De divina justitia et misericordia
Divine Justice and Mercy
Postquam determinavit Magister de receptaculis animarum in quibus puniuntur vel praemiantur ante resurrectionem communem et judicium generale, et de suffragiis quibus juvamus mortuos, vel juvamur ab eis; hic determinat de divina justitia et misericordia, quibus praedicta omnia dispensantur.
After the Master has considered the places for souls in which they are punished or rewarded before the common resurrection and the general judgment, and the suffrages by which we help the dead or are helped by them, here he considers divine justice and mercy, by which all these matters are arranged.
Dividitur autem in partes duas: in prima determinat de divina justitia et misericordia secundum operationem ad poenam damnatorum; in secunda determinat de eis in generali, ibi: sed quomodo justitiam Dei et pietatem, idest misericordiam, supra Cassiodorus duas esse res dixit?
Now it is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers divine justice and mercy according to their action in the punishment of the damned; in the second, he considers them in general, at: But how is it that Cassiodorus, above, said that God’s justice and pity, that is, his mercy, are “two things”?
Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod misericordia Dei in poenis damnatorum locum non habet; secundo ostendit contrarium, ibi: sed his occurrit quod ait Cassiodorus. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi: unde non incongrue dici potest, etc.
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he shows that God’s mercy has no place in the punishment of the damned; second, he shows the contrary, at: But this is contradicted by what Cassiodorus says. Third, he determines the truth, at: Hence it may not unsuitably be said.
Circa quod tria facit: primo proponit quid sit verum circa quaestionem praedictam: secundo solvit auctoritatem quae est in contrarium, ibi: quod igitur dictum est etc.; tertio exponit quod dixerat, scilicet quod sit occultum Dei judicium, ibi: cujus occultum judicium intelligitur poena, qua quisque vel exercetur ad purgationem, vel admonetur ad conversionem.
Concerning this he does three things: first, he proposes what the truth is about this question; second, he resolves the authority that is to the contrary, at: And so that statement; third, he explains what he said, namely, that God’s judgment is secret, at: By his “hidden judgment is understood the pain, by which each one now is either disciplined unto purification or warned to conversion.”
Sed quomodo Dei justitiam et pietatem . . . supra Cassiodorus duas esse res dixit? Hic determinat multipliciter de justitia et misericordia Dei in communi; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima inquirit de differentia justitiae et misericordiae Dei; in secunda inquirit quomodo justitia et misericordia concurrunt ad opus divinum, ibi: post haec considerari oportet, ex quo sensu universae viae Domini dicantur misericordia et veritas.
But how is it that Cassiodorus, above, said that God’s justice and pity, that is, his mercy, are “two things”? Here he determines many things about God’s justice and mercy in general; and it is divided into two parts: in the first, he inquires about the difference between God’s justice and mercy; in the second, he inquires how justice and mercy coincide in God’s work, at: After these matters, it is suitable to consider in what sense “all the ways of the Lord are called mercy and truth.”
Circa primum duo facit: primo movet quaestiones; secundo determinat eas, ibi: his responderi potest.
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he raises questions; second, he considers them, at: To these words it may be answered as follows.
Circa primum duo facit: primo inquirit, utrum sit idem in Deo justitia et misericordia; secundo utrum eadem opera debeant justitiae et misericordiae attribui, ibi: cur igitur dicit Scriptura de operibus Dei, quaedam esse misericordiae, quaedam justitiae?
Concerning the first he does two things: first, he inquires whether justice and mercy are the same in God; second, whether the same works should be attributed to justice and mercy, at: Why, then, does Scripture say of God’s works that some pertain to mercy, some to justice?
His responderi potest, etc. Hic solvit propositas quaestiones; et circa hoc duo facit: primo solvit primam; secundo secundam, ibi: quod autem opera quaedam, etc.
To these words it may be answered as follows. Here he resolves the questions raised; and concerning this he does two things: first, he resolves the first question; second, he resolves the second, at: So it is that some works.
Circa primum tria facit: primo solvit primam quaestionem; secundo movet dubitationem circa solutionem positam, ibi: sed secundum hoc occurrit quaestio etc.; tertio solvit dubitationem, ibi: sed dixi supra, etc.
Concerning the first he does three things: first, he resolves the first question; second, he raises a doubt about the resolution offered, at: But in accordance with this distinction, a question arises; third, he resolves the doubt, at: But I said above.
Post haec considerari oportet, ex quo sensu universae viae Domini dicantur misericordia et veritas. Hic inquirit quomodo misericordia et justitia Dei occurrunt ad opus ipsius; et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod nullum opus Dei est ad quod non concurrat misericordia Dei vel justitia; secundo inquirit, an ad quodlibet opus concurrat utrumque, ibi: sed cum superius Cassiodorus dixerit, in his duobus omnia opera Dei includi, merito quaeri potest, etc.
After these matters, it is suitable to consider in what sense “all the ways of the Lord are called mercy and truth.” Here he inquires how God’s mercy and justice occur in his work. And concerning this he does two things: first, he shows that there is no work of God’s in which his mercy and justice do not agree. Second, he inquires whether both coincide in every work of his, at: But since Cassiodorus said above that all God’s works are included in these two, it can justly be asked, etc.
Et circa hoc duo facit: primo proponit quaestionem; secundo solvit eam, ibi: quibusdam placuit. Et dividitur in partes duas, secundum quod duas opiniones ponit circa hanc quaestionem; secunda incipit ibi: aliis autem videtur, etc.
