Quaestiuncula 3 Quaestiuncula 3 Ulterius. Videtur quod intentio vel voluntas non requiratur in baptizato. Baptismus enim contra peccatum originale datur. Sed peccatum originale praeter voluntatem et intentionem contrahitur. Ergo intentio et voluntas non requiruntur ad baptismum in baptizando. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that the intention or the will is not required in the one baptized. For baptism is given against original sin. But original sin is contracted without will or intention. Therefore, intention and will in the one to be baptized are not required for baptism. Praeterea, pueri, dormientes et amentes possunt baptizari, ut supra, dist. 4, quaest. 3, art. 1, quaestiunc. 2 et 3, dictum est. Sed illi carent intentione baptismi. Ergo ad baptismum non requiritur intentio ex parte baptizandi. Obj. 2: Furthermore, children, sleeping persons, and the mentally disabled can be baptized, as was said above in Distinction 4, Question 3, Article 1, Subquestions 2 and 3. But they all lack the intention of baptism. Therefore, for baptism intention is not required on the part of the one being baptized. Praeterea, unaquaeque res per eadem corrumpitur et fit, contrarie tamen facta, ut dicitur in 2 Ethic. Si ergo intentione baptizandi fieret baptismus, tunc intentione ipsius character baptismalis deleri posset; quod falsum est. Obj. 3: Furthermore, any thing may be corrupted by the same things that made it, just acting in the opposite way, as is said in the Ethics 2. Therefore, if by the intention of the one being baptized baptism was done, then the baptismal character could be erased by his intention as well, which is false. Sed contra, in baptismo fit quoddam spirituale connubium animae ad Deum. Sed in conjugio requiritur consensus. Ergo et in baptismo. On the contrary (1), in baptism a certain spiritual wedding takes place of the soul to God. But in marriage, consent is required. Therefore, also in baptism. Praeterea, baptismi effectus magis impeditur ex parte baptizati quam ex parte baptizantis: quia malitia baptizantis non impedit receptionem gratiae in baptismo, quae impediri potest per malitiam recipientis sacramentum. Sed defectus intentionis ex parte baptizantis impedit sacramentum. Ergo multo fortius defectus intentionis ex parte baptizati. Furthermore (2), baptism’s effect is impeded more on the part of the one being baptized than on the part of the one baptizing, for the wickedness of the one baptizing does not impede the reception of grace in baptism, but it can be impeded by the wickedness of the one receiving the sacrament. But a defect of intention on the part of the one baptizing impedes the sacrament. Therefore, much more would a defect of intention on the part of the baptized. Quaestiuncula 1 Response to Quaestiuncula 1 Respondeo dicendum, ad primam quaestionem, quod cum unius effectus una sit causa, si ex aliquibus pluribus causis unus effectus procedat, oportet quod illae causae sint aliquo modo factae unum ad invicem. Ad effectum autem sacramenti videmus multa concurrere; scilicet ministrum, formam verborum, et materiam. Haec autem non possunt colligari ad invicem ut sint una causa, nisi per intentionem baptizantis, qui scilicet formam ad materiam applicat, suum vero ministerium ad utrumque, et totum hoc ad sacramenti collationem; et ideo requiritur intentio baptizantis. Et similiter etiam in omnibus aliis sacramentis requiritur intentio ministri cum debita materia et forma, non solum ad effectum sacramenti consequendum, sed ad sacramenti perceptionem. To the first question, I answer that since a single effect has a single cause, if a single effect proceeds from several causes, it is necessary that those causes be in some way made one with each other. Now for a sacrament’s effect we see that many things must concur; namely, the minister, the form of the words, and the matter. However, these things cannot be united into one cause except by the intention of the one baptizing, who actually applies the form to the matter, and indeed his own ministry to both, and all this pertains to the conferral of the sacrament. And thus the intention of the one baptizing is required. And likewise, in all the other sacraments also the intention of the minister is required with the due matter and form, not only for bringing about the sacrament’s effect, but for receiving the sacrament. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod duplex est instrumentum, scilicet animatum, ut servus, et inanimatum ut securis, ut dicitur in 8 Ethic. In instrumento igitur inanimato non requiritur intentio propria, quia ipsa inclinatio instrumenti ad effectum per motum principalis agentis, locum intentionis supplet; sed in instrumento animato, quod non tantum agitur, sed aliquo modo agit, utpote per imperium agens, et non per impulsum motus, requiritur intentio exequendi ministerium ad quod applicatum est. Reply Obj. 1: As it says in the Ethics 8, there are two kinds of instruments, namely, animate, like a slave, and inanimate, like an axe. Therefore, a proper intention is not required in an inanimate instrument, for the instrument’s very inclination to the effect by the motion of the principal agent takes the place of an intention. But in an animate instrument, which is not only used but acts in some way, namely acting by a command, and not moved by a force, intention is required to exercise the ministry to which it is applied. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad hoc dupliciter secundum diversas opiniones respondetur. Quidam enim dicunt, quod si desit mentalis intentio in baptizante, non confert sacramentum baptismi; tamen in adulto supplet fides et devotio effectum baptismi, ut periculum ex hoc baptizato, qui ignorat intentionem baptizantis, nullum proveniat. Si autem sit puer, creditur pie, quod summus sacerdos, scilicet Deus, defectum suppleat, et salutem ei conferat. Si tamen non facit, non injuste facit, sicut nec in illo qui sacramento non subjicitur. Alii dicunt, quod in baptismo et in aliis sacramentis quae habent in forma actum exercitum, non requiritur mentalis intentio, sed sufficit expressio intentionis per verba ab ecclesia instituta; et ideo si forma servatur, nec aliquid exterius dicitur quod intentionem contrariam exprimat, baptizatus est. Non enim sine causa in sacramentis necessitatis, scilicet baptismo, et quibusdam aliis, actus baptizantis tam solicite expressus est ad intentionis expressionem. Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways of answering this according to different opinions. For some people say that if mental intention is lacking in the one baptizing, he does not confer the sacrament of baptism; however, in an adult, faith and devotion can supply the effect of baptism, so that danger from this would not affect the one baptized who did not know the intention of the one baptizing. But if it were a child, it is piously believed that the highest priest, namely, God, would supply the defect, and confer on him salvation. Nevertheless, if he does not do this, he does not act unjustly, just as neither does he act unjustly in someone who is not subjected to the sacrament. Other people say that in baptism and in the other sacraments that have in their form the act exercised, a mental intention is not required but the expression of the intention by the words instituted by the Church suffices. And thus if the form is preserved, and nothing is said outwardly that expresses a contrary intention, the person is baptized. For not without reason in the sacraments of necessity, namely, baptism, and certain others, is the act of the one baptizing expressed so carefully for the expression of the intention. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis actu ebrius intentionem habere non possit, tamen ebriosus potest esse non actu ebrius, et intentionem baptizandi habens, baptizare. Reply Obj. 3: Although someone who is drunk cannot have an actual intention, nevertheless a drunk can be sober at a certain moment, and baptize having the intention of baptizing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis minister sacramenti debeat niti ad custodiendum cor suum quantum potest, ut maxime in verbis sacramentalis formae intentionem habeat actualem; quia tamen cogitatio est valde labilis, etiam si tunc non adsit actualis intentio quando verba profert, dummodo prius intenderit, et contraria intentio non intervenerit, sacramentum non impeditur: quia operatur tunc in vi principalis intentionis. Non enim oportet quod in opere semper intentio conjungatur in actu, sed sufficit quod opus ab intentione procedat. Reply Obj. 4: Although the minister of the sacrament may have to struggle to guard his own heart as much as he can, so that he actually has the intention of the form as much as possible in the sacramental words, nevertheless, since thought is so distractible, even if the actual intention is not present at the moment when he utters the words, as long as he intended it before, and no contrary intention has occurred in the meantime, the sacrament is not impeded; for it works at that moment by the force of the principal intention. For it is not necessary that in a work the intention is always actually joined to it, but it suffices that the work proceeds from the intention. Quaestiuncula 2 Response to Quaestiuncula 2 Ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod rectum est cujus medium non exit ab extremis. Sacramentum autem baptismi est quo mediante acquiritur effectus baptismi in anima baptizati; unde tunc est recta intentio quando baptizans seu baptizatus sacramentum ordinat ad effectum sacramenti, qui est salus. To the second question, it should be said that something is “right” or “straight” when its middle does not depart from the end points. Now the sacrament of baptism stands in the middle between the effect of baptism and the baptized soul aquiring the effect; hence the intention is “right” or “straight” when the one baptizing or the one baptized orders the sacrament to the effect of baptism, which is salvation. Si ergo intentio adsit in baptizante, quia intendit sacramentum conferre; sed desit rectitudo, quia ordinat sacramentum ad finem indebitum; non propter hoc in recipiente impeditur perceptio sacramenti, quia ad hoc fertur intentio baptizantis; neque effectus sacramenti, quia mundatio interior a ministro non est, unde ejus intentio ad hoc nihil facit. Si autem in baptizato sit intentio percipiendi sacramentum, sed desit rectitudo intentionis, recipit quidem quod intendit sacramentum, sed non rem sacramenti: quia obicem per pravam intentionem Spiritui Sancto ponit. Therefore, if the intention is present in the one baptizing, for he does intend to confer the sacrament, but rectitude is lacking, because he orders the sacrament to an undue end, this does not impede the sacrament’s reception in the one receiving it, for the one baptizing intends the sacrament’s reception. Nor does it impede the sacrament’s effect, for interior cleansing does not come from the minister, and thus his intention does nothing toward this. But if in the baptized there were the intention of receiving the sacrament, but rectitude of intention were lacking, he would indeed receive the sacrament he intends, but not the reality of the sacrament: for he places an obstacle to the Holy Spirit by his wicked intention. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis ad sacramentum requiratur intentio faciendi quod facit ecclesia, non tamen requiritur quasi de necessitate sacramenti existens, facere quod facit ecclesia propter hoc quod ecclesia facit: et in hoc consistit rectitudo intentionis. Reply Obj. 1: Although the intention of doing what the Church does is required for the sacrament, nevertheless it is not required as being necessary for the sacrament that one does what the Church does for the reason that the Church does it: and this is what rectitude of intention consists in. Ad secundum dicendum, quod baptismus non habet bonitatem ex ministro, sicut alia operatio voluntaria habet bonitatem ex operante; et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 2: Baptism does not have goodness from its minister in the way that other operations of the will have goodness from the one doing them; and thus it is not the same. Quaestiuncula 3 Response to Quaestiuncula 3 Ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod in baptismo baptizatus duo recipit, scilicet sacramentum, et rem sacramenti; sed ad haec duo recipienda non requiritur aliquid causans ex parte recipientis, sed solum impedimentum removens: quod quidem impedimentum nihil aliud est quam voluntas contraria alteri praedictorum; et ideo in adultis et in habentibus usum rationis, in quibus potest esse contraria voluntas actu vel habitu, requiritur et contritio; sive devotio, ad percipiendam rem sacramenti, et intentio, vel voluntas ad recipiendum sacramentum; in pueris autem absque utroque percipitur et sacramentum et res sacramenti; et similiter est in carentibus usu rationis, nisi contraria voluntas habitu insit, etsi non actu. To the third question, it should be said that in baptism a baptized person receives two things, namely, the sacrament and the reality behind the sacrament. But to receive these two things, nothing is required on the part of the one receiving baptism that would cause them, but only the removal of the impediment, which is nothing other than a will contrary to one of the things mentioned. And thus, among adults and those having the use of reason, in whom a contrary will can exist either actually or habitually, baptism requires contrition or devotion, to receive the reality behind the sacrament; as well as intention or will, to receive the sacrament. But among children lacking in either one, both the sacrament and the reality are received; and likewise among those lacking the use of reason, unless there is a will to the contrary in them habitually, even if not actually. Tamen sciendum, quod non requiritur in adulto voluntas absoluta suscipiendi quod ecclesia confert, sed sufficit voluntas conditionata, sicut est in voluntariis mixtis, ut dicitur in 3 Ethic.; et ideo si sit coactio sufficiens, ita quod principium sit ex toto extra, nil conferente vim passo, ut cum aliquis reclamans immergitur violenter, tunc talis nec sacramentum suscipit, nec rem sacramenti. Si autem sit coactio inducens, sicut minis vel flagellis, ita quod baptizatus potius eligat baptismum suscipere quam talia pati; tunc suscipit sacramentum, sed non rem sacramenti. Nevertheless, it should be known that an absolute will to receive what the Church confers is not required in an adult, but it is enough to will it conditionally, as happens in matters of mixed willing, which is discussed in the Ethics 3; and thus if it is completely forced, such that its principle is completely external, with the one undergoing it contributing nothing, as when someone is violently dunked while crying out in protest, that person receives neither the sacrament nor the reality behind it. But if it is compelling inducement, as with threats or beating, such that the baptized chooses to receive baptism rather than suffer such things, then he does receive the sacrament, but not the reality behind it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intentio vel voluntas in baptizato, ut dictum est, non requiritur quasi causans deletionem culpae originalis, sed solum quasi removens prohibens, scilicet contrariam voluntatem. Reply Obj. 1: Intention or willing in the baptized, as was said, is not required as something causing the effacement of original sin, but only as something removing what prevents it, namely, a contrary will. Ad secundum dicendum, quod in pueris non potest esse contraria voluntas neque actu neque habitu; et ideo non requiritur voluntas vel intentio in eis, qua prohibens removeatur. In amentibus autem et dormientibus potest esse voluntas contraria habitualis, quamvis non sit actualis; et ideo si ante somnum vel furiam fuerunt contrariae voluntatis, non recipiunt sacramentum, quia adhuc illa voluntas habitualiter manet. Si autem habuerunt propositum recipiendi baptismum, et hoc per aliqua signa innotuit, tunc in articulo necessitatis debet eis conferri baptismus; et suscipiunt sacramentum et rem sacramenti, etiam si furiosus tunc contradicat: quia illa contradictio non procedit a voluntate rationis, secundum quam est capax baptismalis gratiae. Si autem necessitas non sit, debet in furiosis expectari lucidum intervallum, vel in dormientibus vigilia. Si tamen baptizetur in statu illo, sacramentum