Praeterea, justitia nunquam reddit aequalibus nisi aequalia. Sed Deus quandoque aequalibus inaequalia tribuit; ante enim quam Jacob et Esau nati essent, aut aliquid boni vel mali egissent, omnino aequales erant; et tamen uni praeparavit gloriam, et alteri poenam, ut patet Rom. 9. Similiter cum Aaron et filii Israel peccassent aequaliter in idoli adoratione, Aaron non est punitus, cum populus punitus fuerit, ut patet Exod. 21. Ergo videtur quod non in omnibus justitiam servet. Obj. 5: Furthermore, justice only ever renders equal things to equals. But sometimes God grants unequal things to equals, for before Jacob and Esau were born or had done anything of good or evil, they were completely equal, and yet he prepared glory for one and punishment for the other, as is evident from Romans 9. Likewise, when Aaron and the children of Israel sinned equally in adoring the idol, Aaron was not punished when the people were punished, as is evident from Exodus 21. Therefore, it seems that he does not keep justice in everything. Praeterea, hoc videtur esse injustum, ut meliori minus detur de bonis, et magis de malis. Sed bona temporalia aliquando abundantius dantur a Deo malis quam bonis, et poenae quandoque magis inferuntur bonis quam malis. Ergo videtur quod non in omni opere suo justitiam servet cum misericordia. Obj. 6: Furthermore, it seems to be unjust that a better person should be given less of good things and more of bad things. But temporal goods are sometimes given by God more abundantly to bad people than to the good, and punishments are sometimes imposed more on the good than the bad. Therefore, it seems that he does not preserve justice with his mercy in every one of his works. Sed contra, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Concordia Evangelistarum: Deus, qui res humanas curat, juste et misericorditer curat, ut nec praecludat misericordia justitiam, nec justitia misericordiam excludat. Ergo videtur quod in omni opere Domini justitia et misericordia conveniant. On the contrary (1), Augustine says in his Harmony of the Gospels: God, who cares for human things, cares justly and mercifully, so that neither does his mercy preclude his justice, nor his justice exclude his mercy. Therefore, it seems that justice and mercy come together in every work of the Lord. Praeterea, non magis differt in Deo justitia et misericordia, quam potentia, bonitas et sapientia. Sed omne opus potentiae est opus sapientiae et bonitatis. Ergo videtur quod similiter omne opus justitiae sit misericordiae, et e converso. Furthermore (2), justice and mercy do not differ in God more than power, goodness, and wisdom. But every work of God’s power is a work of his wisdom and goodness. Therefore, it seems that similarly every work of justice is a work of mercy, and vice versa. Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod in opere Dei principalior sit justitia quam misericordia. Quia, ut dicitur Hebr. 10, 4, horrendum est incidere in manus Dei viventis. Sed hoc non esset, si misericordia principalior in ejus opere esset. Ergo justitia magis in opere Dei principatur quam misericordia. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that in the work of God justice is more principal than mercy. For as it says in Hebrews 10:31: it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. But this would not be the case if mercy were foremost in his work. Therefore, justice rules in his work more than mercy. Praeterea, illud quod est prius in quolibet genere, est principalius. Sed justitia videtur esse prior quam misericordia; quia misericordia ex justitia nascitur, ut dicit Anselmus in Proslogio. Ergo justitia principalior est in opere Dei quam misericordia. Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is first in any genus is more principal. But justice seems to be prior to mercy, for mercy is born from justice, as Anselm says in his Proslogion. Therefore, justice is more important in God’s work than mercy. Praeterea, illud quod inest alicui secundum se, principalius ei convenit quam quod convenit ei secundum alterum. Sed, sicut dicit Anselmus in Proslog., parcendo malis justus es secundum te et non secundum nos, sicut misertus es secundum nos et non secundum te; et sic misericordia competit Deo secundum nos; sed justitia secundum seipsum. Ergo principalior est in opere Dei justitia quam misericordia. Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is in something according to itself belongs to it more principally than what belongs to it according to another. But as Anselm says in his Proslogion: you are just, sparing the wicked according to yourself and not according to us, just as you have mercy according to us and not according to yourself. And so mercy applies to God according to us; but justice according to himself. Therefore, justice is more principal in the work of God than mercy. Sed contra est quod dicitur Jacob. 