Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum anima possit aliquid intelligere a corpore separata Whether the soul can understand anything when separated from the body Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima nihil intelligere possit a corpore separata. Quia, ut dicit Philosophus in 1 de Anima, intelligere et considerare consumitur quodam interius corrupto. Sed per mortem illud quod est interius ex parte corporis, corrumpitur. Ergo post mortem non potest anima intelligere aliquid et considerare. Obj. 1: To the first question, we proceed thus. It seems that the soul can understand nothing when separated from the body. For, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1, when something internal is corrupted it puts an end to understanding and contemplating. But what is internal on the part of the body is corrupted by death. Therefore, after death the soul cannot understand or contemplate anything. Praeterea, nulla actio communis corpori et animae potest remanere in anima, corpore corrupto. Sed intelligere est quaedam actio corpori et animae communis, sicut et texere et aedificare, ut patet in 1 de Anima. Ergo, corpore corrupto, anima non potest intelligere. Obj. 2: No action common to the body and the soul can remain in the soul when the body is corrupted. But understanding is an action common to body and soul, as are weaving and building, as is clear in On the Soul 1. Therefore, when the body is corrupted the soul cannot understand. Praeterea, anima nihil potest intelligere sine intellectu possibili. Sed intellectus iste est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in 3 de Anima: non autem corrumpitur nisi corpore corrupto. Ergo anima a corpore separata nihil potest intelligere. Obj. 3: Without the potential intellect, the soul can understand nothing. But this intellect is corruptible, as it says in On the Soul 3, however, it is only corrupted when the body is corrupted. Therefore, the soul separated from the body cannot understand anything. Praeterea, ut dicitur in 3 de Anima, sicut se habent colores ad visum, ita se habent phantasmata ad animam intellectivam. Sed destructis coloribus visus nihil posset videre. Ergo destructis phantasmatibus anima nihil poterit intelligere. Phantasmata autem non remanent in anima separata, cum sint in imaginatione, quae habet organum corporale. Ergo anima separata nihil potest intelligere. Obj. 4: As it says in On the Soul 3, phantasms are to the intellective soul as colors are to sight. But if colors were destroyed, sight could see nothing. Therefore, when phantasms are destroyed the soul will not be able to understand anything. But phantasms do not remain in the separated soul, since they exist in the imagination, which has a bodily organ. Therefore, the separated soul cannot understand anything. Praeterea, perfectius esse habet anima in corpore quam a corpore separata; sicut pars in toto perfectior est quam per se existens. Sed anima intellectiva, cum est in corpore, non potest intelligere sine phantasmatibus, ut patet in 1 et 3 de Anima. Ergo nec separata a corpore sine eis intelligere poterit; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 5: The soul has more perfect being in the body than separated from the body, just as a part is more perfect in the whole than by itself. But the intellective soul, when it is in the body, cannot understand without phantasms, as is clear in On the Soul 1 and 3. Therefore, neither will it be able to understand without them when separated from the body. And so the same follows as before. Praeterea, intellectus humanus est factus sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in 3 de anima. Ergo anima in sui creatione non habet aliquas formas concreatas. Si ergo intelligit aliquid, oportet quod intelligat per formas a sensibus acceptas; cum omnis cognitio fiat per aliquam formam quae sit similitudo rei cognitae. Sed animae puerorum defunctorum in uteris maternis non habent aliquas formas a sensibus acceptas. Ergo saltem animae puerorum non possunt intelligere aliquid, cum non habeant aliquas intelligibiles formas. Obj. 6: The human intellect was made like a blank slate on which nothing is written, as it says in On the Soul 3. Therefore, the soul at its creation does not have any forms co-created with it. If, then, it understands something, it must understand through forms received from the senses, since all knowledge occurs through a form that is a likeness of the thing known. But the souls of children who die in their mother’s womb do not have any forms received from the senses. Therefore, at least the souls of these children cannot understand anything, since they do not possess any intelligible forms. Praeterea, anima ad hoc dicitur esse corpori conjuncta, ut scientiis et virtutibus perficiatur. Ergo antequam in corpore fuerit scientia perfecta, non potest intelligere aliquid; alias frustra corpori conjungeretur. Sed animae parvulorum praedictorum non fuerunt aliqua scientia in corporibus perfectae. