Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit: non solum deitatem Patris, sed nec Filii nec Spiritus Sancti, oculi carnis possunt aspicere, sed oculi mentis, de quibus dicitur: beati mundo corde, etc. Furthermore (2), Jerome says: the eyes of the flesh are unable to gaze upon the deity, not only of the Father, but neither of the Son nor of the Holy Spirit; but the eyes of the mind can, of which it is said, 'blessed are the clean of heart.' Praeterea, idem Hieronymus dicit: res incorporales corporalibus oculis non videntur. Sed Deus est maxime incorporalis. Ergo, etc. Furthermore (3), Jerome again says: incorporeal things are not seen by corporeal eyes. But God is maximally incorporeal. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, Augustinus in Lib. de Videndo Deum, dicit: Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicuti ipse est, vel in angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quae corporali visione cernuntur. Vita autem angelorum dicitur vita beata, in qua resurgentes vivent. Ergo, etc. Furthermore (4), Augustine says: no one has ever seen God as he is, either in this life, or in the life of the angels, in the way that these visible things are discerned by corporeal vision. But the blessed life is called the life of the angels, in which the resurrected will live. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, secundum hoc homo dicitur factus ad imaginem Dei, quod Deum conspicere potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed homo est ad imaginem non secundum carnem, sed secundum mentem. Ergo mente, et non carne, Deum videbit. Furthermore (5), man is said to have been made in the image of God because he can perceive God, as Augustine says. But man is in the image of God not according to the flesh but according to the mind. Therefore, he will see God in his mind, not his flesh. Respondeo dicendum, quod sensu corporali aliquid sentitur dupliciter: uno modo per se, alio modo per accidens. Per se quidem sentitur illud quod per se passionem sensui corporali inferre potest. Per se autem potest aliquid passionem inferre aut sensui inquantum est sensus, aut huic sensui inquantum est hic sensus. Quod autem hoc secundo modo infert per se passionem sensui, dicitur sensibile proprium; sicut color respectu visus, et sonus respectu auditus. Quia autem sensus inquantum est sensus, utitur organo corporali, non potest in eo aliquid recipi nisi corporaliter; cum omne quod recipitur in aliquo, sit in eo per modum recipientis; et ideo omnia sensibilia inferunt passionem sensui inquantum est sensus, secundum quod habent magnitudinem; et ideo magnitudo, et omnia consequentia, ut motus et quies et numerus, et hujusmodi, dicuntur sensibilia communia per se tantum. Per accidens autem sentitur illud quod non infert passionem sensui neque inquantum est sensus, neque inquantum est hic sensus; sed conjungitur his quae per se sensui inferunt passionem; sicut Socrates, et filius Diarii, et amicus, et alia hujusmodi: quae per se cognoscuntur in universali intellectu; in particulari autem in virtute cogitativa in homine, aestimativa autem in aliis animalibus. Hujusmodi autem tunc sensus exterior dicitur sentire, quamvis per accidens, quando ex eo quod per se sentitur, vis apprehensiva, cujus est illud cognitum per se cognoscere, statim sine dubitatione et discursu apprehendit; sicut videmus aliquem vivere ex hoc quod loquitur. Quando autem aliter se habet, non dicitur illud sensus videre, etiam per accidens. I answer that, something can be sensed by the physical senses in two ways. In one way, in itself. In the other, incidentally. What is sensed in itself is whatever can introduce a passion to the physical senses by itself. Now, something can introduce a passion by itself either to a sense as sense or to this particular sense precisely as this particular sense. When it introduces a passion to the sense by itself in this second way, it is called a proper sensible object, as for example color is with respect to sight and sound with respect to hearing. But because sense as sense uses a bodily organ, something can be received in it only in a corporeal manner, since everything received in something is in it after the mode of the receiver. And thus all sensible objects introduce a passion to the sense as sense insofar as they have magnitude. And thus magnitude and everything consequent upon it, such as motion, rest, number, and such things, are called common sensibles in themselves alone. Something is sensed incidentally, however, that does not introduce a passion to the senses, either as sense or as this particular sense, but instead is joined to things which introduce a passion to the sense as such; for example, Socrates, the son of Diarius, a friend, and other such things. These are known per se in the universal by the intellect, but in the particular they are known in man in the cogitative power, and in other animals in the estimative power. The external senses are said to sense things of this sort, though incidentally, when from what is sensed