Praeterea, apostolus dixit, 1 Cor. 10:11: nos sumus in quos fines saeculorum devenerunt; et 1 Joan. 2, 18: filioli, novissima hora est, etc. Cum ergo jam longum tempus transierit ex quo haec dicta sunt, videtur quod saltem nunc scire possumus quod ultimum judicium sit propinquum. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Apostle said, we are those upon whom the end of the ages have come (1 Cor 10:11); and in 1 John 2:18, it says: children, it is the last hour. Therefore, since already a long time has passed since these words were said, it seems that at least now we can know that the last judgment is close. Praeterea, tempus judicii non debet esse occultum, nisi propter hoc quod quilibet solicitus se ad judicium praeparet, dum determinate tempus ignorat. Sed eadem solicitudo remaneret, etiam si certum esset: quia cuicumque incertum est tempus suae mortis, et, sicut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Hesychium, in quo quemque invenerit suus novissimus dies, in hoc eum comprehendet mundi novissimus dies. Ergo non est necessarium, tempus judicii esse occultum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, the time of the judgment should not be secret unless so that each person may anxiously prepare himself for the judgment, since he does not know the exact time. But the same anxiety would remain even if the judgment were known: for the time of each person’s death is unknown to him, and as Augustine says in his letter to Hesychius, the world’s last day will deal with each person in the state that his own last day found him. Therefore, it is not necessary for the time of the judgment to be secret. Sed contra est quod dicitur Marc. 13, 32: de die illa vel hora nemo scit; neque angeli in caelo, neque filius, nisi pater. Dicitur autem filius nescire, inquantum nos scire non facit. On the contrary (1), it is said in Mark 13:32: but of that day or that hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father. And the Son is said to not know inasmuch as he does not cause us to know. Praeterea, 1 Thessal. 5, 2: dies Domini sicut fur in nocte, ita veniet. Ergo videtur, cum adventus furis in nocte sit omnino incertus, quod dies ultimi judicii sit omnino incertus. Furthermore (2), the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night (1 Thess 5:2). Therefore, since the coming of a thief in the night is entirely unknown, it seems that the day of the last judgment is entirely uncertain. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod sicut operatio pertinet ad rerum principium quo producuntur in esse, ita judicium pertinet ad terminum, quo res ad suum finem perducuntur. I answer that, just as activity pertains to the principle of things by which they are produced in being, so judgment pertains to the terminus by which things are brought to their end. Distinguitur autem duplex Dei operatio. Una qua res primitus in esse producit, instituens naturam, et distinguens ea quae ad completionem ipsius pertinent: a quo quidem opere Deus dicitur quievisse Genes. 2. Alia ejus operatio est qua operatur in gubernatione creaturarum, de qua Joan. 5, 17: pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor; ita etiam duplex judicium distinguitur, ordine tamen converso. Now, two operations are distinguished in God. One by which he first produces a thing in being, instituting its nature and distinguishing those things that pertain to its completion: and this is the work God is said to have rested from in Genesis 2:2. His other operation that whereby he carries out the governance of creation, which is what John 5:17 speaks of: my father is working still, and I am working. Accordingly, two kinds of judgment are distinguished in him, but in the reverse order. Unum quod respondet operi gubernationis, quae sine judicio esse non potest: per quod quidem judicium unusquisque singulariter pro suis operibus judicatur non solum secundum quod sibi competit, sed secundum quod competit gubernationi universi; unde differtur unius praemiatio pro utilitate aliorum, ut dicitur Hebr. 11, et poenae unius ad profectum alterius cedunt; unde necesse est ut sit aliquod judicium universale correspondens ex adverso primae rerum productioni in esse, ut videlicet sicut tunc omnia processerunt immediate a Deo, ita tunc ultima completio mundo detur, unoquoque accipiente finaliter quod ei debetur secundum seipsum. One is the judgment that corresponds to the work of governance, which cannot exist without judgment, and by this judgment indeed each one is judged individually for his own works not only according as befits him, but according as befits the governance of the universe. This is why the rewarding of one person is delayed for the benefit of others, as it says in Hebrews 11, and the sufferings of one person result in