Ad sextum dicendum, quod hujusmodi oblatio candelarum vel olei possunt prodesse defuncto, inquantum sunt eleemosynae quaedam: dantur enim ad cultum Ecclesiae, vel etiam in usum fidelium. Reply Obj. 6: An offering of candles or oil like this can benefit the dead, inasmuch as they are a kind of almsgiving, for they are given for the Church’s worship, or for the use of the faithful. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod indulgentia dupliciter alicui prodesse potest: uno modo principaliter; alio modo secundario. Principaliter quidem prodest ei qui indulgentiam accipit, scilicet qui facit hoc pro quo indulgentia datur, ut qui visitat limina alicujus sancti; unde cum mortui non possint aliquid facere eorum pro quibus indulgentiae dantur, eis indulgentiae directe valere non possunt. Secundario autem et indirecte prosunt ei pro quo aliquis facit illud quod est indulgentiae causa, quod, sicut dist. 10, quaest. 1, art. 5, quaestiunc. 3, ad 2, dictum est, quandoque contingere potest, quandoque autem non potest, secundum diversam indulgentiae formam. To the second question, it should be said that indulgences can benefit someone in two ways: in one way, principally; in the other way, secondarily. Principally, it benefits someone who receives an indulgence, namely, the one who does what the indulgence is given for, like whoever visits the entrance of a certain holy place. For this reason, since the dead cannot do any of those things for which indulgences are given, indulgences cannot benefit them directly. However, secondarily and indirectly, they benefit the person for whom someone does whatever is the reason for the indulgence, which, as was said in Distinction 10, Question 1, Article 5, Quaestiuncula 3, response to the second objection, sometimes can happen, although sometimes it cannot, according to the different forms of indulgences. Si enim sit talis indulgentiae forma: quicumque facit hoc vel illud, habebit tantum de indulgentia: ille qui hoc facit, non potest fructum indulgentiae in alium transferre: quia ejus non est applicare ad aliquid intentionem Ecclesiae, per quam communicantur communia suffragia, ex quibus indulgentiae valent. Si autem indulgentia sub hac forma fiat: quicumque fecerit hoc vel illud, ipse et pater ejus, vel quicumque ei adjunctus in purgatorio detentus tantum de indulgentia habebit: talis indulgentia non solum vivo, sed etiam mortuo proderit. Non enim est aliqua ratio quare Ecclesia possit transferre merita communia, quibus indulgentiae innituntur, in vivos et non in mortuos. Nec tamen sequitur quod praelatus Ecclesiae possit pro suo arbitrio animas a purgatorio liberare: quia ad hoc quod indulgentiae valeant, requiritur causa conveniens indulgentias concedendi, ut supra, dist. 20, dictum est. For if the form of the indulgence is thus: whoever does this or that will have an indulgence of so much, then the one who does it cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another person, for it does not belong to him to apply to something else the Church’s intention, by which shared suffrages are communicated, which is how indulgences gain their force. However, if the indulgence is done under this form: whoever does this or that, he and his father or anyone related to him who is detained in purgatory will have an indulgence of so much, then this kind of indulgence would benefit not only the living person but also the deceased. For there is no reason that the Church could transfer its common merits, which indulgences depend on, to the living but not to the dead. However, it does not follow that the one in charge of the Church can free souls from purgatory at his own will, for in order for an indulgence to have value, a fitting reason for granting indulgences is required, as was said above in Distinction 20. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod sepultura adinventa est et propter vivos et propter mortuos. Propter vivos quidem, ne eorum oculi ex turpitudine cadaverum offendantur, et corpora foetoribus inficiantur; et hoc quantum ad corpus: sed spiritualiter etiam prodest vivis, inquantum per hoc astruitur resurrectionis fides. Sed mortuis prosunt ad hoc quod inspicientes sepulcra memoriam retineant defunctorum, ut pro defunctis orent; unde et monumentum a memoria nomen accepit. Dicitur enim monumentum, quia monet mentem, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de Cura pro mortuis gerenda. Paganorum tamen error fuit, quod ad hoc sepultura mortuo prosit, ut ejus anima quietem accipiat: non enim credebant prius animam quietem posse