2, 12: superexaltat autem misericordia judicium; idest, superponetur misericordia in judicio, ut Glossa dicit; et in Psalm. 144, 9: miserationes ejus super omnia opera ejus. Ergo misericordia principalior est in opere Dei quam justitia. On the contrary (1), it is said: yet mercy triumphs over judgment (Jas 2:13); that is, mercy is given the highest place in judgment, as the Gloss says. Likewise Psalm 145 (144):9: his mercies are above all his works. Therefore, mercy is more principal in God’s work than justice. Praeterea, illud quod est proprium alicui, principalius ei convenit quam id quod est alienum ab eo. Sed proprium opus Dei est misereri et parcere; et opus punitionis est alienum ab eo, ut patet Exod. 22. Ergo misericordia principalior est in opere Dei quam justitia. Furthermore (2), what is proper to someone belongs to him more principally than what is alien to him. But it is proper to the work of God to have mercy and to spare; and the work of punishing is alien to him, as is evident from Exodus 22. Therefore, mercy is more principal in the work of God than justice. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod agens et patiens semper debent sibi proportionaliter respondere; ita quod hoc modo se habeat agens ad actionem, sicut patiens ad passionem. Ea autem quae sunt inaequalia, non habent similem proportionem nisi ad inaequalia: sicut enim senarius est major quaternario; ita et ternarius, cujus duplum est senarius, est major binario, cujus duplum est quaternarius. Et inde est quod quandocumque agens excedit patiens, oportet quod actio excedat passionem; sicut videmus in omnibus agentibus aequivocis, quia patiens non recipit effectum totum actionis. Dans autem se habet per modum agentis, et recipiens per modum patientis; et ideo quando dans superexcedit recipientem, conveniens est ut datio excedat illam receptionem quae est proportionata recipienti. Et ideo cum Deus sit excellentissimus dator propter abundantiam suae bonitatis, oportet quod semper ejus datio in bonis superexcedat receptionem quae est proportionata recipienti. Pro eodem autem computatur minus malum et majus bonum, ut dicitur in 5 Ethic.; et ideo Deus semper dat ultra condignum de bonis, et semper mala poenae irrogat citra condignum. I answer that, an agent and what it works upon must always correspond to each other proportionally, so that the agent is related to the action in the same way as the patient to what happens to it. But those things that are unequal do not have a like proportion except to unequal things: for just as six is greater than four, so three, whose double is six, is greater than two, whose double is four. And this is why however much the agent exceeds the patient, it is necessary that the action exceeds the passion, as we see in every equivocal agent, because the patient does not receive the whole effect of the action. Now the giver stands in the role of agent, and the receiver in the role of patient; and thus when the giver exceeds the receiver, it is fitting that the giving exceeds that receiving which is proportioned to the receiver. And thus, since God is the most excellent giver because of the abundance of his goodness, it is necessary that his giving of good things always exceed the reception that is proportioned to the recipient. Now less evil is counted the same as more good, as is said in the Ethics 5; and therefore God always gives good things beyond what is deserved, and always imposes the evils of punishment less than is deserved. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quantum et tantum non important aequalitatem quantitatis, sed proportionis, in auctoritate inducta. Poenae autem proportio ad culpam potest intelligi dupliciter: vel in generali, vel in speciali. In generali quidem; ut qui peccavit, puniatur; et qui multum peccavit, multum puniatur. In speciali autem dupliciter: vel accipiendo proportionem poenae ad culpam secundum debitum culpae absolute; vel praesupposita mitigatione divinae misericordiae, quae aliquid de poena remittit. Primo igitur et tertio modo nunquam Deus punit citra condignum: quia semper peccantes multum punit: nec aliquid de poena dimittitur quae post mitigationem divinae misericordiae remanet. Sed quantum ad secundum modum semper punitur aliquis citra condignum: quia non tantum punitur quis, quantum per culpam meruit. Reply Obj. 1: ‘As much’ and ‘so much’ do not mean an equality of quantity but of proportion in the authority quoted. Now the proportion of punishment to fault can be understood in two ways: either in general or specifically. In general, such that anyone who sinned is punished; and anyone who sinned much, is much punished. However, specifically, there are two ways: either by taking the proportion of punishment