And concerning this he does two things: first, he proposes the question; second, he resolves it, at: It seemed to some. And it is divided into two parts, according as he gives two opinions about this question; the second part begins at: But to others it seems that.
De divina justitia
Hic duo quaeruntur. Primo de divina justitia. Secundo de ejus misericordia.
Here two questions arise. First, about divine justice. Second, about his mercy.
Circa primum quaeruntur tria:
Concerning the first, three questions arise:
primo, an justitia Deo debeat attribui;
First, whether justice should be attributed to God.
secundo, de justitiae ejus effectu;
Second, concerning the effect of his justice.
tertio, de justitia ejus contra damnatos.
Third, about his justice against the damned.
An justitia Deo debeat attribui
Whether justice should be attributed to God
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod justitia Deo attribuenda non sit. Quia, secundum Philosophum in 10 Ethic., ridiculum est laudare deos secundum aliquam virtutem moralem, vel actiones virtutum moralium eis attribuere. Sed justitia est virtus moralis. Ergo Deo attribui non potest.
Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that justice should not be attributed to God. For according to the Philosopher in Ethics 10, it is ridiculous to praise the gods for any moral virtue, or to attribute to them acts of moral virtue. But justice is a moral virtue. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to God.
Praeterea, justitia contra temperantiam dividitur. Sed temperantiam non attribuimus Deo. Ergo nec justitiam ei attribuere debemus.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, justice is divided against temperance. But we do not attribute temperance to God. Therefore, neither should we attribute justice to him.
Praeterea, justitia in aequalitate consistit, ut patet per Philosophum in 5 Ethic. Sed nihil potest Deo esse aequale. Ergo non potest esse aliqua justitia ejus ad alterum.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, justice consists in an equality, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 5. But nothing can be equal to God. Therefore, there cannot be any justice of God toward another.
Praeterea, Philosophus in 5 Ethic. dicit, quod domini ad servum non est justitia. Sed Deus est omnium dominator. Ergo ei justitia non competit.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in Ethics 5, that there is no justice of a lord toward his servant. But God is master of all people. Therefore, justice does not apply to him.
Sed contra est quod, in Psal. 10, dicitur: justus Dominus, et justitias dilexit.
On the contrary, it is said in Psalm 11 (10):7: the Lord is just; he loves just deeds.
Praeterea, omne quod est potissimum, est Deo attribuendum. Sed secundum Philosophum in 5 Ethic., justitia est praeclarissima virtutum. Ergo maxime debet attribui Deo.
Furthermore, everything that is most powerful is to be attributed to God. But according to the Philosopher in Ethics 5, justice is the most preeminent of the virtues. Therefore, it should be attributed to God above all.
Ulterius. Videtur quod in Deo secundum eamdem rationem dicatur bonitas et justitia. Quia justitia est universaliter omnis virtus, ut patet per Philosophum in 5 Ethic. Sed virtus uniuscujusque rei est bonitas ipsius; quia virtus est quae bonum habentem facit, et opus ejus bonum reddit, ut patet in 2 Ethic. Ergo secundum eamdem rationem dicitur justus et bonus.
Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the terms ‘goodness’ and ‘justice’ are applied to God with the same meaning. For justice is universally every virtue, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 5. But the virtue of each thing is its goodness, for virtue is what makes something good, and makes its work good, as is evident in Ethics 2. Therefore, according to the same account someone is called good and just.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit quod justitia laudatur in Deo, inquantum omnibus secundum dignitatem distribuit. Sed distribuere omnibus, ad rationem bonitatis pertinet, quia totius communicationis divina bonitas causa est. Ergo justitia et bonitas dicuntur in Deo secundum eamdem rationem.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius says that justice is praised in God, inasmuch as he distributes to all things according to their dignity. But to distribute to all things pertains to the notion of goodness, for divine goodness is the cause of all sharing. Therefore, justice and goodness are said of God according to the same account.
Praeterea, bonitas et justitia magis conveniunt in Deo quam conveniant in creaturis. Sed in creaturis eadem videtur esse ratio bonitatis et justitiae; nisi enim ex hoc ipso quod creata sunt bona, justa essent, inconvenienter videretur quod a Deo bono omnia essent bona, et ab eo justo non essent omnia justa. Ergo in Deo secundum eamdem rationem dicitur bonitas et justitia.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, goodness and justice coincide in God more than in his creatures. But in creatures the accounts of goodness and justice seem to be the same, for if it were not the case that by the fact that God created things good, they were also just, it would unfittingly seem to be the case that everything from the good God would be good, but not everything from the just God would be just. Therefore, in God goodness and justice are said according to the same account.
Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdom.: bonum esse ad essentiam, justum vero esse ad actum respicit. Sed esse et actus non dicuntur secundum eamdem rationem in Deo. Ergo nec justitia et bonitas.
On the contrary, Boethius says in his book On the Hebdomads: To be good regards the essence, but to be just regards the act. But being and action are not said according to the same account in God. Therefore, neither are justice and goodness.
Praeterea, generis et speciei non est omnino eadem ratio. Sed bonitas et justitia se habent ut genus et species; unde Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdom.: bonum quidem est generale, justum autem speciale. Ergo non est eadem ratio omnino bonitatis et justitiae.
Furthermore, genus and species do not have the same account. But goodness and justice are related as genus and species. This is why Boethius says in his book On the Hebdomads: The good is indeed general, but the just is specific. Therefore, goodness and justice do not have entirely the same account.