accipere quam corpus sepulturae daretur; quod omnino ridiculum et absurdum est. Sed quod ulterius sepultura in loco sacrato mortuo prodest, non quidem est ex ipso opere operato, sed magis ex ipso opere operante, dum scilicet vel ipse defunctus, vel alius, corpus ejus tumulari in loco sacro disponens, patrocinio alicujus sancti eum committit, cujus precibus per hoc credendus est adjuvari, et etiam patrocinio eorum qui loco sacro deserviunt, qui pro apud se tumulatis frequentius et specialius orant. To the third question, it should be said that burial was devised for the sake of both the living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be offended by the disgrace of corpses, and their bodies be infected by the stink. And this has to do with the body, but it benefits the living spiritually as well, inasmuch as faith in the resurrection is bolstered by it. But it benefits the dead in that those who see their tombs keep the deceased in memory, so that they may pray for them. This is why tombstones take their name from memory. For a tombstone is called a ‘monument,’ because it reminds the mind, as Augustine says in his book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead. However, it was an error of the pagans that burial benefitted the dead such that their souls would receive rest, for they did not believe the soul could receive rest before the body was given a burial, which is in every way ridiculous and absurd. But that burial in a consecrated place benefits the deceased is not at all by the work itself performed, but rather from the work of the person doing it, namely, when either the deceased person himself or someone else arranges for his body to be entombed in a sacred place, he commits him to the protection of a certain saint, by whose prayers he is believed to be helped, and also to the protection of those who serve in the sacred place, who pray often and particularly for those buried near them. Sed illa quae ad ornatum sepulturae exhibentur, prosunt quidem vivis inquantum sunt vivorum solatia; sed possunt et defunctis prodesse, non quidem per se, sed per accidens; inquantum scilicet, per hujusmodi, homines excitantur ad compatiendum, et per consequens ad orandum; vel inquantum ex sumptibus sepulturae vel pauperes fructum capiunt, vel Ecclesia decoratur: sic enim Sap. 4, sepultura inter ceteras eleemosynas computatur. But those things that are displayed for the decoration of tombs do benefit the living as a source of comfort for the living. But they can benefit the dead too; not indeed in themselves, but incidentally; namely, inasmuch as by things like this men are inspired to compassion and consequently to prayer; or inasmuch as from the costs of the burial either the poor gain the proceeds or the church is adorned; for this is how burial is counted among other modes of almsgiving in Wisdom 4. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod oleum et cera ad sepulcra defunctorum perlata, per accidens defuncto prosunt: vel inquantum Ecclesiae offeruntur, sive pauperibus dantur, vel inquantum hujusmodi in reverentiam Dei fiunt; unde verbis praemissis subjungitur: oleum enim et cera holocaustum sunt. Reply Obj. 1: Oil and beeswax brought to the tomb of someone deceased benefit that person incidentally, either inasmuch as they are offered to the Church or given to the poor, or inasmuch as such things are done in reverence for God. This is why it is added to the words quoted: for oil and beeswax are a holocaust. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ideo sancti patres de suis corporibus tumulandis curaverunt, ut ostenderent corpora mortuorum ad Dei providentiam pertinere; non quod corporibus mortuis aliquis sensus insit, sed propter fidem resurrectionis astruendam, ut patet per Augustinum in 1 de Civ. Dei; unde etiam voluerunt in terra promissionis sepeliri, ubi credebant Christum nasciturum et moriturum; cujus resurrectio nostrae resurrectionis est causa. Reply Obj. 2: The reason the holy patriarchs took care that their bodies were buried was so that they might show that the bodies of the dead belong to the providence of God; not that any feeling remained in dead bodies, but for the sake of bolstering faith in the resurrection, as is clear from Augustine in the City of God 1. This was also why they wished to be buried in the promised land, where they believed the Christ would be born and die, whose resurrection is the cause of our resurrection. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia caro est pars naturae hominis, naturaliter homo ad carnem suam afficitur, secundum illud Ephes. 