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 7: The soul is said to be joined to the body for the purpose of being perfected in knowledge and virtues. Therefore, before it has been perfected in knowledge in the body, it cannot understand anything. Otherwise it would be joined to the body in vain. But the souls of children as mentioned above have not been perfected by any knowledge in the body. Therefore, the same follows as before. Sed contra, Philosophus dicit in 2 Caeli et mundi, quod omnis res est propter suam operationem: unde re remanente remanet ejus operatio; et hoc est quod Damascenus dicit, quod nulla substantia est otiosa. Si ergo anima post corpus remanet, sicut fides ponit; oportet quod aliqua ejus operatio remaneat; quia, ut dicitur in 1 de anima, si nulla operatio animae est ei propria sine corpore, non contingit eam separari. Sed intelligere est maxime propria ejus operatio. Ergo anima separata aliquid intelligere potest. On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 2 that each thing is for the sake of its activity. Hence while the thing remains, its activity remains. And this is what Damascene says when he says that no substance is without work. If, then, the soul remains after the body, as the faith asserts, its activity must remain. For, as it says in On the Soul 1, if no activity of the soul is proper to it without the body, it cannot be separated. But understanding more than anything else is its proper activity. Therefore, the soul separated from the body can understand something. Praeterea, sicut dicit Avicenna in sua Metaph., immunitas a materia est causa quare aliqua substantia sit intellectiva. Sed anima separata a corpore immunior est a materia quam corpori conjuncta; quia tunc non est actus alicujus materiae, sicut modo est. Cum ergo anima modo intelligat, multo magis intelliget cum erit a corpore separata. Furthermore (2), as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, freedom from matter is the reason that a substance is intellective. But the soul separated from the body is more free from matter than when joined to the body, since then it is not the act of any matter as it now is. Therefore since the soul understands now, all the more will it understand when separated from the body. Praeterea, Avicenna dicit in 6 de Naturalibus, quod anima non indiget imaginatione et aliis virtutibus sensibilibus nisi in principio tantum; et non postea, nisi parum. Cum ergo proficit et roboratur, sola per se operatur actiones suas absolute; et sic anima indiget sensibus sicut homo indiget jumento et ejus apparatu, ut perveniat eo quo proponit; quo cum accesserit, non ejus ulterius indigebit. Ergo anima non semper indiget corpore ad intelligendum; et sic separata intelligere poterit. Furthermore (3), Avicenna says in On Natural Things 6 that the soul does not need the imagination and other sensible powers except only in the beginning and later on only a little. And so, once it progresses and takes on strength it works its own actions absolutely by itself alone. And in this way the soul needs the senses as a man needs a beast of burden and its equipment to reach the place he plans to go, and once he arrives there, he will no longer need it. Therefore, the soul does not always need the body to understand and so will be able to understand when separated. Respondeo dicendum, quod ponentibus intellectum a potentiis sensitivis differre, necesse est ponere intellectus substantiam incorruptibilem esse, eo quod necesse est eum immaterialem ponere, nec a materia secundum esse dependentem. Omnem autem hujusmodi substantiam oportet incorruptibilem esse; quia materia, inquantum potest esse subjectum privationis et formae, est corruptionis causa in rebus materialibus. Unde dicit Philosophus in 1 de Anima, quod intellectus videtur esse substantia quaedam, et non corrumpi. I answer that, for those who hold that the intellect differs from the sensitive powers, it is necessary to hold that the intellect is an incorruptible substance, because it is necessary to hold that it is immaterial and not dependent on matter for its being. But any substance like this must be incorruptible. For inasmuch as matter can be the subject of privation and form, it is the cause of corruption in material things. Hence the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1 that the intellect seems to be a kind of substance and seems not to be corrupted. Quidam vero hunc intellectum corruptibilem dixerunt non esse partem animae humanae, sed esse aliquam substantiam omnino a corpore separatam: animam vero humanam non dici intellectivam nisi secundum quamdam participationem intellectualitatis ex refulgentia intellectus separati super ipsam; unde destructo corpore anima humana nec remanebat, nec aliquid intelligere poterat. Sed hoc videtur esse contra intentionem Philosophi; dicit enim in 2 de Anima, de intellectu loquens, quod intellectus videtur esse alterum genus animae: et hoc solum contingit separari sicut perpetuum a corruptibili. 