per se the apprehensive power, to which it belongs to know what it is known as such, apprehends at once and without doubting or discursion, as when we see that someone is alive from the fact that he is speaking. But when the situation is otherwise, the senses are not said to see such an object, even incidentally. Dico ergo, quod Deus nullo modo potest videri visu corporali, aut aliquo alio sensu sentiri, sicut per se visibile, nec hic nec in patria; quia si a sensu removeatur id quod convenit sensui inquantum est sensus, non erit sensus; et similiter si a visu removeatur id quod est visus inquantum est visus, non erit visus. Cum ergo sensus, inquantum est sensus, percipiat magnitudinem; et visus, inquantum est talis sensus, percipiat colorem; impossibile est quod visus percipiat aliquid quod non est color nec magnitudo, nisi sensus diceretur aequivoce. Cum ergo visus et sensus sit futurus idem specie in corpore glorioso, non poterit esse quod divinam essentiam videat sicut visibile per se; videbit autem eam sicut visibile per accidens, dum ex una parte visus corporalis tantam gloriam Dei inspiciet in corporibus, et praecipue gloriosis, et maxime in corpore Christi, et ex parte alia intellectus tam clare videbit Deum, quod in rebus corporaliter visis Deus percipietur, sicut in locutione percipitur vita: quamvis enim tunc intellectus noster non videat Deum ex creaturis, tamen videbit eum in creaturis corporaliter visis. Et hunc modum quo Deus corporaliter possit videri, ponit Augustinus in fine de Civ. Dei, ut patet verba ejus intuenti; dicit enim sic: valde credibile est sic nos visuros mundana tunc corpora caeli novi vel terrae, ut Deum ubique praesentem et universa corpora gubernantem clarissima perspicuitate videamus; non sicut nunc invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur; sed sicut homines mox ut aspicimus, non credimus vivere, sed videmus. I say, therefore, that God can in no way be seen by corporeal sight or sensed with any other sense as visible as such, either here or in heaven. For if what befits a sense precisely as a sense is taken away from the sense, it will not be a sense at all. Likewise, if what belongs to sight precisely as sight is taken away from sight, there will be no sight. Since, then, the sense considered as a sense perceives magnitude, and sight, precisely as this kind of sense, perceives color, it is impossible for sight to perceive something that is neither color nor magnitude, unless sense is spoken of equivocally. Since, therefore, sight and sense are going to be the same specifically in the glorified body, it will not be possible for them to see the divine essence as visible as such. But it will see it as visible incidentally, when on the one hand corporeal sight will see God’s great glory in bodies, especially glorified bodies, and most of all the body of Christ, and on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly that God will be perceived in things seen corporeally, as life is perceived in the fact of speaking. For even though our intellect will not then see God from creation, it will see him in created things seen corporeally. And this is the manner in which God can be seen corporeally that Augustine posits at the end of the City of God, as is clear from his words to one who reads them closely. He says: it is quite believable that in that state we will see the worldly bodies of the new heavens and the new earth in such a way that we will see with the clearest acuity God present everywhere, governing all bodies, not as we now perceive intellectually the invisible things of God through the things that have been made, but rather in the way that when we look at men we do not have to believe that they are alive but instead see it at once. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum illud Job intelligitur de oculo spirituali, de quo dicit apostolus Ephes. 1, 18: illuminatos habere oculos cordis vestri. Reply Obj. 1: This passage of Job is understood as about the spiritual eye, about which the Apostle says: the eyes of your heart enlightened (Eph 1:18). Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa auctoritas non intelligitur quod per oculos carnis Deum simus visuri, sed quia in carne existentes Deum videbimus. Reply Obj. 2: This text is not understood to mean that we are going to see God through the eyes of flesh but rather that, being ourselves in the flesh, we will see God. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur inquirendo in verbis illis, et sub conditione; quod patet ex hoc quod praemittitur: longe itaque alterius potentiae erunt, si per eos videbitur incorporea illa natura; et postea subdit: vis itaque etc., et postmodum determinat, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: In those words Augustine is speaking by way of inquiry and conditionally, as is clear from what comes before: and so these eyes will have a different power by far if that incorporeal nature will be seen through them. And later he adds: and consequently, the power, and afterwards makes a determination, as has been said. Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnis cognitio fit per aliquam abstractionem a materia; et ideo quanto forma corporalis magis abstrahitur a materia, magis est cognitionis principium; et inde est quod forma in materia existens nullo modo est cognitionis principium; in sensu autem aliquo modo, prout a materia separatur; et in intellectu nostro adhuc melius; et ideo oculus spiritualis, a quo removetur impedimentum cognitionis, potest videre rem corporalem; non autem sequitur quod oculus corporalis, in quo deficit vis cognoscitiva, secundum quod participat de materia, possit cognoscere perfecte cognoscibilia quae sunt incorporea. Reply Obj. 4: All knowledge comes through an abstraction from matter. And thus the more a corporeal form is abstracted from matter, the more it is the principle of knowledge. And so it is that a form existing in matter is in no way the principle of knowledge, but a form existing in the senses is in a way the principle of knowledge, as being separated from matter, and a form in our intellect is better still. And thus the spiritual eye, from which the impediment to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal thing. It does not follow, however, that the corporeal eye, in which the cognoscitive power falls short to the extent that it participates in matter, can know perfectly the incorporeal things that can be known. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis mens facta carnalis non possit cogitare nisi accepta a sensibus, tamen cogitat ea immaterialiter: et similiter oportet quod visus illud quod apprehendit, semper apprehendat corporaliter; unde non potest cognoscere illa quae corporaliter apprehendi non possunt. Reply Obj. 5: Even though a mind that has been rendered carnal can only think about things received from the senses, it still thinks about them in an immaterial way. Likewise, what sight apprehends it must always apprehend in a corporeal manner. Hence it cannot know things that cannot be apprehended corporeally. Ad sextum dicendum, quod beatitudo est perfectio hominis inquantum est homo; et quia homo non habet quod sit homo ex corpore, sed magis ex anima, corpus autem est de essentia hominis inquantum est perfectum per animam; ideo beatitudo hominis non consistit principaliter nisi in actu animae, et ex ea derivatur ad corpus per quamdam redundantiam, sicut patet ex his quae dicta sunt 44 dist. quaest. 2, art. 4, in corp. Quaedam tamen beatitudo corporis nostri erit, inquantum Deum videbit in sensibilibus creaturis, et praecipue in corpore Christi. Reply Obj. 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man precisely as man. And because man possesses the fact of being man not from the body but rather from the soul, though the body pertains to man’s essence inasmuch as it is perfected by the soul, man’s beatitude consists principally only in an act of the soul. And from the soul beatitude is channeled into the body through a kind of overflowing, as is clear from what was said. But there will be a kind of beatitude of our body inasmuch as it will see God in sensible creation, especially in Christ’s body. Ad septimum dicendum, quod intellectus est perceptivus spiritualium, non autem visus incorporalium; et ideo intellectus poterit cognoscere divinam essentiam sibi conjunctam, non autem visus incorporalia. Reply Obj. 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things, but physical sight cannot. And thus the intellect will be able to know the divine essence joined to it, but the physical sight will not. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum videndo Deum comprehendant ipsum Whether by seeing God they will comprehend him Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sancti in patria videndo Deum, eum comprehendant. 1 Corinth. 9, 24: sic currite ut comprehendatis. Cursus autem est ad praemium. Ergo comprehensio Dei est praemium virtutis, quod sanctis reddetur. Obj. 1: To the third question, we proceed thus. It seems that in heaven the saints, by seeing God, comprehend him: so run that you may comprehend (1 Cor 9:24). Therefore, the comprehension of God is the prize for virtue that is awarded to the saints. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Videndo Deum: totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil ipsius lateat videntem. Sed si Deus videtur ab aliquo, nihil ipsius latet videntem: quia cum sit simplex, non potest esse quod aliquid ejus videatur, et aliquid lateat. Ergo Deus a quolibet ipsum vidente comprehenditur. Obj. 2: In On Seeing God, Augustine says: something is wholly comprehended by seeing it when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden to the one seeing. But if God is seen by someone, nothing of him is hidden to the one seeing. For since he is simple, it cannot be the case that something of him is seen and something else is hidden. Therefore, God is comprehended by anyone who sees him. Praeterea, omne quod totum et totaliter videtur, comprehenditur. Sed Deus a videntibus essentiam suam totus videtur, et totaliter; quia totus Deus non est nisi ejus essentia; quilibet etiam ejus modus est ejus essentia: nec potest essentia ejus videri, nisi ipse totus, et totaliter, videatur. Ergo ab omnibus essentiam suam videntibus comprehenditur. Obj. 3: Everything that is seen completely and wholly is comprehended. But the whole of God is seen wholly by those who see his essence, since the whole of God is nothing but his essence. Moreover, any mode of his is his essence. Nor can his essence be seen in any way except as a whole and wholly. Therefore, all who see his essence comprehend him. Praeterea, sicut dicitur in 3 De anima, intellectus eodem modo intelligit se et alia. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus in lib. 83 quaest., omne quod se intelligit, comprehendit se. Ergo omne quod intelligit aliud, comprehendit ipsum. Sed quilibet videns essentiam divinam, intelligit ipsam. Ergo comprehendit eam. Obj. 4: As it says in On the Soul 3, the intellect understands itself and other things in the same way. But, as Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions: everything that understands itself comprehends itself. Therefore, everything that understands another comprehends it. But anyone who sees the divine essence understands it. Therefore, he comprehends it. Praeterea, omne illud de quo cognoscitur quid est, comprehenditur; quia hoc cognoscitur quasi per suam definitionem: comprehenditur autem cujus fines circumspici possunt, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de Videndo Deum. Sed omne illud cujus essentia videtur, cognoscitur de eo quid est. Ergo quilibet essentiam Dei videns, comprehendit ipsum. Obj. 5: Whenever what something is is known, it is comprehended, since then it is known, as it were, in its definition. Now something is comprehended when its boundaries can be seen all around, as Augustine says in On Seeing God. But when something’s essence is seen, what it is is known. Therefore, anyone who sees the essence of God comprehends him. Praeterea, quantitas actionis est secundum quantitatem formae, quae est actionis principium; secundum enim quantitatem caloris est quantitas calefactionis. Sed forma, quae est cognitionis principium, est id quo cognoscens cognoscit. Ergo secundum modum ejus quo cognoscitur, est modus cognitionis. Sed illud quo cognoscitur Deus, non est aliud quam eius essentia, ut dictum est supra, haec autem infinita est. Ergo et visio infinita; ergo ea potest divina essentia comprehendi, quamvis sit infinita. Obj. 6: The quantity of an action follows on the quantity of the form, which is the principle of the action. For the quantity of heating follows on the quantity of the heat. But the form that is the principle of knowledge is what a knower knows by. Therefore, the mode of knowledge follows on the mode of what the thing is known by. But what God is known by is nothing other than his essence, as was said above, and this is infinite. Therefore, the vision is also infinite and thus the divine essence can be comprehended, even though it is infinite. Praeterea, si essentia divina non potest comprehendi, hoc non est nisi propter excessum claritatis ipsius. Sed excessus cognoscibilis impedit cognitionem, inquantum corrumpit potentiam cognoscitivam; quod accidit tantum in sensu, non autem in intellectu, ut patet ex hoc quod dicitur in 3 de Anima, quod qui intelligit maxima, non minus potest intelligere minima, sed magis; cujus contrarium in sensu accidit. Cum ergo divina essentia non videatur nisi per intellectum, ut dictum est, videtur quod excessus divinae claritatis comprehensionem divinae essentiae non impediat. Obj. 7: If the divine essence cannot be comprehended, this is only because of its excessive brightness. But a knowable excess impedes knowledge inasmuch as it corrupts the cognoscitive potency, which occurs only in the senses but not in the intellect. This is clear from what is said in On the Soul 3, that one who understands the greatest things is not less able to understand the least things but is, rather, more able to understand them, whereas the contrary occurs in the senses. Since, then, the divine essence is only seen by the intellect, as has been said, it seems that the excess of divine brightness does not impede comprehension of the divine essence. Praeterea, essentia divina comprehensibilis est ab aliquo intellectu; quia ipse Deus seipsum comprehendit. Si ergo ab intellectu humano non possit comprehendi, hoc erit propter defectum intellectus. Sed lumen gloriae aufert omnem defectum intellectus; cum etiam per gloriam auferatur omnis corporis defectus. Ergo illi qui in lumine gloriae videbunt Deum, comprehendent ipsum. Obj. 8: The divine essence can be comprehended by an intellect, since God comprehends himself. If, then, it cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, this will be due to a defect of that intellect. But the light of glory takes away every intellectual defect, since through glory every bodily defect is also taken away. Therefore, those who will see God in the light of glory will comprehend him. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Videndo Deum: Dei plenitudinem non solum oculis corporis, sed nec ipsa mente quisquam aliquando comprehendit. On the contrary (1), in On Seeing God Augustine says: no one ever comprehends the fullness of God, not only with the eyes of the body but even with the mind itself. Praeterea, sicut dicit Augustinus in lib. 83 quaest., quod comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Ergo quod comprehendit aliud, illud finitum est ei. Sed Deus non potest esse finitus alicui intellectui creato. Ergo nullus intellectus creatus potest Deum comprehendere. Furthermore (2), as Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions: what comprehends itself is finite to itself. Therefore, what is comprehended by something else is also finite to it. But God cannot be finite to any created intellect. Therefore, no created intellect can comprehend God. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit in 1 Lib.: quoniam incomprehensibilis est Dei substantia, his qui divinae credunt Scripturae, non dubium est. Furthermore (3), Damascene says in Book 1: for those who believe divine Scripture there is no doubt that the substance of God is incomprehensible. Praeterea, omne quod comprehendit aliquid, vel est majus vel aequale illi. Sed intellectus creatus non potest esse major Deo, nec aequalis. Ergo non potest ipsum comprehendere. Furthermore (4), everything that comprehends something is either greater than or equal to it. But the created intellect cannot be greater than God or even equal to him. Therefore, it cannot comprehend him. Respondeo dicendum, quod comprehendere dicitur quasi simul prendere, idest capere; et ideo illud proprie comprehenditur quod simul capitur, idest cum omnibus quae ejus sunt. Unde oportet quod omne comprehensum includatur in comprehendente; includitur autem proprie contentum in continente; et ideo oportet comprehensum contineri in comprehendente. Sicut autem dicitur corporaliter aliquid in altero contineri, quia non excedit continens ex ulla parte secundum quantitatem dimensivam, ut vinum in dolio; ita dicitur contineri aliquid ab aliquo spiritualiter, quod substat virtuti ejus, et in nullo excedit ipsum. Et ideo tunc dicitur aliquid per cognitionem comprehendi, quando cognitum stat sub actu virtutis cognoscitivae, et non excedit ipsam. I answer that, to ‘comprehend’ is said as if ‘taking together,’ i.e., taking hold of. And thus something is properly comprehended when it is taken hold of together, i.e., with everything that belongs to it. For this reason everything that is comprehended must be enclosed in the comprehensor. But what is contained is properly enclosed in what contains it. And thus what is comprehended must be contained in the comprehensor. Now just as something is said to be contained in something else physically when it does not exceed the container by its dimensive quantity on any side, like wine in a jar, so also something is said to be contained by something else spiritually when it lies under its power and exceeds it in no respect. And thus something is said to be comprehended by knowledge when what is known lies under the act of the cognoscitive power and does not exceed it. Excessus autem omnis est secundum aliquam quantitatem. Secundum hanc autem quantitatem dicitur cognoscibile excedere potentiam cognoscitivam, secundum quam cognoscibile est ab ipsa. Sensibile autem cognoscitur et secundum quantitatem dimensivam, propter hoc quod sensus in cognoscendo utitur organo corporali, ratione cujus cognoscit sensibilia omnia quae reducuntur ad quantitatem dimensivam; et secundum quantitatem virtualem, ut patet in sensibilibus propriis, quae qualitates sunt; et ideo etiam comprehensio sensus impeditur et propter excessum quantitatis dimensivae, sicut impeditur ne comprehendat totam terram; et propter excessum quantitatis virtualis, sicut impeditur ne comprehendat claritatem solis: quia non est tanta virtus oculi ad cognoscendum, quanta claritas solis quae est cognoscibilis. Intelligibile autem non cognoscitur ab intellectu sub ratione quantitatis dimensivae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet accipit a sensu; ex quo sequitur quod intelligat cum continuo; et secundum hoc intellectus impeditur a comprehensione intelligibilis propter excessum quantitatis; sicut impeditur a comprehensione lineae vel numeri infiniti. Sed per se loquendo, intelligibile comparatur ad intellectum secundum rationem quantitatis virtualis, eo quod proprium objectum intellectus est quid; et ideo in his quae sunt separata a sensu, non impeditur comprehensio intellectus nisi per excessum quantitatis virtualis; et hoc est quando intelligibile plus est cognoscibile quam intellectus cognoscere possit vel cognoscat. Sicut ille qui scit hanc conclusionem, triangulus habet tres, per probabilem rationem, quia scilicet ita communiter dicitur, non comprehendit ipsam: non quia partem ejus videat et partem non videat; sed quia modus quo cognoscit, deficit a modo quo est cognoscibilis