5, 29: nemo carnem suam unquam odio habuit. Unde secundum istum naturalem affectum inest viventi quaedam sollicitudo quid etiam post mortem de ejus corpore sit futurum; doleretque, si aliquid indignum corpori suo evenire praesentiret; et ideo illi qui hominem diligunt, ex hoc quod affectui ejus quem diligunt, conformantur, circa ejus carnem curam humanitatis impendunt. Ut enim dicit Augustinus in 1 de Civ. Dei: si paterna vestis, si annulus, ac si quid hujusmodi tanto carius sunt posteris, quanto erga parentes major affectus; nullo modo ipsa spernenda sunt corpora, quae utique multo familiarius atque conjunctius quam quaelibet indumenta, gestamus. Unde et inquantum affectui hominis satisfacit sepeliens ejus corpus, cum ipse in hoc sibi satisfacere non potest, eleemosynam ei facere dicitur. Reply Obj. 3: Since flesh is part of the nature of man, a man has a natural affection toward his own flesh, according to Ephesians 5:29: no man ever hates his own flesh. Therefore, according to this natural affection there is a certain solicitude in anyone living forwhat will happen concerning his body even after death, and he would be pained if he foresaw that anything shameful would happen to his body. And therefore those who love a person, from the fact that they are conformed to the affection of the one they love, devote humane care to his flesh. As Augustine says in City of God 1: If a father’s garments, or a ring of his, or anything like this is so much dearer to his descendents the greater their love for their parents, then in no way are their bodies to be despised, which we wear more closely and more intimately than any clothing. Therefore, inasmuch as it satisfies someone’s affections when he buries a man’s body, since the man himself cannot satisfy himself in this regard, it is said to be an act of almsgiving to him. Ad quartum dicendum, quod fidelium devotio, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Cura pro mortuis gerenda, suis caris in locis sacris providens sepulturam, in hoc non frustratur quod defunctum suum suffragio sanctorum committit, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 4: The devotion of the faithful who provide tombs for their loved ones in sacred places, as Augustine says in the book On the Care to be Taken for the Dead, is not in vain inasmuch as they commit their dead to the suffrage of the saints, as has been said. Ad quintum dicendum, quod sepultura in loco sacro impio defuncto non nocet, nisi quatenus hanc sepulturam sibi indignam propter humanam gloriam procuravit. Reply Obj. 5: Burial in a sacred place does not harm someone wicked who has died, except to the extent that he procured this tomb for himself unworthily for the sake of human glory. Articulus 4 Article 4 Quantum prosint How much good they do Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod suffragia quae fiunt pro uno defuncto, non magis proficiunt ei pro quo fiunt, quam aliis. Lumen enim spirituale est magis communicabile quam lumen corporale. Sed lumen corporale, scilicet candelae, quamvis accendatur pro uno, tamen aequaliter omnibus prodest qui simul commorantur, quamvis pro eis candela non accendatur. Ergo cum suffragia sint quaedam spiritualia lumina, quamvis pro uno specialiter fiant, non magis valerent ei quam aliis in purgatorio existentibus. Obj. 1: To the fourth question, we proceed thus. It seems that the intercessory acts that are done for someone deceased do not do more for him than for any other people. For spiritual light is more communicable than physical light. But physical light, like that of a candle, although it may be lit for one person, nevertheless benefits equally all those who abide together with him, even if the candle was not lit for them. Therefore, since suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, even if they are done for one person in particular, they do not work more for him than for others dwelling in purgatory. Praeterea, sicut in littera dicitur, secundum hoc suffragia mortuis prosunt, quia cum viverent hic, sibi ut postea possent prodesse, meruerunt. Sed aliqui magis meruerunt ut suffragia sibi prodessent quam illi pro quibus fiunt. Ergo eis magis prosunt; alias eorum meritum frustraretur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in the text, suffrages benefit the dead according as, when they were alive, they merited for themselves that afterward they should benefit. But some people merited such that suffrages would benefit them more than those for whom they are done. Therefore, they