12 etiam Metaph., dicit, quod anima est talis dispositionis, ut scilicet possit separari non tota, sed intellectus. Ex quo patet quod intellectum, qui est pars animae, ponit a corpore separari; et ideo oportet animam intellectivam, quae est anima humana, post corpus remanere, sicut fides ponit: et per consequens necesse est quod intelligat, cum intelligere sit ejus propria operatio. Sed quomodo intelligat, diversimode a quibusdam ponitur. Some, however, said that this incorruptible intellect is not part of the human soul but is rather a substance altogether separate from the body, whereas the human soul is only called intellective by a kind of participation in intellectuality from the separated intellect’s shining upon it. Thus when the body is destroyed the human soul would neither remain nor be able to understand anything. But this seems to be contrary to the Philosopher’s understanding. For in On the Soul 2, he says, speaking of the intellect, that the intellect seems to be another genus of soul, and that it can only be the case that it is separated as the perpetual from the corruptible. In the Metaphysics 12, too, he says that the soul has such a disposition that it can be separated, not the whole thing, but the intellect. From this it is clear that he believes that the intellect, which is part of the soul, can be separated from the body. And thus an intellective soul, which the human soul is, must remain after the body, as the faith asserts. And, consequently, it is necessary for it to understand, since understanding is its proper activity. But different people have different ways of explaining how it understands. Quidam enim dicunt, quod anima separata, a rebus cognitionem accipit, sicut et nunc facit. Sed haec opinio videtur omnino irrationabilis: anima enim humana a corpore separata non poterit uti sensitivis potentiis, ut supra, dist. 44, qu. 3, art. 3, qu. 2, dictum est, cum harum potentiarum actus per organa corporea necesse sit exerceri; unde non erit nisi in usu potentiarum intellectivae partis. Intellectus autem non est natus accipere cognitionem a rebus sensibilibus immediate, sed mediantibus potentiis sensitivis; cum oporteat esse quamdam convenientiam inter recipiens et receptum. Species autem in sensibus existentes habent convenientiam et cum intellectu, inquantum sunt sine materia, et cum rebus materialibus, inquantum sunt cum conditionibus materiae; unde convenienter sensus a rebus materialibus accipit, et intellectus a sensibus: non autem intellectus immediate a rebus materialibus; et ideo non potest poni quod anima separata cognitionem a rebus materialibus accipiat. Nec sufficit ponere in ea cognitionem solum quae fuit a sensibus accepta in corpore, propter animas puerorum decedentium in maternis uteris, quae a sensibus cognitionem non acceperunt. For some say that the soul receives knowledge from things when separated as it does now. But this opinion seems totally unreasonable. For the human soul separated from the body cannot use the sensitive powers, as said above in Distinction 44, Question 3, Article 3, Quaestiuncula 2, since the acts of these powers must be carried out through bodily organs. Thus the soul will not be able to use anything except the potencies of the intellective part. But the intellect was not made to receive knowledge from sensible things directly but rather by the mediation of the sensitive powers, since there must be a kind of agreement between the receiver and the received. Now the species existing in the senses agree both with the intellect, in that they are without matter, and with material things, in that they are with the conditions of matter. And this is how the senses fittingly receive from material things and the intellect from the senses, while the intellect does not receive directly from material things. And thus we cannot hold that the separated soul receives knowledge from material things. Nor is it sufficient to posit in it only knowledge that was received from the senses when it was in the body, on account of the souls of children who die in their mothers’ wombs, which have not received knowledge from the senses. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod sicut angelus habet apud se formas innatas causarum ordinis universi, ita et anima a sui creatione; sed dum est in corpore, a corpore opprimitur, ut illis formis uti non possit ad intelligendum; sed utitur formis quas a sensu accipit, vel etiam ipsis formis innatis, secundum quosdam qui posuerunt quod addiscere non est aliud quam reminisci; sed postquam a corpore fuerit separata, utetur illis formis innatis. Sed illud contradicit sententiae Philosophi, qui dicit intellectum humanum esse sicut tabulam in qua nihil est scriptum: contradicit etiam experientiae, qua experimur nos nihil posse intelligere, nisi ex praeacceptis a sensu ad intelligendum manuducamur. Nec esset probabile quod, cum anima naturaliter corpori uniatur, totaliter impediretur per conjunctionem ad corpus, ut formis innatis uti posset. Sed hoc consonum videretur opinioni illorum qui posuerunt animam ante corpus creatam, et postea corpori accidentaliter conjunctam: non enim ea quae uni et eidem naturaliter insunt, ita se habent, quod unum eorum totaliter impediat alterum; alias in natura aliquid esset otiosum. And thus others say that just as an angel has with it the innate forms of the causes of the order of the universe, so too does the soul from its creation, but while it is in the body it is oppressed by the body such that it cannot use these forms for understanding. Rather, it uses the forms that it receives from the senses or even the innate forms themselves, according to those who believed that learning was nothing other than remembering. But after the soul is separated from the body, it will use the innate forms. But this contradicts the opinion of the Philosopher, who says that the human intellect is like a slate on which nothing is written. It also contradicts the experience we have of not being able to understand anything unless we are gently led from what we have already received from the senses to understanding. Nor would it be probable that, since the soul is naturally united to the body, it would be totally impeded by being joined to the body from using the innate forms. But this would seem to agree with the opinion of those who held that the soul is created before the body and later joined to the body in an incidental way. For things that are naturally in one and the same thing are not related such that one of them totally impedes the other. Otherwise, there would be something useless in nature. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod anima in sui creatione nullas habet formas concreatas: nec ad hoc quod post separationem a corpore intelligat, requiruntur aliquae formae a rebus acceptae vel tunc vel prius; sed intelliget, de naturali cognitione loquendo, per influentiam a substantiis superioribus, Deo, scilicet, vel angelis; et loquor de naturali influentia; et hoc sic patet. Intellectus enim noster est medius inter substantias intelligibiles et res corporales; unde anima intellectiva dicitur esse creata in orizonte aeternitatis, in libro de Causis; et hoc ideo quia ipsa per intellectum attingit ad substantias intelligibiles; inquantum vero est actus corporis, contingit res corporales. Omne autem medium quanto magis appropinquat uni extremorum, tanto magis recedit ab alio; et quanto magis recedit ab uno, tanto magis alteri appropinquat. Unde cum anima nostra in statu viae maxime ad corpus accedat, utpote actus ejus existens; non habet respectum ad res intelligibiles nisi aliquo modo contingendo corpus; et propter hoc anima in statu hujus viae non recipit influentiam a superioribus substantiis, nisi ut cognoscat sub speciebus a sensibus acceptis; unde Dionysius dicit, quod non est possibile nobis in hac vita aliter superlucere divinum radium, nisi cum varietate sensibilium formarum: et ideo etiam in hac vita quanto anima magis a corpore abstrahitur: tanto magis a substantiis spiritualibus influxum cognitionis recipit; et inde est quod quaedam occulta cognoscunt in dormiendo, et in excessu mentis, quando anima a corporis sensibus abstrahitur; unde cum actu erit a corpore separata, erit paratissima ad recipiendum influentiam a substantiis superioribus, scilicet Deo vel angelis; et sic per hujusmodi influentiam cognitionem habebit majorem, vel minorem secundum modum naturalis capacitatis ipsius animae: et sic etiam Commentator, qui ponit intellectum possibilem esse substantiam separatam, quamvis in hoc erret; tamen quantum ad hoc recte dicit quod ex hoc quod ponitur substantia separata, habet respectum ad alias