Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut perfectio hominis multipliciter assignatur; est enim perfectio naturae conditae, et naturae glorificatae; ita etiam perfectio universi est duplex; una secundum statum hujus mutabilitatis, altera secundum statum futurae novitatis. Plantae autem et animalia sunt de perfectione ejus secundum statum istum, non autem secundum statum novitatis illius, cum ordinem ad eam non habeant.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as we assign man’s perfection in several ways, for there is the perfection of created nature and of glorified nature, so also there are two kinds of perfection for the universe: one perfection according to the state of this mutability, the second according to the state of future newness. Now plants and animals pertain to the perfection of the universe according to the present state, not according to the state of that newness, since they do not have an order to it.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis animalia et plantae quantum ad quaedam alia, sint nobiliora quam ipsa elementa; tamen quantum ad ordinem incorruptionis, elementa sunt nobiliora, ut ex dictis patet.
Reply Obj. 4: Even though animals and plants are more noble than the elements themselves in certain respects, the elements are nobler as regards the order to incorruption, as is clear from what has been said.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod naturalis appetitus ad perpetuitatem, qui inest animalibus et plantis, est accipiendus secundum ordinem ad motum caeli, ut scilicet tantum in esse permaneant, quantum motus caeli durabit; non enim potest appetitus esse in effectu ut permaneat ultra causam suam. Et ideo si, cessante motu primi mobilis, plantae et animalia non remaneant secundum speciem, non sequitur appetitum naturalem frustrari.
Reply Obj. 5: The natural appetite for perpetuity that is in animals and plants is to be taken with reference to the motion of heaven, namely, to remain in being as long as the motion of heaven will last. For there cannot be an appetite in the effect to remain beyond its own cause. And thus, when the motion of the first-moved ceases, if plants and animals do not remain as regards their species, it does not follow that a natural appetite is being frustrated.
Exposition of the text
Cum tamen virtute divinitatis sit suscitaturus, non humanitatis. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Glossa 1 Corinth. 15, quod resurrectio Christi fuit causa nostrae resurrectionis. Sed Christus secundum humanitatem resurrexit. Ergo virtute humanitatis corpora resuscitabit. Et dicendum, quod sicut Damascenus in 3 Lib., dicit, humanitas Christi est quasi divinitatis organum, sicut corpus animae; unde effectus aliquis potest attribui humanitati Christi dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se, sicut attribuitur ei tangere leprosum, et hujusmodi; alio modo inquantum est instrumentum divinitatis; sicut attribuitur ei tactu suo leprosum mundare. Hoc autem modo attribuitur humanitati Christi sua resurrectione nostram causare, sicut tactu suo leprosum mundare. Et quia instrumentum non agit nisi in virtute principalis agentis; inde est quod dicitur Christus resuscitaturus corpora non virtute humanitatis, sed divinitatis; quamvis sua resurrectio sit nostrae resurrectionis causa per modum quo tactus leprosi est causa mundationis.
Even though he will raise them by the power of his divinity, and not of his humanity. On the contrary, it is said in a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15 that Christ’s resurrection was the cause of our resurrection. But Christ rose in his humanity. Therefore it is by the power of his humanity that he will raise bodies. And it should be said that, as Damascene says in Book 3, Christ’s humanity is like an organ of his divinity, as the body is an organ of the soul. From this a given effect can be attributed to Christ’s humanity in two ways. In one way, in itself, as we attribute to it touching a leper and things of this sort. In the other way, as the instrument of his divinity, as we attribute to it the cleansing of the leper by his touch. Now we attribute to Christ’s humanity that his resurrection causes ours, in the way that he cleanses a leper by his touch. And because an instrument acts only by the power of the principal agent, so it is that we say that Christ will raise bodies not by the power of his humanity but of his divinity, although his resurrection is the cause of our resurrection in the way that touching a leper is the cause of cleansing.