to fault according to what is due to the fault absolutely, or having presupposed its mitigation by divine mercy, which forgives something of the punishment. Therefore, in the first and third modes God never punishes less than is deserved, for he always punishes sinners much, nor is any of the punishment that remains after the mitigation of divine mercy forgiven. But as to the second mode, a person is always punished less than he deserves, for no one is punished as much as he has merited by his fault. Vel dicendum, et melius, quod aequalitas ista proportionalitatis est, non aequalitatis; et attendenda est non secundum comparationem poenae ad culpam, sed secundum proportionem duorum peccantium ad duas poenas; ut scilicet qui plus peccavit, plus puniatur; et secundum quod exceditur in peccato, sic excedatur in poena; et sic etiam intelligendae sunt omnes auctoritates quae videntur aequalitatem culpae et poenae demonstrare. Or it could be said, and better, that this is an equality of proportionality and not of equality; and it is to be looked for not according to the relation of punishment to fault, but according to the proportion of two sinners to two punishments, namely, such that whoever sinned more is punished more, and according as one surpasses in sin, so in punishment; and this is also how are to be understood all the authorities that seem to show an equality between fault and penalty. Ad secundum dicendum, quod duplicitas illa poenae non intelligitur secundum excessum poenae ad culpam in duplo; sed quia homo in duobus punietur; scilicet in anima et corpore. Quod autem dicitur, quod plus exigitur in poenis quam commissum sit in culpis; intelligendum est quantum ad temporis durationem: quia pro delectatione momentanea infligitur poena aeterna. Duratio autem poenae non proportionatur durationi culpae; sed magis intensio poenae respondet enormitati culpae, ut patet ex supra dictis. Reply Obj. 2: The doubling of that punishment is not to be understood as though the punishment were two times the fault, but because a man is punished in two ways, namely, in soul and body. Now, when it is said that more will be exacted in punishment than was committed in faults, that should be understood as referring to the duration of time, for an eternal punishment is inflicted for a momentary pleasure. But the duration of the punishment is not proportioned to the duration of the fault, but rather the intensity of the punishment corresponds to the enormity of the fault, as is seen from what was said above. Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum originale sequitur duplex poena. Una, secundum quod infectivum personae; et sic est poena ejus carentia visionis divinae. Alia, secundum quod est vitium naturae; et sic sequuntur ipsum poenae quae ex principio naturae causantur, ut mors, quae causatur ex contrarietate principiorum naturae, et alia hujusmodi quae ad mortem ordinantur, vel quae ex deordinatione principiorum naturae consequuntur, ut febris, et hujusmodi. Dico ergo, quod Baptismus mundat personam, sed non curat naturam; quod patet ex hoc quod per actum naturae baptizatus originale transmittit in prolem; et ideo per Baptismum absolvitur puer baptizatus a reatu mortis aeternae, quae est carentia visionis divinae; manet tamen adhuc reatus mortis temporalis, et aliorum hujusmodi, quae ex peccato naturae consequuntur: quae quamvis ad utilitatem illius personae non cedant, si infra aetatem perfectam decedit, quia his passionibus non meretur; cedunt tamen in utilitatem aliorum qui sunt ei conformes in natura: quia et poenae hujusmodi peccatum naturae consequuntur. Reply Obj. 3: Two punishments follow upon original sin. One, according as it infects the person, and then its punishment is the loss of the vision of God. The other, according as it corrupts nature, and then those punishments follow it that are caused by a principle of nature, like death, which is caused by the contrariety of the principles of nature, and other things like it that are ordered toward death, or that result from the disordering of the principles of nature, like fever and such. I say, therefore, that baptism cleanses the person but does not cure the nature, which is evident from the fact that by an act of nature a baptized person transmits original sin to his children. And so a child is absolved by baptism from the liability to eternal death, which is the loss of the divine vision, yet the liability to temporal death still remains, and other things like it that result from the sin of nature; which, although they do not work to the benefit of that person if he dies before a mature age (for he does not merit by his sufferings), are nevertheless granted for the benefit of others who are like him in nature, for punishments such as this result from the sin of nature. Ad quartum