substantias spirituales superiores ut eas intelligat; sed secundum illum respectum quo comparatur ad nostrum corpus recipiendo species a phantasmatibus, non conjungitur substantiis altioribus. And thus we should say instead, that the soul at its creation has no concrete forms and for it to understand after separation from the body no forms received from things are required either then or before. Rather, it will understand, speaking of natural knowledge, through an inpouring from higher substances, namely God or angels. And I am speaking of a natural inpouring, as is clear in the following way: Our intellect is a mean between intelligible substances and corporeal things. This is why in the Book of Causes the intellective soul is said to be created on the horizon of eternity. And it says this because the soul attains to intelligible substances through the intellect, while as the act of the body it comes into contact with corporeal things. Now in the case of every mean, the more it approaches one of the extremes, the more it withdraws from the other. And the more it withdraws from one, the more it approaches the other. Therefore, since our soul in the wayfaring state is closest to the body, being its act, it only relates to intelligible things by some bodily contact. And for this reason the soul in the wayfaring state does not receive an influence from higher substances unless it knows under species received from the senses. This is why Dionysius says that it is not possible for a ray of the divine light to shine upon us in this life other than with a variety of sensible forms. And thus, even in this life, the more the soul is withdrawn from the body, the more it receives an influx of knowledge from spiritual substances. And this is how people know certain hidden things when sleeping and in mental transport, when the soul is withdrawn from the body’s senses. For this reason when the soul will actually be separated from the body, it will be most ready to receive an inpouring from separated substances, namely God or angels. And so by this influence it will have greater or less knowledge according to the mode of the soul’s natural capacity. And so, too, the Commentator, who claims that the potential intellect is a separated substance, though he errs in this, is right when he says that what is posited as being a separated substance is related to other higher spiritual substances such that it understands them. But it is not joined to higher substances in respect to the way it is related to our body in receiving species from phantasms. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de actu intellectus quo nunc in via intelligimus, abstrahendo a phantasmatibus: hic enim actus esse desinit, phantasmatibus destructis, in separatione animae a corpore. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the act of the intellect whereby we understand now in the wayfaring state, by abstracting from phantasms. For this act ceases when phantasms are destroyed in the soul’s separation from the body. Ad secundum dicendum, quod intelligere, secundum quod exit ab intellectu, non est actio communis animae et corpori (non enim intellectus intelligit mediante aliquo organo corporali), sed est communis animae et corpori ex parte objecti, inquantum intelligimus abstrahendo a phantasmatibus, quae sunt in organo corporali; et hunc modum intelligendi anima separata non habet. Reply Obj. 2: Understanding, insofar as it proceeds from the intellect, is not an action common to the soul and body (for the intellect does not understand by the mediation of a bodily organ). Rather, it is common to soul and body on the part of the object, inasmuch as we understand by abstracting from phantasms, which are in a bodily organ. And this is the mode of understanding not possessed by the separated soul. Ad tertium dicendum, quod passivus intellectus, de quo Philosophus loquitur, non est intellectus possibilis, sed ratio particularis, quae dicitur vis cogitativa, habens determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis, ut Commentator ibidem dicit; et sine hoc anima nihil modo intelligit; intelliget autem in futuro, quando a phantasmatibus abstrahere non indigebit. Reply Obj. 3: The passive intellect of which the Philosopher is speaking is not the potential intellect but instead the particular reason, which is called the cogitative power, which has a determinate organ in the body, namely a small medial segment in the head, as the Commentator says on the same passage. And without this the soul cannot understand anything. But it will understand in the future when it will not need to abstract from phantasms. Ad quartum dicendum, quod