is past, but with the future; for which reason, if at one time the fifth degree were to be prohibited, which is now allowed, those who are now joined in the fifth degree need not be separated, for no subsequent impediment to marriage can invalidate it; and so the union that was a marriage before would not become incestuous by the statute of the Church. Likewise, if a certain degree were to be permitted which is now prohibited, that union would not become matrimonial by the statute of the Church by reason of the first contract, for they could separate if they wished; but nevertheless they could contract again, and that would be another union. Ad septimum dicendum, quod in gradibus consanguinitatis prohibendis Ecclesia praecipue observat rationem amoris; et quia non est minor ratio amoris ad nepotem quam ad patruum, sed etiam major, quanto propinquior est filio pater quam patri filius, ut dicitur in 8 Ethic., propter hoc aequaliter prohibuit gradus consanguinitatis in patruis et nepotibus. Sed lex vetus in personis prohibendis attendit praecipue cohabitationem contra concupiscentiam, illas personas prohibens ad quas facilior pateret accessus propter mutuam cohabitationem. Magis autem consuevit cohabitare neptis patruo quam amita nepoti; quia filia est quasi idem cum patre, cum sit aliquid ejus; sed soror non est hoc modo idem cum fratre, cum non sit aliquid ejus, sed magis ex eodem nascitur; et ideo non erat eadem ratio prohibendi neptem et amitam. Reply Obj. 7: In prohibiting degrees of consanguinity, the Church particularly attends to the reason of love; and since there is not less reason of love for a grandson than for a paternal uncle, but rather a greater one—as a father is said to be closer to his son than the son to his father in the Ethics 8 —because of this it prohibits the degrees of consanguinity equally among uncles and grandsons. But in prohibiting persons the Old Law attempted to restrict concupiscence especially as regards cohabitation, by prohibiting those persons to whom the access was more easily open because of living together. But it is more customary for a granddaughter to live together with an uncle than for an aunt to live with a grandson; for a daughter is almost the same with her father, since she is something of his; but a sister is not in this way the same as her brother, since she is not something of his, but rather born from the same; and thus there was not the same reason for prohibiting a niece and an aunt. Expositio textus Exposition of the Text Quia truncum inter gradus non computat. Truncum appellat consanguinitatis radicem, qui est pater filiorum. Principium autem alicujus generis potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo principium quod est in genere illo; ut si primam partem lineae principium dicamus. Alio modo principium, quia non recipit generis praedicationem, sicut principium lineae dicitur punctus; et hoc modo principium et radix consanguinitatis potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo ipsa persona prima a qua consanguinitas dicitur, quae persona non est consanguinitas, sed consanguinitatis principium; et secundum hoc filius qui distat a persona patris, facit primae distantiae gradum, et filius filii secundum, et sic deinceps. Alio modo prima consanguinitas quae est causa omnis alterius consanguinitatis; et sic ipsa consanguinitas quae est inter patrem et filium, radix ponitur, et computantur secundum hoc pater et filius pro uno principio, a quorum consanguinitate primo distat filius filii; et ideo haec distantia facit primum gradum, et sic deinceps; et secundum hoc diversimode fit computatio graduum in littera. Sed primus modus computandi magis est in communi usu. Because he does not count the trunk among the degrees. He calls the root of consanguinity the trunk, which is the father of sons. But the principle of a certain genus can be taken in two ways. In one way, the principle is what is in that genus, as if we say the first part of a line is the principle. In another way, the principle is what does not receive the predication of the genus, as the principle of a line is said to be a point; and in this way the principle and root of consanguinity can be said in two ways. In one way the first person himself by whom consanguinity is said, which person is not consanguinity, but the principle of consanguinity; and according to this, a son who is removed from the person of his father makes the first degree of distance, and the son of the son makes the second, and so on in succession. In another way, the first consanguinity is what is the cause of every other consanguinity; and thus the very consanguinity that is between father and son is established as the root, and according to that the father and son are counted as one principle, from whom the son of the son is removed by the first consanguinity; and thus this distance makes the first degree and so on in succession; and according to the degrees are calculated in different ways in the text. But the first way of calculating is more in common use. Sicut sex aetatibus mundi generatio et hominis status finitur; ita propinquitas generis tot gradibus terminetur. Mundo non assignantur aetates quantum ad substantiam, quia sic in perpetuum durabit; sed quantum ad statum; sic enim transibit mundus, et sic antiquatur et senescit; et secundum hoc distinguuntur aetates mundi metaphorice ad similitudinem aetatis unius hominis. Variantur enim in homine aetates secundum diversas notabiles varietates in statu ipsius; unde prima aetas dicitur infantia usque ad septimum annum; secunda pueritia usque ad quartumdecimum; tertia adolescentia usque ad vigesimum quintum; quae tres aetates computantur quandoque pro una; quarta est juventus usque ad quinquaginta annos; quinta vero aetas est senectus usque ad