dicendum, quod pro peccato originali secundum rigorem justitiae non solum debetur naturae pro poena carentia visionis divinae, sed etiam ipsius annihilatio; et ideo ex hoc ipso quod conservantur pueris non baptizatis naturalia bona, citra condignum puniuntur. Unde Threnor. cap. 3, 22: misericordiae Domini, quod non sumus consumpti. Reply Obj. 4: As a punishment for original sin according to the rigor of justice, the loss of the divine vision is not the only thing due to our nature, but also its very annihilation. And so by the fact that natural goods are preserved for unbaptized children, they are punished less than is deserved. This is why it says in Lamentations 3:22: it belongs to the Lord’s mercy that we are not consumed. Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut potentia Dei habet ordinem ad ejus justitiam, ita etiam habet ordinem ad ejus misericordiam; unde quamvis non repugnet potentiae secundum quod ordinatur ad justitiam, nihil de poena dimittere; repugnat tamen potentiae secundum quod ordinatur ad misericordiam; et sic de potentia ad misericordiam ordinata hoc Deus non potest. Reply Obj. 5: Just as God’s power has an order to his justice, so too it has an order to his mercy; and so, although it is not inconsistent with his power as it is ordered to his justice to forgive nothing of the punishment, nevertheless, it is inconsistent with his power according as it is ordered to mercy. And thus, from the vantage of his ordered power (ordered, namely, to mercy), God cannot do this. Ad sextum dicendum, quod immisericordes non consequuntur misericordiam totaliter a poena liberantem, consequuntur tamen misericordiam aliquid de poena relaxantem. Similiter etiam si potentes sint mali, non possunt excusari per infirmitatem, quae quandoque excusat a toto, sicut per eam exigui, idest totaliter infirmi, excusantur. Reply Obj. 6: The unmerciful do not receive mercy completely freeing them from punishment; however, they do obtain mercy relaxing some of the punishment. Likewise too, if the powerful are wicked, they cannot be excused by weakness, which sometimes excuses entirely, as the lowly, that is, the completely weak, are excused by it. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod operatio Dei est quasi medium inter Deum operantem et ipsum opus operatum. Omne autem medium participat quodammodo cum utroque extremorum; et ideo in operatione Dei oportet aliquid inveniri ex parte ipsius Dei operantis et ex parte operati, ad quod operatio terminatur. Ex parte quidem operantis exigitur ut sit superabundantia in collatione bonorum et diminutione malorum, cum ipse Deus sit excellentissimus operator, ut dictum est, et in hoc consistit divina misericordia; ex parte autem operati requiritur receptio, quae fit secundum proportionem recipientis; et in hoc ratio justitiae consistit. Ideo oportet quod in omni divina operatione aliquid misericordiae et aliquid justitiae inveniatur: nec justitia misericordiae repugnat; quia misericordia non est laudabilis nisi sit secundum rationem rectam, quae est regula justitiae, sive secundum ordinem sapientiae in divinis; nec misericordia repugnat justitiae; quia elargiri aliquid supra debitum de bonis, vel citra debitum de malis, non est contra justitiam, sed praeter eam, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo nec immensitas misericordiae excludit justitiam a divino opere, nec immensitas justitiae misericordiam. To the second question, it should be said that God’s operation is like a middle between God, the one operating, and the work itself that he has performed. Now every middle partakes in some way of both extremes, and so in God’s operation it is necessary for something to be found on the part of God himself working and on the part of the work performed, in which the operation is terminated. On the part of the one operating, it is required that there be a superabundance in the conferral of goods and the diminishment of evils, since God himself is the most excellent worker, as was said, and in this divine mercy consists. But on the part of what is done, what is required is a reception proportional to the receiver; and in this the account of justice consists. Therefore, it is necessary that in every divine operation something of mercy and something of justice is found; nor is justice opposed to mercy, for mercy is not praiseworthy unless it is according to right reason, which is the rule of justice, or according to the order of wisdom in divine things. Nor is mercy opposed to justice, since the bestowal of something above what is due of goods, or less than what is due of evils, is not against justice, but above and beyond it, as is clear from what has been said. And so neither does the immensity of mercy exclude justice from divine work, nor does the immensity of justice exclude mercy. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia, ut ex dictis patet, quandoque consistit in retributione meritorum; et sic justitia in creatione non consideratur: quandoque vero justitia consistit in condecentia divinae bonitatis; et sic non praesupponit aliquid ex parte recipientis, sed solum ex parte Dei; et sic potest esse justitia in opere creationis. Justum est enim ut unaquaeque res hoc modo esse habeat quomodo praeordinatum est a sapientia divina. Similiter et misericordia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod repellit miseriam praecedentem non ex debito; et sic non potest esse misericordia in opere creationis: alio modo communiter, secundum quod sine debito tollitur quicumque defectus; et sic in opere creationis est misericordia: quia maximum defectum Deus creando removit, scilicet non esse; et hoc ex gratuita voluntate fecit, non aliquo debito constrictus. Reply Obj. 1: Justice, as is clear from what has been said, sometimes consists in recompense for merits, and in this way no justice is considered to exist in the work of creation. But sometimes justice consists in that which is befitting to divine goodness; and in this way it does not presuppose anything on the side of the receiver, but only on the side of God. Taken that way, there can be justice in the work of creation. For it is just that each thing should have being in the manner preordained by divine wisdom. Likewise, too, mercy is said in two ways. In one way, as it drives off a preexisting misery in a way that is not owed; and there can be no mercy in the work of creation in this manner. In the other way, generally, according as without it being owed, any defect whatsoever is removed; and in this way there is mercy in the work of creation, for by creating, God removes the greatest defect, namely, non-existence. And he did this by a gratuitous will, not constricted by any debt. Ad secundum dicendum, quod apostolus utitur tali modo distinctionis, quia aliquis modus justitiae fuit in salvatione Judaeorum qui non fuit in conversione gentium; scilicet impletio promissorum, quae fuerunt per prophetas Judaeis, et non gentibus, repromissa a Deo. Sed tamen in utrisque salvatio habuit et justitiam et misericordiam: justitiam autem quae est secundum decentiam divinae bonitatis: decuit enim ut Deus rationalem creaturam non totaliter perderet, quam ad beatitudinem fecit: misericordiam vero, quia in neutris merita praecesserunt quae ad hoc sufficerent, secundum illud Tit. 3, 5: non ex operibus justitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit. Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle uses this kind of distinction because there was a certain mode of justice in the salvation of the Jews which was not present in the conversion of the gentiles; namely, the fulfillment of promises, which were promised by God through the prophets to the Jews, and not to the gentiles. But nevertheless, in both cases salvation included both justice and mercy: the justice, however, that is according to what is becoming to divine goodness, for it was fitting that God not totally discard the rational creature which he had made for beatitude; but mercy, because in neither case did merits precede which were sufficient for this, according to which it says: he saved us, not because of works of righteousness we did, but in keeping with his own mercy (Tit 3:5). Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus super illud Josue, 7: filii Israel praevaricati sunt etc., in poenis aeternis nunquam unus punitur pro alio; sed in temporali quandoque unus punitur pro alio: cujus ratio potest esse triplex. Una est, quia poena aeterna non infligitur alicui ad profectum patientis, sed ad vindictam culpae; sed poena temporalis quandoque infertur ad profectum patientis. Unde sicut quandoque aliquis sine culpa punitur temporali poena, ita etiam quandoque aliquis punitur pro peccato alterius ad profectum sui et aliorum, ut scilicet videatur quantum unus debeat esse solicitus pro alio, ne cadat in peccatum, ex quo pro peccato unius tota congregatio temporaliter punitur; et ut etiam ostendatur quam fugiendum sit peccatum, quod ita graviter punitur, ut uno delinquente plures puniantur. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says commenting on Joshua 7:1, but the people of Israel broke faith in regard to the devoted things, one person is never punished for another in eternal suffering, but in temporal punishment sometimes one person is punished for another. And there can be three reasons for this. One is that eternal punishment is not inflicted on anyone for the perfection of the one suffering it, but for the vengeance on the fault. But temporal punishment is sometimes imposed for the improvement of the one suffering it. Thus, just as sometimes someone without fault is punished with temporal punishment, so too sometimes someone is punished for the sin of another for his own perfection and that of others, so that it will be seen how much one person should be concerned for another, that he not fall into sin, and for this reason the whole congregation is punished temporally for the sin of one; and also to shown that one must flee from sin, which is so gravely punished that many are punished for one transgressor. Secunda ratio potest esse, quia quantum ad temporalia unus homo est res alterius, sicut filius est quaedam res patris; et ideo quandoque filius punitur temporaliter pro peccato patris, et servus pro peccato domini; sed quantum ad bonum animae quilibet gerit personam propriam. Ezech. 18, 4: omnes animae meae sunt. Tertia ratio est quam assignat Gregorius, quia quandoque aliquis est particeps culpae alterius; sicut ex culpa subditorum quandoque permittuntur praelati cadere in peccatum; et ita non est mirum, si pro peccatis praelatorum subditi puniuntur, sicut in 2 Reg., ultim., David peccante populus est punitur. Unde hoc non est divinae justitiae contrarium, ut unus quandoque pro peccato alterius puniatur. Nec tamen ex hoc debet sumi exemplum in judicio humano, ut unus puniatur pro alio, ut Augustinus dicit: quia homo non potest scire profectum provenientem ex poena temporali, sicut hoc Deus infallibiliter cognoscit. The second reason can be that in temporal matters one man belongs to another, as a son is in a certain way his father’s thing; and so sometimes a son is temporally punished for the sin of his father, and a slave for the sin of his master. But as to the good of the soul, each one bears his own person: behold, all souls are mine; the soul of the father as well as the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sins shall die (Ezek 18:4). Third, there is the reason that Gregory assigns, that sometimes a person is a participant in the guilt of another, as when by the guilt of the subjects, those responsible for them are sometimes allowed to fall into sin; and so it is no surprise if those who are subject are punished for the sins of those who have charge of them, as at the end of 2 Samuel, the people are punished for David’s sins. So it is not contrary to divine justice that sometimes one person be punished for the sins of another. Nevertheless, human judgements should not be patterned on this example, such that one person is punished for another, as Augustine says. For a man cannot know what benefit may arise from temporal punishment, which God knows infallibly. Ad quartum dicendum, quod in justificatione impii servatur aliquis modus justitiae, qui est secundum condecentiam divinae bonitatis, vel etiam secundum exhibitionem promissi, ut habetur in Glossa super illud Psal. 50, 6: ut justificeris in sermonibus tuis, etc. Deus enim hoc promisit ut peccatoribus veniam petentibus venia largiretur. Reply Obj. 4: In the justification of the wicked a certain mode of justice is preserved, which is according to what befits divine goodness, or according as a promise is kept, as we have in the Gloss on Psalm 51 (50):4: so that thou art justified in thy sentence and blameless in thy judgment. For God promised that forgiveness would be granted to sinners seeking forgiveness. Ad quintum dicendum, quod non est justitia, si de eo quod neutri est debitum, aequalibus inaequaliter detur, sicut patet Matth. 20, in parabola de laborantibus in vinea, qui licet inaequaliter laborassent, est redditum aequale praemium; eo enim quod aliquis liberaliter dat quod potest dare vel non dare, nihil differt quo ad justitiam quantumcumque detur. Dico ergo, quod omnibus hominibus ex merito proprii peccati debetur poena aeterna; sed quod aliqui liberentur, hoc est ex sola divina liberalitate: posset enim omnes juste damnare; et ideo nulla est injustitia, si aliquos eligat et aliquos reprobet, in quibus tamen nulla differentia meritorum praecessit. Aaron autem punitus fuit, quamvis non poena manifesta, sicut et populus, in signum quod praelati non debent puniri manifeste, sed occulte propter scandalum vitandum. Poena autem Aaron dicitur fuisse in ipso et filiis ejus, quod in sacrificio vitulae rufae immundi efficiebantur, ut habetur Numer. 