comparatio illa intelligitur de anima intellectiva ex parte illa qua corpori conjungitur, et non prout est intellectiva simpliciter: quia intellectus, inquantum hujusmodi, non respicit phantasmata, sicut patet de intellectu angelico. Reply Obj. 4: This relationship is understood of the intellective soul on the part of its being joined to the body, not as intellective simply. For the intellect as such does not have to do with phantasms, as is seen in the case of the angelic intellect. Ad quintum dicendum, quod anima habet esse perfectius in corpore quam separata, inquantum est forma, non autem inquantum est intellectus; nisi forte conjungatur tali corpori quod est omnino animae subditum, in nullo intellectum distrahens, sicut erit corpus gloriosum: corpus enim quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena habitatio sensum multa cogitantem: sapientiae 9, 15. Reply Obj. 5: The soul has more perfect being in the body than separated inasmuch as it is a form, not inasmuch as it is an intellect, unless perhaps it is joined to the sort of body that is completely subject to the soul, drawing the intellect away in no respect, as will be the case with the glorious body: a perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthy tent burdens the thoughtful mind (Wis 9:15). Ad sextum dicendum, quod animae puerorum quamvis non habeant formas innatas vel acquisitas, habebunt tamen aliquas formas intelligibiles ex influentia divini luminis, cooperante ministerio angelorum. Reply Obj. 6: The souls of children, though they do not have innate or acquired forms, will have some intelligible forms from the inpouring of the divine light with the cooperation of the angels’ ministry. Ad septimum dicendum, quod anima ex hoc quod in corpore scientis perfecta fuit, etiam separata magis intelliget, ut infra dicetur: non tamen sequitur quod, si non fuerit in scientia perfecta, nullo modo intelligat. Reply Obj. 7: From the fact that the soul was perfect in the body of the knower it will also understand more when separated, as will be said below. It does not follow, however, that if it was not perfect in knowledge it will not understand at all. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum possit intelligere per species quas a sensibus accepit, dum corpori esset juncta Whether it can understand through the species that it received from the senses when it was joined to the body Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima per species quas nunc a corpore abstrahit, separata postmodum per eas nihil intelligat. Hujusmodi enim species ejusdem rationis erunt in anima separata cujus modo sunt. Sed nunc per eas non potest anima intelligere sine phantasmatibus: quod patet ex hoc quod laeso organo phantasiae anima impeditur in consideratione eorum quae prius a sensu accepit. Ergo nec anima separata per illas species intelligere poterit, cum in ea nulla phantasmata sint. Obj. 1: To the second question, we proceed thus. It seems that the soul, after separation, will not understand anything through the species that it now abstracts from the body. For such species will have the same character in the separated soul as they have now. But now the soul cannot understand through them without phantasms, as is clear from the fact that if the organ of the imagination is harmed, the soul is impeded in the consideration of things that it previously received from the senses. Therefore, neither will the separated soul be able to understand through these species, since there will be no phantasms in it. Praeterea, ex similibus actibus similes habitus relinquuntur. Sed habitus scientiae nunc acquirimus ex actu intelligendi, quo anima a phantasmatibus abstrahit. Ergo habitus scientiae acquisitae non inclinat nisi in similes actus. Cum ergo talis actus intelligendi non possit esse in anima separata, scilicet accipiendo a phantasmatibus; videtur quod per scientiam hic acquisitam, vel per species hic a sensibus acceptas, anima separata nihil intelligat. Obj. 2: Similar habits are left by similar acts. But we now acquire habits of knowledge from the act of understanding by which the soul abstracts from phantasms. Therefore, a habit of acquired knowledge only inclines to similar acts. Therefore since in the separated soul there cannot be an act of understanding of this sort, namely by receiving from phantasms, it seems that the separated soul cannot understand anything through knowledge acquired here or through species received from the senses here. Praeterea, in operibus naturae nihil est superfluum; nec natura facit per duo quod per unum facere potest. Sed anima separata poterit intelligere per influentiam a substantiis