Per verbum filium Dei fit animarum resurrectio, per verbum factum in carne filium hominis fit corporum resurrectio. Sed contra, quia sicut resurrectio Christi dicitur esse causa resurrectionis nostrae corporalis, ita et spiritualis, ut patet per illud Rom. 4, 25: resurrexit propter justificationem nostram. Et dicendum, quod utrumque fit principaliter virtute divina, et quasi instrumentaliter per operationem humanitatis Christi; sed tamen spiritualis resurrectio appropriatur divinitati; corporalis vero humanitati per appropriationem quamdam; ut servetur similitudo inter effectum et causam.
“The resurrection of souls happens through the Word, the Son of God; the resurrection of bodies happens through the Word made flesh in the son of man.” On the contrary, just as Christ’s resurrection is said to be the cause of our corporeal resurrection, so also it is the cause of our spiritual resurrection, as is clear through the passage: raised for our justification (Rom 4:25). And it should be said that both happen principally by divine power and, as it were, instrumentally through the operation of Christ’s humanity. Yet the spiritual resurrection is appropriated to the divinity and the corporeal to the humanity by a kind of appropriation, to preserve likeness between the effect and the cause.
Filius cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto eadem vita est, quae pertinet ad animam non ad corpus. Sed contra, quia omnis vita tam spiritualis quam corporalis oritur a vita divina, et imitatur eam, ut patet per Dionysium, 6 cap. de Divin. Nomin. Et dicendum, quod dicitur non pertinere ad corpus, quia corpus non potest ejus esse particeps per cognitionem et amorem.
It is not the Father alone who is life, but also the Son with him and the Holy Spirit is “the same life.” This life “pertains to the soul, not to the body.” On the contrary, all life, both spiritual and corporeal, arises from the divine life and imitates it, as is clear from Dionysius in On the Divine Names 6. And it should be said that this life is said not to pertain to the body because the body cannot be a participant in it through knowledge and love.
Angeli deferent ante signum crucis. Sed contra est quod signum illud crucis non habet aliquem ordinem ad incorruptionem; et ita non remanebit post illam innovationem. Et dicendum, quod signum crucis non accipitur hic pro ipso ligno crucis dominicae, sed pro aliqua repraesentatione ipsius.
“Angels will bear the sign of the cross.” On the contrary, the sign of the cross does not have an order to incorruption and thus will not remain after the renewal. And it should be said that the sign of the cross is not taken here as meaning the actual wood of the Lord’s cross but instead some representation of it.
Columnae caeli pavent adventum ejus. Columnae caeli hic dicuntur angeli qui caelos movent, quia in eorum virtute sustentatur tota efficacia caelestis actionis, cum omnia corpora regantur per spiritum vitae rationalem, ut Augustinus dicit 3, de Trinit.
The columns of heaven are in awe of his coming. The columns of heaven mean here the angels who move the heavens, since the whole efficacy of heavenly action is maintained by their power because all bodies are ruled through a rational spirit of life, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 3.
Quantum luxit sol in prima conditione septem dierum ante peccatum primi hominis, tantum lucebit post judicium. Intelligenda est haec comparatio secundum commodum quod homo percipit ex lumine caelestium corporum quod fuit majus ante peccatum quam post; quamvis post resurrectionem realiter magis luceant, ut dictum est.
As much as the sun shone in the first creation of seven days, before the sin of the first man, so much shall it shine after the judgment. This comparison should be understood with reference to the advantage that man receives from the light of the heavenly bodies, which was greater before sin than after, though after the resurrection they will really shine more, as has been said.
Significat, solem et lunam his qui erunt in aeterna beatitudine, nullum lucis usum praestare. Hoc intelligendum est de usu necessitatis, ut prius dictum est.
He means that the sun and the moon will not be useful for their light to those who will be “in eternal blessedness.” This should be understood of the usefulness of necessity, as said before.
Ne impii in tormentis sub terra positi fruantur luce eorum. Secundum hoc videtur Isidorus sensisse, quod infernus sit in alia superficie terrae; cum tamen ab aliis dicatur, quod sit in profundo terrae. Quidam vero dicunt, Isidorum etiam hoc sensisse, quod infernus sit in profundo terrae; sed quod ex alia superficie terrae sit aliquis magnus terrae hiatus, unde lumen solis ad alios qui sunt in inferno pervenire posset, si sol terram circuiret: quod utrum verum sit, omnino certum non est.