suscipit, quamvis peccet baptizans. Reply Obj. 2: Among children there cannot be a contrary will either actually or habitually; and thus in them neither willing nor intention is required for any impediment to be removed. But among those mentally disabled or asleep there can be a habitual contrary will, although it may not be actual; and thus if before they fell asleep or lost their wits they were of contrary will, they do not receive the sacrament, for that will remains habitually afterward. But if they had planned to receive baptism, and made this known through some kind of sign, then emergency baptism should be conferred on them, and they receive both the sacrament and the reality behind it, even if they should speak against it in their mental illness: for that contradiction does not proceed from their rational will, by which they are capable of baptismal grace. But if there is no necessity, a lucid interval should be waited for in the mentally ill, and waking in the ones sleeping. But if someone should be baptized in that state, he does receive the sacrament, although the one baptizing him sins. Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas vel intentio baptismum suscipiendi non requiritur ad baptismum quasi causa vel dispositio characteris, sed solum sicut removens prohibens: ideo ratio non valet. Reply Obj. 3: The will or intention to receive baptism is not required for baptism as a cause or disposition to the character, but only as removing what prevents it; therefore the argument does not hold. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum requiratur fides Whether faith is required for baptism Quaestiuncula 1 Quaestiuncula 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in baptizato fides requiratur ad hoc quod sacramentum suscipiat. Baptismus enim sacramentum fidei dicitur. Sed nonnisi propter fidem recipientis ipsum. Ergo requiritur fides baptizandi. Obj. 1: To the third question we proceed thus. It seems that in baptism faith is required for one to receive the sacrament. For baptism is called the sacrament of faith. But this would only be on account of the faith of the person receiving it. Therefore, faith is required in the person to be baptized. Praeterea, Marc. ult. 16, dicitur: qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit. Ergo videtur quod requiritur in adulto quod credat ad hoc quod baptizetur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is said, whoever believes and is baptized (Mark 16:16). Therefore, it seems that it is required in an adult that he believe in order to be baptized. Praeterea, fides essentialior est sacramento quam voluntas. Sed voluntas requiritur, ut dictum est. Ergo multo amplius fides. Obj. 3: Furthermore, faith is more essential to the sacrament than will. But will is required, as has been said. Therefore, faith is required much more. Sed contra, adulti non sunt pejoris conditionis quam pueri. Sed in pueris sufficit fides ecclesiae ad baptismum, et non requiritur fides personae illius. Ergo nec in adultis. On the contrary (4), adults are not in a worse condition than children. Yet among children the faith of the Church suffices for baptism, and the faith of the person himself is not required. Therefore, neither is it required in adults. Praeterea, caritas propinquior est ad gratiam quam fides: quia caritas non potest esse sine gratia sicut fides. Sed non requiritur caritas in recipiente baptismum, quia sic nullus adultus de novo acciperet ibi gratiam. Ergo non requiritur fides. Furthermore (5), charity is closer to grace than faith is, since charity cannot exist without grace, as faith can. But charity is not required in the one receiving baptism, since then no adult would receive grace again then. Therefore, faith is not required there. Quaestiuncula 2 Quaestiuncula 2 Ulterius. Videtur quod requiratur fides in baptizante. Requiritur enim in baptizante intentio conferendi sacramentum. Sed infidelis quantum ad articulum baptismi non credit sacramentum baptismi. Ergo non potest intendere conferre illud, et ita non potest baptizare. Obj. 1: Moreover, it seems that faith is required in the one baptizing. For the intention of conferring the sacrament is required in the one baptizing. But an unbeliever does not believe in the sacrament of baptism as far as the article of the Creed goes. Therefore, he cannot intend to confer it, and thus he cannot baptize. Praeterea, baptismus est sacramentum ecclesiae. Sed fides est per quam membra ecclesiae primo ad invicem uniuntur. Ergo qui non habet fidem, nec potest baptizare, cum non sit de ecclesia. Obj. 2: Furthermore, baptism is a sacrament of the Church. But faith is how members of the Church are first united with each other. Therefore, anyone who has no faith cannot baptize, since he is not of the Church. Praeterea, propinquius se habet ad baptismum baptizans quam offerens puerum ad baptizandum. Sed in offerente requiritur fides, quia respondet, credo. Ergo multo fortius requiritur in baptizante. Obj. 3: Furthermore, the person baptizing is more closely related to baptism than the one offering the child to be baptized. But faith is required in the one offering, for he is the one who answers, I believe. Therefore, much more is it required in the one baptizing. Sed contra est quod in littera determinatur quod haeretici verum baptismum conferunt. Haeretici autem infideles sunt. Ergo, etc. On the contrary, it is determined in the text that heretics confer valid baptism. But heretics are unbelievers. Therefore, etc.