superioribus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non intelliget per aliquas species a sensibus acceptas. Obj. 3: In the works of nature nothing is superfluous, nor does nature do through two things what it can do through one. But the separated soul will be able to understand through an inpouring from higher substances, as said above. Therefore, it will not understand through any species received from the senses. Praeterea, impossibile est duas formas ejusdem speciei esse in eodem subjecto. Sed anima separata recipiet aliquas formas intelligibiles ex influentia substantiae superioris, per quas poterit res intelligere. Ergo in ipsa non possunt remanere intelligibiles formae earumdem rerum a sensibus acceptae. Obj. 4: It is impossible for there to be two forms of the same species in the same subject. But the separated soul will receive some intelligible forms from the influence of a higher substance, through which it will be able to understand. Therefore, intelligible forms of the same things received from the senses cannot remain in it. Praeterea, ex hoc intellectus noster actu intelligit quod forma intelligibilis in eo existit. Ergo postquam destitit actu intelligere, forma intelligibilis in eo non remanet; et sic videtur quod non remaneant in anima separata aliquae formae intelligibiles a sensibus acceptae, per quas intelligere possit. Obj. 5: Our intellect actually understands from the fact of that the intelligible forms exist in it. Therefore, after it has ceased actually understanding the intelligible form does not remain in it. And so it seems that no intelligible forms received from the senses, through which it can understand, remain in the separated soul. Praeterea, considerare illud cujus scientiam aliquis prius accepit, videtur ad memoriam vel reminiscentiam pertinere. Sed destructo corpore, anima non reminiscitur, ut dicit Philosophus in 1 et 3 de Anima. Anima ergo separata non intelligit per species in hac vita a sensibus acceptas. Obj. 6: For someone to consider what he previously came to know seems to pertain to memory or recollection. But when the body is destroyed the soul has no recollection, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 1 and 3. Therefore, the separated soul does not understand through species received from the senses in this life. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, quod anima est locus specierum; et loquitur de parte intellectiva. Sed locus conservat locatum. Ergo species a sensibus acceptae in intellectiva conservantur; et sic videtur quod per eas possit intelligere anima separata a corpore, sicut et nunc potest. On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says that the soul is the place of species, speaking of the intellective part. But a place keeps what is located in the place. Therefore, species received from the senses are preserved in the intellective part. And so it seems that through them the soul can understand when separated from the body just as it can now. Praeterea, finis remanet remotis etiam his quae sunt ad finem. Sed sensus ordinatur ad cognitionem animae intellectivae sicut ad finem, inquantum ex sensibus cognitionem accipit. Ergo cognitio quam anima accipit a sensibus, remanet in ea etiam destructis sensibus corporis; quod erit cum anima fuerit a corpore separata. Furthermore (2), the end remains even when what is directed toward the end is withdrawn. But the senses are ordered to the knowledge of the intellective soul as to an end, inasmuch as it receives knowledge from the senses. Therefore, the knowledge that the soul receives from the senses remains in it even when the body’s senses have been destroyed, as will be the case when the soul has been separated from the body. Praeterea, quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sed anima est incorruptibilis et perpetua. Ergo quod in ea recipitur, recipitur ut perpetuo conservabile in ipsa; ergo species intelligibiles quas a sensibus accipit, remanent in ea post separationem a corpore. Frustra autem remanerent, nisi per eas intelligeret formas prius a sensibus acceptas. Furthermore (3), what is received in something is received in it after the mode of the receiver. But the soul is incorruptible and perpetual. Therefore, what is received in it is received as able to be preserved perpetually in it. Therefore, intelligible species that it receives from the senses remain in it after separation from the body. But they would remain in vain if through them it did not understand forms previously received from the senses. Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex est opinio. I answer that, concerning this there are two opinions.