Lest the impious, subjected to torments under the earth, enjoy their light. In this regard Isidore seems to have thought that hell is on some part of the earth’s surface, though others say that it is in the depth of the earth. Some, however, say that Isidore also thought that hell is in the depth of the earth but that from some place on the earth’s surface there is a large aperture in the earth from which the sun’s light could reach others who are in hell, if the sun circled the earth. It is not altogether certain which of these is true.
De praemiis bonorum
The Rewards of the Blessed
Postquam determinavit Magister de his quae pertinent ad judicium generale, in parte hac incipit determinare de praemiis et poenis quae judicium generale sequuntur; et dividitur in partes duas: in prima determinat de praemiis bonorum; in secunda de poenis malorum, 50 dist., ibi: hic oritur quaestio, etc.
After the Master has considered what pertains to the general judgment, in this part he begins to consider the rewards and punishments that follow the general judgment. And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines the rewards of the good. In the second, the punishments of the wicked, at Distinction 50: Here a question arises.
Prima autem pars dividitur in partes tres: in prima enim describit qualis erit beatitudo sanctorum, quae eis in praemium post generale judicium dabitur; in secunda ostendit quomodo ad eam consequendam omnis humanus appetitus tendat, ibi: solet etiam quaeri de beatitudine, utrum omnes eam velint.
Now the first part is divided into three parts. In the first, he describes what will be the quality of the beatitude, or blessedness, of the saints, which will be given to them as a reward after the general judgment. In the second, he shows how every human appetite tends to its attainment: Concerning blessedness, it is also usual to ask whether all wish it.
In tertia qualiter eam habentes, diversimode ipsam participant, ibi: solet etiam quaeri, utrum aliquid de Deo cognoscat aliquis magis meritus, ut Petrus, quod non cognoscat aliquis minus meritus, ut Linus.
In the third, how those who possess beatitude participate in it in different ways: It is usual to ask whether someone of greater merit, such as Peter, will know something concerning God which someone of lesser merit, such as Linus, will not know.
Circa hoc tria facit: primo ostendit diversitatem quae in beatitudine sanctorum accidit ex parte cognitionis; secundo ex parte gaudii, vel delectationis, ibi: solet etiam quaeri, an in gaudio dispares sint. Tertio inquirit de augmento beatitudinis, quod accidet ex resumptione corporis, ibi: post hoc quaeri solet, si beatitudo sanctorum major sit futura post judicium quam interim.
Concerning this he does three things. First, he shows the differentiation that will occur in the saints’ beatitude on the part of knowledge. Second, on the part of joy or delight: It is also usual to ask whether they are unequal in joy. Third, he inquires about the increase of beatitude that will occur from the resumption of the body: It is usual to ask next whether the blessedness of the saints will become greater after the judgment than in the meantime.
Hic quaeruntur quinque. Primo de beatitudine. Secundo de visione Dei, in qua principaliter beatitudo consistit. Tertio de delectatione, quae formaliter beatitudinem complet. Quarto de dotibus quae in beatitudine continentur. Quinto de aureolis, quibus beatitudo perficitur et decoratur.
Here five questions arise. First, concerning beatitude. Second, concerning the vision of God, in which beatitude principally consists. Third, concerning delight, which completes beatitude formally. Fourth, concerning the “dowries,” which are included in beatitude. Fifth, concerning the crowns of special distinction, whereby beatitude is perfected and adorned.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor:
Concerning the first, four questions arise:
primo, in quo sit quaerenda beatitudo;
first, where beatitude should be sought;
secundo, quid sit;
second, what it is;
tertio, utrum omnes eam appetant;
third, whether all desire it;
quarto, utrum ab omnibus aequaliter participetur.
fourth, whether all participate in it equally.
In quo sit quaerenda beatitudo
Where beatitude should be sought
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo in bonis corporis consistat. Quia quod a pluribus dicitur, impossibile est falsum esse totaliter, ut Commentator dicit in Libr. de Anima; et Philosophus dicit in 7 Ethicor., quod opinio non perditur, quam populi multi famant. Sed major hominum multitudo inclinatur ad quaerendum corporales delectationes et corporalia bona quasi finem. Ergo finis humanae vitae in corporalibus bonis consistit. Finem autem humanae vitae dicimus beatitudinem. Ergo beatitudo in bonis corporis quaerenda est.