per demonstrationem. Now every excess refers to a quantity. And the knowable is said to exceed the cognoscitive power according to the amount that the knowable is knowable by it. The sensible, however, is known both according to dimensive quantity, because the senses use a bodily organ in knowing by reason of which they know all sensible things that are reduced to dimensive quantity, and also according to quantity of power, as is seen in the proper objects of sense, which are qualities. And thus, too, the senses’ comprehension is impeded both because of an excess of dimensive quantity, as one is impeded from comprehending the whole earth, and also due to an excess of quantity of power, as one is impeded from comprehending the brightness of the sun. For the eye is not as powerful in its ability to know as is the sun’s brightness, which is knowable. Now, what is intelligible is not known by the intellect under the aspect of dimensive quantity except incidentally, namely inasmuch as it is received from the senses. From this it follows that it understands with the continuous and time. And in this regard the intellect is impeded from comprehending the intelligible due to the excess of quantity, as it is impeded from comprehending a line or an infinite number. But speaking per se, the intelligible is compared to the intellect under the aspect of quantity of power from the fact that the proper object of the intellect is the what. And thus in things separated from the senses the intellect’s comprehension is only impeded through excess of quantity of power. And this occurs when the intelligible object is more knowable than the intellect knows or can know. Just as one who knows the conclusion that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles on the basis of a probable argument, namely because people commonly say this, does not comprehend this fact. And this is not because he sees part of it and does not see another part but rather because the way in which he knows it falls short of the way in which it can be known, for it can be known by demonstration. Essentia autem divina est cognoscibilis per veritatem suam; intellectus autem est cognoscitivus per lumen intellectuale quod est in ipso. Veritas autem divinae essentiae excedit lumen quodcumque intellectus creati; et ideo impossibile est quod videat Deum ita perfecte sicut est visibilis; et ex hoc sequitur quod nullus intellectus creatus Deum comprehendere possit. Now the divine essence is knowable through its own truth, and the intellect can know through the intellectual light that is in it. But the truth of the divine essence exceeds any light of a created intellect. Thus it is impossible for it to see God as perfectly as he is seeable. And from this it follows that no created intellect can comprehend God. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod apostolus loquitur de comprehensione gloriae, qua scilicet fit ut anima capiat in se omne illud quod ad perfectionem gloriae pertinet; et secundum hoc dicitur gloriam comprehendere, quamvis nunquam essentiam intellectu comprehendat. Vel comprehensio ibi dicitur ipsa perventio ad habendum Deum, secundum quod spei dicitur comprehensio succedere. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the comprehension of glory, i.e., that by which the soul becomes able to hold in itself all that pertains to the perfection of glory. And to this extent it is said to comprehend glory, though it never comprehends the essence intellectually. Or else in this passage arriving at the possession of God is called comprehension, inasmuch as comprehension is said to succeed to the place of hope. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus duo ponit in definitione comprehensionis; quorum uno excluditur excessus cognoscibilis supra virtutem cognoscentis, quae est secundum quantitatem dimensivam; et quantum ad hoc dicit: quod ita videtur ut nihil ejus lateat videntem; alio autem excluditur excessus secundum quantitatem virtutis; et quantum ad hoc dicit: aut cujus fines circumspici possunt; tunc enim fines rei circumspiciuntur quando videns pervenit ad finem visionis perfecte videndo. Reply Obj. 2: Augustine includes two elements in the definition of comprehension. One of these excludes the excess of the knowable above the power of the knower with respect to dimensive quantity. In this regard he says: when it is seen such that nothing of it is hidden to the one seeing. The other excludes excess with respect to quantity of power. With regard to this he says: or whose boundaries can be seen on every side. For a thing’s boundaries are seen on every side when the one seeing it reaches the end of vision by seeing perfectly. Ad tertium dicendum, quod totam essentiam divinam sancti videbunt in patria, sed non totaliter; non ita quod aliquis modus sit in Deo quem non videant, vel aliquis modus sit intellectus ipsorum qui non convertatur ad Deum; sed quia modus quo convertuntur ad Deum cognoscendum, non est aequalis modo quo Deus est cognoscibilis; et haec inaequalitas ostenditur