19. Augustinus tamen in Glossa Exod. 32, hoc occulto Dei judicio ascribit, qui quibusdam parcit ad tempus, ut in melius commutentur, aliis punitis. Reply Obj. 5: It is not injustice if what is owed to neither is given unequally to equal parties, as is clear from Matthew 20, in the parable of the workers in the vineyard, who, although they had worked unequally, were given an equal reward. For by the fact that someone gives liberally what he is free to give or not to give, it makes no difference to justice how much is given. Therefore, I say that eternal punishment ought to be given to all people by the merit of their own sin, but the fact that some are freed is due to divine generosity alone. For he could justly damn all people, and therefore it is no injustice if he elects some and reprobates others, between whom there was no difference in prior merits. Now, Aaron was punished, although not with a manifest punishment, as the people were, as a sign that those in responsibility should not be manifestly punished, but privately, in order to avoid scandal. However, Aaron’s punishment is said to have been inflicted on him and his sons, that they became unclean in the sacrifice of bloody calves, as we have in Numbers 19. However Augustine in the gloss on Exodus 32 ascribes this to the secret judgment of God, who spares certain people for a time so that they might grow better, when others are punished. Ad sextum dicendum, quod hoc quod melioribus minus datur de bono temporali, et quandoque plus de malo, in eorum profectum cedit quantum ad spirituale bonum, quod est simpliciter hominis bonum. Bona enim temporalia non sunt simpliciter hominis bona, nisi secundum quod organice deserviunt ad spirituale bonum. Quomodo autem hoc cedat in profectum spiritualis boni, supra ostensum est. Reply Obj. 6: The fact that less temporal good and sometimes more evil is given to better people results in their progress in spiritual good, which is the good of man simply. For temporal goods are not the goods of man simply, except according as they instrumentally serve a spiritual good. Now the way that they contribute to advancement in spiritual good was shown above. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod illud quod est formale in unoquoque, est excellentius in eo; quia per formam materia completur. In qualibet autem actione illud quod est ex parte agentis, est quasi formale; illud autem quod est ex parte patientis vel recipientis, est quasi materiale. Dictum autem est supra, quod misericordia in omni opere divino resultat ex parte ipsius Dei, qui superabundat in bono; sed justitia ex parte recipientis, qui recipit secundum suam proportionem; et ideo in quolibet opere divino supereminet misericordia justitiae, sicut materiali formale; et hoc est quod in Psal. 144, 9, dicitur: miserationes ejus super omnia opera ejus. To the third question, it should be said that what is formal in each thing is most excellent in it, for matter is completed by form. However, in any action what exists on the side of the agent is formal, as it were; but what is on the part of the patient or receiver is like the matter. Now it was said above that mercy in every divine work results from the side of God himself, who is superabundant in good, but justice, from the side of the receiver, who receives according to his own proportion; and therefore, in any divine work mercy stands above justice as the formal above the material; and this is what is said in Psalm 145 (144):9: his mercies are above all his works. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dicitur esse horrendum incidere in manus Dei viventis, non propter remotionem misericordiae relaxantis aliquid de poena, sed propter poenae interminabilitatem, vel etiam propter remotionem resistentiae: quia ejus irae nemo resistere potest, cum sit omnipotens; nec ab eo fugere, cum sit ubique praesens; nec coram eo fallaciter se excusare, cum omnia sciat. Reply Obj. 1: It is said to be a frightening thing to fall into the hands of the living God, not because of the withdrawal of his mercy which softens some of the punishment, but because of the interminability of the punishment, or also because of the removal of the possibility of resistance: for no one can resist his anger, since he is omnipotent; nor can anyone escape him, since he is present everywhere; nor can anyone falsely excuse himself before him, since he knows all. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Anselmus loquitur non de justitia quae attendit proportionem creaturae, vel humana merita, sed quae attendit solam decentiam bonitatis divinae: ex tali enim decentia misericordia nascitur: non autem loquitur de justitia secundum quod respicit debitum ex parte creaturae. Reply Obj. 2: Anselm is not speaking about the justice that regards the proportion to a creature, or about human merit, but about the justice that has to do only with what befits divine goodness, for mercy is born from this fittingness. But at present we are speaking about justice according as it regards what is due on the side of the created being. Et similiter etiam est dicendum ad tertium. And the third objection should be answered in the same way. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum misericordia Dei patiatur poenas damnatorum esse perpetuas Whether God’s mercy can suffer the punishments of the damned to be perpetual Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1