benefit them more; otherwise their merits would be in vain. Praeterea, pro pauperibus non fiunt tot suffragia quot pro divitibus. Si ergo suffragia facta pro aliquibus, eis solum, vel magis eis quam aliis valerent, pauperes essent deterioris conditionis; quod est contra sententiam Domini, Luc. 6, 20: beati pauperes, quoniam vestrum est regnum Dei. Obj. 3: Furthermore, not as many suffrages are done for poor people as for the rich. Therefore, if suffrages done for people benefited only them, or benefited them more than others, poor people would be in a worse condition, which is against the words of the Lord: blessed are you poor, for yours is the kingdom of God (Luke 6:20). Sed contra, justitia humana exemplatur a divina justitia. Sed justitia humana, si aliquis debitum pro aliquo solvit, eum solum absolvit. Ergo cum ille qui suffragia facit, quodammodo solvat debitum ejus pro quo facit, ei soli proderit. On the contrary, human justice follows the example of divine justice. But in human justice, if someone pays a debt for another, only that person is released from the debt. Therefore, since someone who performs suffrages in a certain way pays the debt of the one for whom he does them, it will only benefit that person. Praeterea, sicut homo faciens suffragia quodammodo satisfacit mortuo, ita et interdum aliquis pro vivo potest satisfacere, ut supra, dist. 20, quaest. 1, art. 2, quaestiunc. 3, in corp., dictum est. Sed quando aliquis satisfacit pro vivo, satisfactio illa non computatur nisi illi pro quo facta est. Ergo et suffragia faciens, ei soli prodest pro quo facit. Furthermore, just as a man doing suffrages in a certain way makes satisfaction for a dead man, so too sometimes someone can make satisfaction for a living man, as was said above in Distinction 20, Question 1, Article 2, Quaestiuncula 3. But when someone satisfies for a living man, that satisfaction only counts for the one for whom it was done. Therefore, when someone performs suffrages, that too benefits only the one for whom it is done. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod suffragia facta pro multis tantumdem valeant singulis ac si pro unoquoque singulariter fierent. Videmus enim quod ex lectione quae uni legitur, nihil ei deperit, si simul et alii legatur. Ergo et eadem ratione nihil deperit ei pro quo fit suffragium, si ei aliquis connumeretur; et ita si pro pluribus fiat, tantum valet singulis ac si pro unoquoque singulariter fieret. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that suffrages done for many people are worth as much as if they were done for each person individually. For we see that from the reading that is read to one person, nothing is lost if it is read to others at the same time. Therefore, by the same argument, nothing is lost to someone for whom a suffrage is done, if someone else is included with him. And so if it were done for several people, it would be worth as much for each one as if it had been done for each person individually. Praeterea, secundum communem usum Ecclesiae videmus, quod cum Missa pro aliquo defuncto dicitur, simul etiam orationes illic adjunguntur pro aliis defunctis. Hoc autem non fieret, si ex hoc defunctus pro quo Missa dicitur, aliquod detrimentum reportaret. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the common use of the Church, we see that when Mass is said for a certain deceased person, at the same time prayers are also added for others of the dead. But this would not be done if the deceased for whom the Mass is said suffered any loss by it. Therefore, the same as before. Praeterea, suffragia, praecipue orationum, innituntur divinae virtuti. Sed apud Deum sicut non differt juvare per multos vel per paucos, ita non differt juvare multos vel paucos. Ergo quantum juvaretur unus ex una oratione, si pro eo tantum fieret; tantum juvabuntur singuli multorum, si eadem oratio pro multis fiat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, suffrages, especially of prayers, depend on divine power. But for God, just as it does not differ whether he helps through many people or through few, so it does not differ if he helps many or few. Therefore, as much as one person may be helped by one prayer if it were done for him alone, many individuals will also be helped if the same prayer were said for many. Sed contra, melius est plures juvare quam unum. Si ergo suffragium pro multis factum tantum valeret singulis ac si pro uno tantum fieret; videtur quod Ecclesia non debuit instituisse ut pro aliquo singulariter Missa vel oratio fieret; sed quod semper