cum dicitur, quod divina essentia non totaliter videbitur; hoc enim adverbium ‘totaliter’ neque dicit modum videntis absolute, neque modum absolute rei visae; sed modum videntis per comparationem ad rem visam: hoc enim adverbium determinat ipsam visionem, secundum quam comparatur videns ad visum. Reply Obj. 3: The saints will see the whole divine essence in heaven, but they will not see it completely; not because there will be any mode in God that they do not see or any mode in their intellect that is not turned toward God, but rather because the mode by which they are turned toward knowing God is not equal to the mode by which God can be known. And it is this inequality that is shown when it is said that the divine essence will not be seen wholly. For the adverb ‘wholly’ indicates neither absolutely the mode of the one seeing nor absolutely the mode of the thing seen but instead the mode of the one seeing by way of comparison to the thing seen. For this adverb modifies the seeing itself in accord with which the one seeing is compared to what is seen. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quando aliquid intelligit se, idem est modus cognoscentis et cogniti; et ideo si intelligit se, comprehendit se. Non est autem idem modus cognoscentis et cogniti quando intellectus intelligit aliud; et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 4: When something understands itself, the knower and the known have the same mode. And thus if it understands itself it comprehends itself. But the knower and the known do not have the same mode when the intellect understands something else. Thus the case is not similar. Ad quintum dicendum, quod eodem modo aliquis cognoscit quid est res quo cognoscit essentiam rei, cum ipsa essentia sit quidditas rei; et ideo ille solus comprehendit quid est res, qui comprehendit essentiam; unde sicut sancti videbunt essentiam divinam, sed non comprehendent ipsam; ita videbunt quid est Deus, sed non comprehendent; et ita non videbitur Deus ab eis sicut videtur res per suam definitionem, cujus essentia comprehenditur. Reply Obj. 5: Someone knows what a thing is in the same way that he knows the thing’s essence, since the essence is the thing’s quiddity. And thus only one who comprehends a thing’s essence comprehends what it is. Hence just as the saints will see the divine essence but not comprehend it, so also they will see what God is but not comprehend this. And thus God will not be seen by them in the way that a thing is seen through its definition and whose essence is thus comprehended. Ad sextum dicendum, quod actio non attribuitur formae tantum, quae est principium actionis, sed composito; sicut calefactio calido, non calori tantum; et ideo actionem oportet mensurare non solum secundum formam, quae est principium actionis, sed etiam secundum subjectum formae. Sed forma quae non est per se subsistens, non habet alium modum a modo subjecti, quia non habet esse nisi inquantum est actus talis subjecti; et ideo mensura formae est mensura compositi; sed forma quae est per se subsistens, habet aliquem modum inquantum est res quaedam subsistens, et quemdam modum, secundum quod est actus talis subjecti; et hic modus accipitur secundum mensuram qua perfectibile pertingit ut perficiat tali forma; et ex hoc modo mensuratur actio. Essentia autem divina est per se subsistens; et ideo visio quae per eam fit in intellectu creato, non mensuratur secundum modum infinitum, qui est ipsius essentiae secundum se, sed secundum modum quo intellectus pertingit ad hoc quod per ipsam perficiatur. Ad hoc autem pertingit, inquantum ei conjungitur per lumen gloriae, quod est finitum; et ideo finita est ex parte videntis. Reply Obj. 6: Action is attributed not to form alone, which is the principle of action, but to the composite, just as heating is attributed to what is hot, not to heat alone. And thus we must measure an action not only with reference to the form, which is the principle of the action, but also with reference to the form’s subject. But a form that is not subsistent by itself has no other mode from the mode of the subject, since it only has being inasmuch as it is the act of such a subject. And thus the measure of the form is the measure of the composite. But a form that is subsistent by itself has a mode inasmuch as it is a given subsistent thing and another mode to the extent that it is the act of such a subject. And this mode is taken after the measure by which the perfectible attains to being perfected by such a form, and it is on the basis of this mode that the action is measured. Now the divine essence is subsistent by itself. And thus the vision that comes to the created intellect through it is measured not according to the infinite mode that belongs to the essence itself in its own right but rather according to the mode by which the intellect attains to being perfected through it. But it attains to this inasmuch as it is joined to it through the light of glory, which is finite. And thus the vision is finite on the part of the one seeing.