septuaginta; sexta senium usque in finem. Et similiter in mundo dicitur prima aetas ab Adam usque ad Noe, in qua fuit humani generis institutio et lapsus; secunda a Noe usque ad Abraham, in qua fuit humani generis destructio per diluvium, et renovatio; tertia ab Abraham usque ad David, in qua fuit circumcisionis institutio; quarta a David usque ad transmigrationem Babylonis, in qua lex floruit sub regibus et prophetis; quinta a transmigratione Babylonis usque ad Christum, in qua fuit populi captivatio et liberatio; sexta a Christo usque ad finem, in qua est humani generis redemptio. Sed tamen non oportet quod aequali numero annorum mundi aetas humani generis compleatur, sicut nec aetas unius hominis; quia ultima aetas hominis quandoque habet tantum quantum omnes primae. “Just as the generation of the world and of the state of man is terminated at six ages, so also the relationship of kinship should be terminated at so many degrees.” In the world, the ages are not assigned as to substance, for this will endure in perpetuity, but as to state, for thus the world will pass away, and thus it grows old and declines; and according to this the ages of the world are distinguished metaphorically by their likeness to the age of one man. For the ages in man are differentiated according to different notable changes in his states. For this reason, the first age is called infancy, up until the seventh year; the second, childhood, is up to the fourteenth year; the third, adolescence, to the twentieth year; which three ages are sometimes counted as one; the fourth is youth up to fifty years; the fifth age is mature age, to seventy years; the sixth is old age, until the end. And similarly, in the world, the first age is said to be from Adam until Noah, in which the institution of the human race and the fall took place; the second from Noah to Abraham, in which the destruction of the human race by the flood and its renewal took place; the third from Abraham to David, in which the institution of circumcision happened; the fourth from David until the exile in Babylon, in which the law flourished under the kings and prophets; the fifth from the exile in Babylon until Christ, in which the captivity and liberation of the people occurred; the sixth from Christ until the end, in which there is the redemption of the human race. But nevertheless, it is not necessary that the ages of the human race be completed by an equal number of years, since neither are the ages of one man; for the last age of man sometimes has as much as all the previous. Distinctio 41 Distinction 41 De affinitate On affinity Postquam determinavit Magister de consanguinitatis impedimento, hic determinat de impedimento matrimonii quod provenit ex affinitate; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima ostendit quomodo affinitas matrimonium impediat; in secunda docet affinitatis nomina, ibi: attendendum est etiam illud Alexandri, etc. After the Master has considered the impediment of consanguinity, here he considers the impediment to marriage that arises from affinity; and this is divided into two parts: in the first he shows how affinity impedes marriage; in the second he gives the names of affinity, where he says: let that text of Alexander also be noted, etc. Prima in tres: in prima ostendit quomodo affinitas matrimonium impediat, sicut et consanguinitas; in secunda ostendit quomodo matrimonium propter consanguinitatem et affinitatem sit separandum, ibi: et est sciendum, quod Ecclesia infra praedictos gradus consanguinitatis conjunctos separat; in tertia determinat de incestu, quo consanguinitatis et affinitatis foedus per carnalem copulam violatur, per differentiam ad alia vitia ejusdem generis, ibi: hic dicendum est, quod aliud est fornicatio, aliud stuprum, etc. The first is in three parts: in the first he shows how affinity impedes marriage, just as consanguinity does; in the second he shows how a marriage may be dissolved because of consanguinity and affinity, where he says: and it is to be known that the Church separates those who are joined within the said degrees of consanguinity; in the third, he considers incest, in which the bond of consanguinity and affinity is violated by physical intimacy, by differentiating from other vices of the same genus, where he says: here it is to be said that fornication is one thing, defilement another thing, etc. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit quod affinitas ex matrimonio contracta impedit matrimonium; in secunda inquirit, utrum affinitas maneat matrimonio transeunte, quod ejus causa erat, ibi: illud non est praetermittendum quod Gregorius Venerio episcopo scripsit. The first is in two parts: in the first he shows that affinity from a marriage already contracted impedes marriage; in the second he inquires whether affinity remains once the marriage that caused it is over, where he says: nor is that to be passed over which Gregory wrote to Bishop Venerius. Prima in duas: in prima ostendit usque ad quot gradus affinitas matrimonium impedit, sicut et consanguinitas; in secunda objicit in contrarium, et solvit, ibi: sed alii videntur concedere, in quinta generatione inter affines contrahi conjugium. The first is in two parts: in the first he shows up to which degree affinity impedes marriage, just as consanguinity does; in the second, he objects to the contrary, and resolves the objection, where he says: but others appear to grant that marriage may be contracted between people related by affinity in the fifth degree. Quaestio 1 Question 2 De affinitate On affinity Hic quaeruntur quinque: Here five questions arise: primo, de causa affinitatis; first, concerning the cause of affinity; secundo, utrum impediat matrimonium, sicut et consanguinitas; second, whether it impedes marriage, as consanguinity does;