progress for another. This is why it is necessary that there be some universal judgment corresponding oppositely to the first production of things in being, so that namely, just as at that time all things proceeded immediately from God, so too on the last day a final completion will be given to the world, with each person receiving finally what is due to him in himself. Unde in illo judicio apparebit manifeste divina justitia quantum ad omnia quae nunc ex hoc occultantur quod interdum de uno disponitur ad utilitatem aliorum aliter quam manifesta opera exigere videantur; unde etiam et tunc erit universalis separatio bonorum a malis, quia ulterius non erit locus ut mali per bonos vel boni per malos proficiant; propter quem profectum interim commixti inveniuntur boni malis, quoadusque status hujus vitae per divinam providentiam gubernatur. Therefore, in that judgment we will see clearly the divine justice regarding all the things now hidden because sometimes things concerning one man are arranged to the benefit of others in a way other than his obvious works seem to require. Therefore, on that day there will also be a universal separation of the good from the wicked, for in the end it will not happen that the wicked benefit by the good or the good by the evil. And it is for the sake of this benefit that the good are found intermingled with the wicked in the meantime, while the state of this life is directed by divine providence. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quilibet homo et est singularis quaedam persona, et est pars totius humani generis; unde et duplex ei judicium debetur. Unum singulare, quod de eo fiet post mortem, quando recipiet juxta ea quae in corpore gessit, quamvis non totaliter, quia non quo ad corpus, sed quo ad animam tantum. Aliud judicium debet esse de eo secundum quod est pars totius humani generis; sicut aliquis judicari dicitur secundum humanam justitiam etiam quando judicium datur de communitate, cujus ipse est pars; unde et tunc quando fiet universale judicium totius humani generis per universalem separationem bonorum a malis, etiam quilibet per consequens judicabitur. Nec tamen Deus bis judicat in idipsum: quia non duas poenas pro uno peccato infert; sed poena quae ante judicium complete inflicta non fuerat, in ultimo judicio complebitur, post quod impii cruciabuntur quo ad corpus et animam simul. Reply Obj. 1: Every man is both an individual person and a part of the whole human race: and this is why he must have two judgments. One is individual, which happens to him after his death, when he receives according to those things he did in his body, although not completely, for not according to the body, but only according to the soul. But he must have another judgment as he is a part of the whole human race, just as someone is said to be judged according to human justice even when the judgment is given to the community that he is a part of. Therefore, on that day when the universal judgment of the whole human race takes place through the universal separation of the good and the wicked, each person will also be judged as a result. Nevertheless, God will not judge anyone twice: for he does not impose two punishments for one sin, but punishment which is not completely inflicted before the judgment, in the last judgment will be completed, after which the wicked will be tormented in body and soul together. Ad secundum dicendum, quod propria sententia illius generalis judicii est universalis separatio bonorum a malis, quae illud judicium non praecedet. Sed nec etiam quo ad particularem sententiam uniuscujusque plene praecessit judicii effectus: quia etiam boni amplius post judicium praemiabuntur, tum ex gloria corporis adjuncta, tum ex numero sanctorum completo; et mali etiam amplius torquebuntur adjuncta poena corporis, et impleto in poenis numero damnatorum: quia quanto cum pluribus ardebunt, tanto plus ardebunt. Reply Obj. 2: The sentencing proper to that general judgment is the universal separation of the good from the bad, which will not happen before that judgment. But as to the particular sentence of each person, the judgment’s effect will not have fully taken place, either: for the good will also be further rewarded after the judgment, both by the addition of the body’s glory and by the number of the saints being complete. And the wicked will also be further tormented by the addition of the bodily punishment, and by the number of the damned in punishment being fulfilled: for the more people they burn with, the more they will burn. Ad tertium dicendum, quod universale judicium, ut dictum est, magis directe respicit utilitatem hominum quam singulos judicandorum. Quamvis ergo cuilibet homini ante judicium sit certa notitia de sua damnatione vel praemio; non tamen omnibus omnium damnatio vel praemium innotescet; unde judicium necessarium erit. Reply Obj. 3: The universal judgment, as was said, has to do more directly with the benefit of men than with the individuals to be judged. Therefore, although the judgment of every man’s own damnation or reward will be known to him for certain, nevertheless, not everyone’s damnation or reward will be known to everyone, which is why the judgment will be necessary. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod quid sit verum circa hanc quaestionem, definiri pro certo non potest; tamen probabilius aestimatur quod totum illud judicium, et quo ad discussionem, et quo ad accusationem malorum et commendationem bonorum, et quo ad sententiam de utrisque, mentaliter perficietur. Si enim vocaliter singulorum facta narrarentur, inaestimabilis magnitudo temporis ad hoc exigeretur; sicut etiam Augustinus, 20 de Civ. Dei, dicit, quod si liber ex cujus Scriptura omnes judicabuntur, ut dicitur Apoc. 20, carnaliter cogitetur, quis ejus magnitudinem aut longitudinem valeat aestimare? Aut quanto tempore legi poterit liber, in quo scriptae sunt universae vitae universorum? Non autem minus tempus requiritur ad narrandum oretenus singulorum facta, quam ad legendum, si essent in libro materiali scripta. Unde probabile est quod illa quae dicuntur Matth. 25, non vocaliter, sed mentaliter, intelligenda sint esse perficienda. To the second question, it should be said that whatever may be true about this question, it cannot be defined for certain. Nevertheless, it can be most probably guessed that the whole judgment, both as to the presentation of the case and the accusation of the wicked and the commendation of the good, and as to the sentencing of each, will be accomplished mentally. For if the deeds of individuals were vocally recounted, an inestimably huge amount of time would be needed for this, as Augustine also says in the City of God 20, if the book from whose writing all will be judged, as it says in Revelation 20:12, were conceived physically, who would be competent to guess its size and length? Or how much time would it take for the book to be read, in which the entire lives of all had been written? But no less time is required for telling orally the deeds of individuals than is required for reading them, if they were written in a material book. Therefore, it is probable that the things that are spoken of in Matthew 25, should be understood to be accomplished not vocally, but mentally. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pro tanto dicit Augustinus quod incertum est per quot dies hoc judicium tendatur, quia non est determinatum utrum perficiatur vocaliter. Si enim vocaliter perficeretur, prolixum tempus ad hoc requireretur; si autem mentaliter, in momento fieri poterit. Reply Obj. 1: The reason Augustine says it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last is that he had not settled whether it would be accomplished vocally. For if it were accomplished vocally, a lengthy time would be required for this; but if mentally, it could be done in a moment. Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam si judicium fiat mentaliter tamen verbum Gregorii salvari potest: quia etsi omnibus innotescent sua et aliorum facta, divina virtute hoc faciente, quae in Evangelio locutio dicitur; tamen illi qui fidem habuerunt, quam ex verbis Dei conceperunt, ex ipsis verbis judicabuntur: quia, ut dicitur Rom. 2, 12, qui in lege peccaverunt, per legem judicabuntur. Unde et quodam speciali modo dicetur aliquid his qui fuerunt fideles quod non dicetur his qui fuerunt infideles. Reply Obj. 2: Even if the judgment happens mentally, the words of Gregory can still be saved: for although one’s own deeds and the deeds of others are made known to all, this is done by divine power, which is called ‘speech’ in the Gospel. Nevertheless, those who had faith, which they conceived from the words of God, will be judged by those words, for as it says in Romans 2:12, all who have sinned under the law will be judged by the law. Therefore, in a certain way, something will be said to those who were believers which will not be said to those who were unbelievers. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus corporaliter apparebit, ut ab omnibus judex corporalis cognoscatur; quod quidem subito fieri poterit. Sed locutio quae tempore mensuratur requireret immensam temporis prolixitatem, si vocali locutione judicium perageretur. Reply Obj. 3: Christ will appear physically, so that he may be recognized as the physical judge by all men, and this indeed will be able to happen in a moment. But speech, which is measured by time, would require an immense extent of time, if the judgment were conducted by vocal speech. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod Deus per scientiam suam est causa rerum. Utrumque autem creaturis communicat, dum et rebus tribuit virtutem agendi alias res quarum sint causa, et quibusdam etiam rerum cognitionem praebet; sed in utroque aliqua sibi reservat. Operatur enim quaedam in quibus nulla creatura ei cooperatur; et similiter cognoscit quaedam quae a nulla pura creatura cognoscuntur. To the third question, it should be said that God is the cause of things through his knowledge. Now, he communicates both of these to created things when on the one hand he confers on things the power of acting upon other things of which they are the causes, and when on the other hand he also grants some creatures the knowledge of things. But in each case, he reserves something to himself, for he works some things in which no created being cooperates; and likewise he knows some things that are known to no mere created being. Haec autem nulla alia magis esse debent quam illa quae soli divinae subjacent potestati, in quibus ei nulla creatura cooperatur; et hujusmodi est finis mundi, in quo erit dies judicii. Non enim per aliquam causam creatam mundus finietur, sicut etiam et mundus esse incepit immediate a Deo; unde dicitur, quod cognitio finis mundi soli Deo reservatur. Et hanc rationem ipse Dominus videtur assignare Act. 1, 7: non est, inquit, vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta, quae pater posuit in sua potestate; quasi dicat, quae soli potestati ejus reservata sunt. Moreover, nothing else should be greater than those works that are subject to divine power alone, in which no creature cooperates with him; and the end of the world, when the day of judgment will happen, is this kind of work. For just as the world took the beginning of its existence from God immediately, so also no created cause will bring about the end of the world. Therefore, the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly reserved to God alone. And the Lord himself seems to give this reason when he says: it is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own power (Acts 1:7), as though he were saying that they had been reserved to his power alone. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in primo adventu Christus venit occultus, secundum illud Isai. 45, 15: vere tu es Deus absconditus, sanctus Israel salvator; et ideo ut a fidelibus cognosci posset, oportuit determinate tempus praedeterminare. Sed in secundo adventu veniet manifestus, ut dicitur in Psalm. 49, 3: Deus manifeste veniet etc.; et ideo circa cognitionem adventus ipsius error esse non poterit: propter quod non est simile. Reply Obj. 1: In the first coming, Christ came secretly, in keeping with Isa 45:15: truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself, O God of Israel, the Savior. And this is why, in order for the time to be recognized by the faithful, it was necessary that a specific time be predetermined. But in the second coming, he will come openly, as it says in Psalm 50 (49):2, God shall come openly; and thus there will be no possibility of error about the knowledge of his coming. Consequently, it is not the same. Ad secundum dicendum, sicut dicit Augustinus in epistola, de die judicii ad Hesychium, signa quae in Evangeliis ponuntur, non omnia pertinent ad secundum adventum, qui erit in fine; sed quaedam eorum pertinent ad tempus destructionis Hierusalem, quae jam praeteriit; quaedam vero, et plura, eorum pertinent ad adventum quo quotidie ad Ecclesiam suam venit, eam spiritualiter visitans, prout inhabitat nos per fidem et amorem: nec illa quae in Evangeliis vel in epistolis ponuntur ad ultimum adventum spectantia, ad hoc possunt valere ut determinate tempus judicii possit cognosci; quia illa pericula quae praenuntiantur nuntiantia vicinum Christi adventum, etiam a tempore primitivae Ecclesiae fuerunt, quandoque intensius quandoque remissius: unde et ipsi dies apostolorum dicti sunt novissimi dies, ut patet Act. 2, 17: ubi Petrus exponit illud verbum Joel. 2, 28: erit in novissimis diebus, effundam spiritum meum super omnem carnem, et prophetabunt filii vestri et filiae vestrae, pro tempore illo; et tamen ex illo tempore tempus plurimum transivit; et quandoque plures, et quandoque pauciores tribulationes in Ecclesia fuerunt. Unde non potest determinari tempus quantum sit futurum, nec de mense, nec de anno, nec de centum, nec de mille annis, ut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit. Et si credatur in fine hujusmodi pericula magis abundare, non tamen potest determinari quae sit illa quantitas periculorum quae immediate diem judicii praecedet, vel Antichristi adventum; cum et circa tempora primitivae Ecclesiae fuerint persecutiones aliquae adeo graves, et corruptiones errorum adeo abundarent, quod aliquibus tunc vicinus expectaretur vel imminens Antichristi adventus, sicut dicitur in ecclesiastica historia, et in Lib. Hieronymi de viris illustribus. Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in a letter about the day of judgment to Hesychius, the signs that are set down in the Gospels do not all pertain to the second coming, which will be at the end, but some of them pertain to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, which has already passed; but some of them, and an even greater number, pertain to the coming in which he daily comes to the Church, visiting her spiritually, as he dwells in us by faith and love. Nor can what is recorded in the Gospels or the epistles regarding the last coming suffice for us to know the time of the judgment determinately; for those dangers that are foretold as announcing the approaching coming of Christ also existed at the time of the early Church, sometimes more intensely, sometimes less so. This is why also the very days of the apostles were called ‘the last days,’ as is seen in Acts 2:17, where Peter explains the words of Joel 2:28 as pertaining to that time: and in the last days it shall be, God declares, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy. And yet much time has passed since that time, and sometimes more and sometimes fewer tribulations have existed in the Church. Therefore, it cannot be determined how far in the future the time will be, neither as regards the month, nor the year, nor the century, nor the millennium, as Augustine says in the same book. And if it were believed that in the end times these dangers would abound much more, it still could not be determined what amount of dangers would immediately precede the day of judgment or the coming of the anti-Christ, since also in the time of the early Church there were such serious persecutions and corruptions of errors abounded to such an extent that some believed that the coming of the Antichrist was close or imminent, as it says in the Ecclesiastical History, and Jerome’s book On Famous Men. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex hoc quod dicitur, novissima hora est, vel ex similibus locutionibus quae in Scriptura dicuntur, non potest aliqua determinata quantitas temporis sciri. Non enim est dictum ad significandum aliquam brevem horam temporis, sed ad significandum novissimum statum mundi, qui est quasi novissima aetas; quae quanto temporis spatio duret, non est definitum; cum etiam nec senio, quod est ultima aetas hominis, sit aliquis terminus certus praefinitus, cum quandoque inveniatur durare quantum omnes praecedentes aetates, vel plus, ut dicit Augustinus in lib. 83 quaest., quaest. 58; unde etiam et apostolus, 2 Thessal. 2, excludit falsum intellectum quem quidam ex illis verbis conceperant, ut crederent diem Domini jam instare. Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that it is said, it is the last hour, or from other similar expressions that are said in scripture, no determinate amount of time can be known. For it was not said in order to mean some brief hour of time, but to mean the last state of the world, which is like the last age, which does not have a definite amount of time that it should endure. It is like old age, which is the final age of a man, and has no certain fixed limit, since sometimes it is found to last as long as all the previous ages, or even longer, as Augustine says in question 58 of his book On the Eighty-three Different Questions. This is also why in 2 Thessalonians 2, the Apostle excludes the false understanding that certain people had conceived from these words, so that they were believing that the day of the Lord had already arrived. Ad quartum dicendum, quod etiam supposita mortis incertitudine, dupliciter ad vigilantiam valet incertitudo judicii. Primo ad hoc quod ignoratur utrum etiam differatur tantum quantum est hominis vita, ut sic ex duabus partibus incertitudo majorem diligentiam faciat. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod homo non gerit solum solicitudinem de persona sua, sed de familia vel civitate vel regno, aut tota Ecclesia, cui non determinatur tempus durationis secundum hominis vitam; et tamen oportet unumquodque horum hoc modo disponi ut dies Domini non inveniat imparatos. Reply Obj. 4: Even given the uncertainty of death, uncertainty about the judgment contributes to vigilance in two ways. First, it makes it impossible to know whether the judgment will be delayed even as long as a man’s life, so that then uncertainty about both matters causes greater diligence. Second, it makes a difference because a man does not worry only about his own person, but about his family and his state or kingdom, or about the whole Church, whose temporal duration is not fixed according to the lifetime of a man. And yet each of these must be handled such that the day of the Lord does not find them unprepared. Articulus 2 Article 2 De judicantibus cum Christo About those who will judge with Christ Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulli homines judicabunt cum Christo. Quia Joan. 5, 22: pater omne judicium dedit filio, ut omnes honorificent filium, sicut honorificant patrem. Sed honorificentia talis non debetur alicui quam Christo. Ergo, etc. Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that no men will judge with Christ. For the Father . . . has given all judgment to the Son, that all may honor the Son, even as they honor the Father (John 5:22–23). But this kind of honor should not be given to anyone but Christ. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, quicumque judicat, habet potestatem super illud quod judicat. Sed ea de quibus debet esse futurum judicium, sicut merita et praemia humana, soli divinae auctoritati subsunt. Ergo nulli competit de his judicare. Obj. 2: Furthermore, anyone who judges has power over what he judges. But those things about which there must be a future judgment, like human merits and rewards, are subject to divine authority alone. Therefore it does not belong to anyone to judge these things. Praeterea, judicium illud non exercebitur vocaliter, sed mentaliter, ut probabilius aestimatur. Sed hoc quod cordibus hominum notificentur merita et demerita, quod est quasi accusatio vel commendatio; vel retributio poenae et praemii, quod est quasi sententiae prolatio, sola divina virtute fiet. Ergo nulli alii judicabunt nisi Christus, qui est Deus. Obj. 3: Furthermore, that judgment will not be handed down by voice, but mentally, as is most probably guessed. But making merits and demerits known to the hearts of men, which is like accusation and commendation, or meting out punishment and reward, which is like the uttering of a sentence, will be done by divine power alone. Therefore no others will judge but Christ, who is God. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. 19, 28: sedebitis super sedes duodecim, judicantes duodecim tribus Israel. On the contrary (1), it says: you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel (Matt 19:28). Praeterea, Isai. 3, 14: Dominus ad judicium veniet cum senioribus populi sui. Ergo videtur quod etiam alii judicabunt cum Christo. Furthermore (2), the Lord enters into judgment with the elders and princes of his people (Isa 3:14). Therefore it seems that others too shall judge with Christ. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod judiciaria potestas non respondeat voluntariae paupertati. Hoc enim solum duodecim apostolis promissum est Matth. 19, 28: sedebitis super sedes duodecim, judicantes duodecim tribus Israel. Ergo cum non omnes voluntarie pauperes sint apostoli, videtur quod non omnibus judiciaria potestas respondeat. Obj. 1: Moreover. It seems that the power for judging does not correspond to voluntary poverty. For this is promised to the twelve apostles alone: you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel (Matt 19:28). Therefore since not all those who choose poverty are apostles, it seems that the power to judge does not correspond to all of them. Praeterea, majus est offerre sacrificium Deo de proprio corpore quam de exterioribus rebus. Sed martyres, et etiam virgines, offerunt de proprio corpore sacrificium Deo, voluntarie autem pauperes de exterioribus rebus. Ergo sublimitas judiciariae potestatis magis respondet martyribus et virginibus quam voluntarie pauperibus. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is a greater thing to offer God the sacrifice of one’s own body than of a sacrifice of external things. But martyrs and also virgins offer the sacrifice of their own bodies to God, while the voluntarily poor offer up external goods. Therefore, the loftiness of judging power corresponds more to martyrs and virgins than to those who are willingly poor. Praeterea, Joan. 5, 45: est qui accusat vos Moyses, in quo vos speratis; Glossa: quia voci ejus non creditis; et Joan. 12, 48: sermo quem locutus sum, ille judicabit eum in novissimo die. Ergo ex hoc quod aliquis proponit legem vel verbum exhortationis ad instructionem morum, habet quod judicet contemnentes. Sed hoc est doctorum. Ergo doctoribus magis competit quam pauperibus. Obj. 3: Furthermore, commenting on John 5:45, it is Moses who accuses you, on whom you set your hope; the Gloss says, for you do not believe his voice. Also, John 12:48: the word that I have spoken will be his judge on the last day. Therefore by the fact that someone sets forth a law or a word of exhortation for instruction in morals, he is able to judge those who scorn it. But this belongs to teachers of the faith. Therefore it applies to teachers more than to the poor.