diceretur pro omnibus fidelibus defunctis; quod patet esse falsum. On the contrary, it is better to help many rather than one. Therefore, if a suffrage done for many were worth as much to each as if it had been done for one person alone, it would seem that the Church should not have established that a Mass or prayer be said for anyone individually, but that it would always be said for all the faithful departed; which is evidently false. Praeterea, suffragium habet finitam efficaciam. Ergo distributum in multos, minus prodest singulis quam prodesset si fieret pro uno tantum. Furthermore, a suffrage has a finite efficacy. Therefore, when distributed over many people, it does less good for them individually than it would do for one person alone. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod tantum valeant suffragia communia illis pro quibus specialia non fiunt, quantum illis pro quibus fiunt, valent specialia et communia simul. Unicuique enim secundum propria merita reddetur in futuro. Sed ille pro quo non fiunt suffragia, meruit ut tantum juvaretur post mortem, quantum ille pro quo fiunt specialia. Ergo tantum juvabitur per communia, quantum ille per specialia et communia. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that general suffrages work for those for whom they are not specifically done, as much as they do for those for whom they are done both specifically and generally. For in the future it will be rendered to each person according to his proper merits. But someone for whom suffrages are not done merited to be helped after death as much as someone for whom they were specifically done. Therefore, he will be helped as much by general suffrages as another person would be by specific and general ones. Praeterea, inter Ecclesiae suffragia praecipuum est Eucharistia. Sed Eucharistia, cum contineat totum Christum, habet quodammodo efficaciam infinitam. Ergo una oblatio Eucharistiae quae communiter pro omnibus fit, valet ad plenam liberationem eorum qui sunt in purgatorio; et ita tantum juvant communia suffragia sola, quantum juvant specialia et communia simul. Obj. 2: Furthermore, among the Church’s suffrages, the Eucharist is preeminent. But since the Eucharist contains the whole Christ, it has in some way an infinite efficacy. Therefore, the one offering of the Eucharist that is done generally for all men avails for the full liberation of those who are in purgatory. And in this way general suffrages alone help as much as specific and general ones together. Sed contra est quod duo bona uno sunt magis eligenda. Ergo suffragia communia et specialia magis prosunt ei pro quo fiunt, quam communia tantum. On the contrary, two goods should be chosen over one alone. Therefore, general and specific suffrages are more beneficial to the person for whom they are done than general ones alone. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. I answer that, there are two opinions about this. Quidam enim, ut Praepositinus, dixerunt, quod suffragia pro uno aliquo facta, non magis prosunt ei pro quo fiunt, sed eis qui sunt magis digni; et ponebat exemplum de candela quae accenditur pro aliquo divite; quae non minus aliis prodest qui cum eo sunt quam ipsi diviti, et forte magis, si habeant oculos clariores; et etiam de lectione, quae non magis prodest ei pro quo legitur quam aliis qui simul cum eo audiunt, sed forte aliis magis qui sunt sensu capaciores. Et si eis objiceretur, quod secundum hoc Ecclesiae ordinatio esset vana, quae specialiter pro aliquibus orationes instituit, dicebant, quod hoc Ecclesia fecit ad excitandas devotiones fidelium, qui promptiores sunt ad facienda specialia suffragia quam communia, et ferventius etiam pro suis propinquis orant quam pro extraneis. Alii e contrario dixerunt, quod suffragia magis valent pro quo fiunt. For some people, like Praepositinus, have said that suffrages done for one certain person do more good not to the one for whom they are done, but to those who are more worthy; and he gave the example of a candle that is lit for a rich person, which does not benefit less the others who are with the rich man, and perhaps benefits them more, if they have clearer eyes. And also the example of reading, which does not benefit the one for whom it is read more than the others who hear it along with him, but perhaps it benefits the others more, if they are more apt for understanding. And if it were objected to these people that according to this the Church’s ordinances, which establish prayers specifically for certain people, would be in vain, they would say that the Church does this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are quicker to do specific suffrages than general ones, and they also pray more fervently for their own loved ones than for strangers. Others have said the contrary, that suffrages do more for those for whom they are done. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid veritatem habet. Valor enim suffragiorum potest pensari ex duobus. Valent enim uno modo ex virtute caritatis, quae facit omnia bona communia; et secundum hoc verum est quod magis valent ei qui magis caritate est plenus, quamvis pro eo specialiter non fiant; et sic valor suffragiorum attenditur magis secundum quamdam interiorem consolationem, secundum quod unus in caritate existens, de bonis alterius delectatur post mortem, quantum ad diminutionem poenae: post mortem enim non est locus acquirendi gratiam vel augmentandi, ad quod valent nobis in vita opera aliorum ex virtute caritatis. Alio modo suffragia valent ex hoc quod per intentionem unius alteri applicantur; et sic satisfactio unius alteri computatur; et hoc modo non est dubium quod magis valent ei pro quo fiunt, immo sic ei soli valent. Satisfactio enim proprie ad poenae dimissionem ordinatur; unde quantum ad dimissionem poenae praecipue valet suffragium ei pro quo fit; et secundum hoc secunda opinio plus habet de veritate quam prima. However, both opinions contain truth in a certain respect. For the value of the suffrages can be thought about from two sides. For they have value in one way from the virtue of charity, which makes all good things common; and according to this it is true that they are worth more for the one who is more filled with charity, even if they are not especially done for him. And this is how the value of the suffrages counts as more according to a certain interior consolation, as one person who has charity enjoys the good deeds of another after death, as to the diminishment of punishment; for after death there is no place for acquiring or increasing grace, for which others’ works avail us in life by the virtue of charity. In another way intercessory deeds have value from the fact that by one person’s intention they are applied to another person. And this is how the satisfaction of one person is counted for another, and in this way there is no doubt that they are worth more for the person for whom they are done; on the contrary, in this way they benefit him alone. For satisfaction is properly directed to the remission of punishment. Therefore, as to the remission of punishment a suffrage works particularly for the one for whom it is done; and according to this the second opinion contains more truth than the first. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod suffragia prosunt per modum luminis, inquantum a mortuis acceptantur; et ex hoc quamdam consolationem recipiunt, et tanto majorem, quanto majori caritate sunt praediti. Sed inquantum suffragia sunt quaedam satisfactio per intentionem facientis translata in alterum, non sunt similia lumini, sed magis solutioni alicujus debiti. Non autem est necesse ut si debitum pro uno solvitur, quod ex hoc aliorum debitum solvatur. Reply Obj. 1: Suffrages are beneficial in the way that light is insofar as they are received by the dead, who receive a certain consolation from them, which is greater the more they are endowed with charity. But according as acts of intercession are a kind of satisfaction by the doer’s intention of transferring them to another, they are not like light, but rather like the payment of a debt. But it is not necessary that if one person’s debt is paid, the debts of others should be paid by it. Ad secundum dicendum, quod istud meritum est conditionale, quo sibi meruerunt: hoc enim modo sibi meruerunt ut sibi prodessent, si pro eis fierent; quod nihil aliud fuit quam facere se habiles ad recipiendum. Unde patet quod non directe meruerunt illud juvamen suffragiorum; sed per merita praecedentia se habilitaverunt, ut fructum suffragiorum susciperent: et ideo non sequitur quod meritum eorum frustretur. Reply Obj. 2: The merit by which they merit for themselves is conditional, for for the merited in such a way that suffrages would beneft them if they were done for them, which was nothing other than making themselves suited to receiving it. Therefore, it is clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of those suffrages, but by their prior merits they made themselves capable of receiving the fruits of these suffrages. And therefore it does not follow that their merit would be in vain.