Obj. 1: To the first question we proceed thus. It seems that beatitude consists in goods of the body. For it is impossible that what is asserted by most people is totally false, as the Commentator says in the book On the Soul; and the Philosopher says in Ethics 7, a saying generally expressed among the people never dies completely. But the greater number of people are inclined to seek physical pleasures and bodily goods as their end. Therefore, the end of human life consists in bodily goods. But we call the end of human life beatitude. Therefore, beatitude should be sought in goods of the body.
Praeterea, quanto aliquis finis est magis ultimus in consecutione, tanto prior est in intentione et appetitu. Sed homo prius appetit corporale bonum quam spirituale, cum ex amore corporalium rerum in amorem invisibilium manuducamur, ut Gregorius dicit. Ergo bonum corporale est ultimus finis noster. Talis autem finis est beatitudo. Ergo in bonis corporalibus beatitudo est quaerenda.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the more final an end is in order of attainment, the more prior it is in intention and desire. But man desires bodily good before he desires spiritual good, since we are led, as by the hand, from the love of bodily things to the love of invisible things, as Gregory says. Therefore, bodily good is our ultimate end. But such an end is beatitude. Therefore, beatitude should be sought in bodily goods.
Praeterea, quanto aliquod bonum est communius, tanto divinius, ut patet in 1 Ethic. Sed bonum corporale communius est quam spirituale: quia corporale ad plantas et animalia bruta se extendit, non autem spirituale. Ergo corporale bonum spirituali praeminet; et ita in corporalibus bonis magis est beatitudo quaerenda.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more common a good is, the more divine it is, as is clear from Ethics 1. But bodily good is more common than spiritual good, because bodily good extends itself even to plants and brute animals, while spiritual good does not. Therefore, bodily good is superior to spiritual good; and so beatitude is to be sought more in bodily goods than in spiritual ones.
Praeterea, beatitudo ab omnibus ponitur finis virtutis. Sed virtus habet finem suum non solum in bonis spiritualibus, sed etiam in corporalibus: per virtutem enim temperantiae et alias virtutes homo conservatur a nocivis etiam secundum corpus. Ergo beatitudo non solum in spiritualibus, sed etiam in corporalibus bonis est quaerenda.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, beatitude is held by all to be virtue’s end. But virtue has its end not only in spiritual goods, but also in bodily ones; for through the virtue of temperance and other such virtues, man is preserved from harmful things even in regard to his body. Therefore, beatitude is to be sought not only in spiritual goods but also in bodily ones.
Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in 2 Phys., felicitas et fortuna circa idem esse videntur. Sed bona fortunae sunt corporalia. Ergo bona in quibus consistit beatitudo et felicitas, sunt corporalia.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Physics 2, happiness and fortune seem to have to do with the same things. But the goods of fortune are bodily goods. Therefore, the goods in which beatitude and happiness consists are bodily.
Praeterea homo ex anima et corpore constituitur. Ergo bonum hominis debet esse commune animae et corpori. Sed bonum spirituale non potest esse commune corpori; bonum autem corporale potest esse commune animae, inquantum anima de corporalibus delectatur. Ergo beatitudo, quae est bonum hominis, magis consistit in corporalibus quam in spiritualibus bonis.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, man is constituted of soul and body. Therefore, man’s good ought to be common to soul and body. But spiritual good cannot be shared by the body, whereas bodily good can be shared by the soul, inasmuch as the soul takes pleasure in bodily things. Therefore beatitude, which is man’s good, consists more in bodily goods than in spiritual ones.
Sed contra, illud quod convenit homini secundum corpus, potest esse commune sibi et aliis animalibus. Sed beatitudo aliis animalibus non potest competere. Ergo beatitudo non est quaerenda in bonis corporis.
On the contrary, what belongs to man according to his body can be common to him and to the other animals. But the other animals cannot possess beatitude. Therefore, beatitude should not be sought in goods of the body.